During the 1870s to 1930, anxieties about the racial and national identity of Argentina was demonstrated in its racist immigration policies. Despite Argentina’s generally open borders, its immigration policies were deeply concerned with the global phenomenon of eugenics, of “race improvement.” Argentina supported European immigration and the nation’s elites used discourse that supported this “whitening” of the Argentine racial identity to “absorb” the lower races.

Yet, economic theories and histories of immigration in Argentina completely lack discussion of the racist discourse that characterized immigration. Instead, the three books characterize European immigration in Argentina as beneficial for the Argentine economy. While the books take into consideration negative externalities behind immigration in general, these arguments pertain mostly to economic factors. Are the economic arguments turning a blind eye to the racism inherent in the immigration policy or do they simply not see it as relevant?

Development cycles, political regimes and international migration: Argentina in the twentieth century by Andrés Solimano gives a brief history of Argentine immigration in the context of Argentina’s role in the world economy during the twentieth century. The book characterizes European immigration though economics: “International migration is like a barometer of economic conditions in home countries with respect to the rest of the world” (DC 7). Solimano argues that European immigration occurred at a widespread rate because of the the good economic conditions and the perception of opportunities of the resource-rich, labor-scarce country (DC 17). In a self-sustaining cycle, the massive immigration created further economic prosperity and expanding opportunities (DC 17). Solimano considers purely economic factors without consideration of social and racial dynamics when discussing immigration causes and effects, though racial identities were and continue to be economic identities.

Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, authors of The Economics of Immigration, also look at positive economic effects of immigration, arguing that immigrants increase the demand and supply curves of labor, as they are both consumers and workers (EI 419). Therefore, the authors argue that immigrants increase the size of the economy, “stimulating more specialization and exchange, economies of scale, and profit from innovation” (EI 252). While negative externalities of immigrants include their “demand of a share of ‘the commons’ in destination countries,” the book concludes that immigrants generally do not consume as many public services as natives (EI 419). Bodvarsson and Van den Berg state that a holistic approach towards immigration is crucial, and they consider economic and sociological theories (EI 422). Though the authors consider political or religious conditions as influencing immigration policy, they stop short of racial policies.

The third book, Immigration Worldwide by Segal, Elliott, and Mayadas highlights certain patterns when it comes to the history of migration in the world. First, the book explores causes or incentives of migration including the push from countries of origin and pulls from destination countries: “The ‘push’ out of the country often emerges from its internal conditions and intensifies with the personal circumstances of individuals. The ‘pull’ to another country or region works in tandem with the ‘push’ from the home country. In the absence of all dissatisfaction in the country of origin, the likelihood that individuals will move is practically nonexistent” (IW 7).  The authors explore negative factors in countries of origin and positive ones in destination countries that go beyond purely economic factors. Yet, they do not explore the racial pulls from Argentina supporting European immigration.

All three books explore the idea that immigrants are self-selected and therefore more likely to be risk-taking, entrepreneurial, innovative and of higher socioeconomic backgrounds than average members of their countries of origin. Segal, Elliott, and Mayadas argue that this is the case because “immigrants must have the resources” and certain skills, whether they be emotional or economic, to make the journey and adapt (IW 7). The books argue that this self-selection of immigrants contributed to the economic growth of Argentina during the period of mass migration from Europe. However, Argentine elites saw immigrants specifically from Europe as beneficial to the economy because they were white and because this racial identity was also an economic one associated with productivity and with being ahead in the world economy.

Therefore, the fact that all three books which consider immigration in the economic trajectories do not even allude to the racial motivations and tensions behind Argentine immigration policy is problematic. Yes, European immigration helped the Argentine economy grow at the same time it was racist. Perhaps the economic books ignore race because their analyses would reinforce the racist economic categories of the time.  However, without discussion of the racial discourse surrounding the economic policy of immigration, the books leave the relationship up to the readership’s imagination and confusion. The scholarship on immigration seems so fragmented, and therefore economic historians have deemed race as not relevant in the economic effects of immigration. Likewise, few historians on racial policy deem economics as relevant. This cleavage between these academic sectors needs to be sewn together.

Bibliography

Bodvarsson, Örn B. and Van den Berg, Hendrik. The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy. New York and London: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. PDF e-book.

Immigration Worldwide: Policies, Practices, and Trends. Edited by Uma A. Segal, Doreen Elliott, and Nazneen S. Mayadas. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Solimano, Andrés. Development cycles, political regimes and international migration:Argentina in the twentieth century. Translated by CEPAL. Santiago: United Nations, 2003. PDF

The factors leading to Germany’s remarkable recovery and growth during the post-World War II era have been widely debated by historians. Some suggest it was the effect of the Marshall Plan, while others suggest that Germans were just an industrious people. Volker R. Berghahn’s The Americanisation of West German Industry analyzes America’s impact in changing German industrial structure and culture over four decades. On the other hand, in his book The West German Economy 1945-1955, Alan Kramer suggests that it was Germany’s preconditions for growth that enabled it to catch up and return to its previous economic capacity. More recently, James Van Hook’s Rebuilding Germany suggests that beyond Western influences and German economic conditions, German leaders were able to effect policies and economic conditions that propelled the German economy towards rapid growth.

Berghahn’s analysis focuses on the U.S.’ influence on German industrial development. He suggests that while West Germany initially resisted the American economic model, it was worked into German industry over time. He attributes this resistance to the continuity in German industrial leadership, an older generation leadership that supported concentration and cartelization, from the Nazi-era to the postwar era. By not thoroughly denazifying German industrial leadership, America actually slowed down Germany’s Americanization. However, Berghahn suggests that it was America’s influence that ultimately turned German away from its wartime autarkic tendencies towards oligopolies and freer trade. While they all agreed that cartels and monopolies would be eliminated, America (and Britain and France) had differing opinions of how deconcentrated industries should be. As Britain slowly relinquished power over the American-British zone, the Americans began to take a greater lead, shaping German industry to best suit America’s Cold War interests (AWGI 87-97). Yet, Berghahn admits that there were limits to American influence. Beyond the deconcentration of the steel, coal, and banking industries, other industries faced “no more than marginal restructuring…[leading to] a plateau…from which the reconcentration of West German industry could be initiated” (AWGI 110). Berghahn then demonstrates that only when locals promoted aspects of the American model, such as Erhard’s support of market competition, the American ideology was able to take root in German policy.

Kramer’s The West German Economy reads like a textbook, using facts and figures on production, capital, and finances to provide an overview of Germany’s economic recovery. He suggests that Germany grew rapidly, but only to catch up to its prewar growth trajectory. Germany took advantage of three preconditions for growth: the presence of a large capital stock, the availability of skilled labor, and pro-growth policies promoted by the American and British occupational governments. Even though Germany appeared to be devastated by the war bombings, the Allies found it was the transport and communications infrastructure that was destroyed, not the core of German industrial capacity. Kramer explains that Germany’s capital, such as machinery, buildings, and vehicles, was at least 20 percent higher in May 1945 compared to 1936 (WGE 17). Germany built up its industrial capacity during the war, so increasing its peacetime output required shifting from armament to peacetime production. The training workers received for wartime production also increased Germany’s human capital, ready to be directed towards peacetime production. Kramer emphasizes that this human capital was supplemented by the influx of immigrant refugees from the East, who were generally skilled or motivated to work towards a better life in the West (WGE 222-223). Finally, the British and American push for lighter reparations and provision of financial assistance enabled Germany to jumpstart its economy. Kramer emphasizes that increasing tensions between the West and East in the Cold War increased the West’s willingness to rebuild and reintegrate Germany’s economy. In particular, the Korean War caused a shortage in wartime necessities, increasing the West’s demand for German industrial output.

In his book Rebuilding Germany, Van Hook focuses more on the political dynamics that shaped the German recovery. His central thesis is that despite the presence and influence of the occupational governments, the Germans had a degree of autonomy in negotiating and determining their economic policy. He documents the shifts in politics that eventually led to Ludwig Erhard serving as director of the economic council in the American-British zone. Van Hook suggests that the success of the currency reform of 1948 with the simultaneous elimination of many price controls jumpstarted Germany’s recovery. While this success was boosted by completion of the transportation and power infrastructure by Erhard’s predecessor Johannes Semler, financial support from the Marshall Plan, and the Americans and British’ desire for Germans to take initiative to rectify their own economy, Van Hook argues that “only Erhard dared [to eliminate price controls] decisively and in conjunction with the long-awaited currency reform” (RG 142). He praises Erhard’s role in negotiating the Investment Aid Law of 1952 and Anti-Cartel Law of 1957, countering critics’ assertions that Erhard veered from free-market ideology in his leniency towards industrial power and centralization in those statutes. Alternatively, Van Hook suggests that by directing investment in a “market-conforming” way and outlawing cartels, Erhard did what he could to temper the actions of his market-planning opponents.

I argue that although the occupation powers had a degree of influence in West Germany, their presence and involvement in local affairs was not what fueled German economic growth. Even German knowledge of Americanization was not the catalyst for growth. While Erhard may have learned about American ideas through his advisers or own experiences studying American industries, he consciously chose to pursue similar anti-cartel and free trade policies for Germany, while resisting American pressure to return to “corporatist forms of organization” (RG 192). Thus, it was the preconditions (which included occupation powers’ financial support), the right leadership, and market-oriented economic policies that worked in tandem to generate Germany’s rapid economic growth.

Bibliography

 Berghahn, V. R. The Americanisation of West German Industry. Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Berg, 1986.

Hook, James C. Van. Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945-1957. First Edition edition. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Kramer, Alan. West German Economy, 1945-1955. Bloomsbury Academic, 1991.

Western Germany’s economic rebound after the Second World War was extremely impressive and many even call it an economic miracle. There are many scholarly perspectives on how Germany accomplished such economic growth. The three main explanations for Germany’s quick recovery and growth are Erhard’s social market economy and abolishment of prices, the United States’ Marshall Plan, and the opportune timing of other global events happening after 1945 that allowed for Germany to export its machinery, which Germany had excess capacity from the war.

In Van Hook’s Rebuilding Germany, the author offers insights from Germany’s postwar economic system He emphasizes a lot on German Economics minister Ludwig Erhard’s critical role in rebuilding Germany through introducing the social market economy in 1948 and creating competition through his trade and investments policies. Erhard wanted to dismantle the control economy that was inherited from the Nazis and replace it with a genuine competitive system (Stunde Null or zero hour) (RG 141). In this case, the economic miracle was not really a miracle, because the free market would naturally bring in free international trade, competition, and monetary stability. This also led to increased productivity, raised real wages, and raised the living standards of average Western Germans (RG3).

When Erhard moved Germany towards the social market economy, it is also important to note the international and structure context. Erhard succeeded Johannes Semler, who had rebuilt transportation and power infrastructure in Germany and Germany received benefits from the Marshall Plan for recovery (RG 141). Nevertheless, Erhard still played an important role. Through the Anticartel law of 1957, his government extended the free market by exposing West Germany industry to international markets by reducing tariffs, creating private markets, and instilling competition (RG 293). Additionally, Erhard resisted pressures from the Americans, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the use of Keynesian planning to combat unemployment crisis. Instead, he supported the Investment law of 1952 to overcome industrial bottlenecks in the heavy industries. Erhard wanted solutions that involved the least government intervention that would still create a private capital market (RG 294).

Maier and Bischof looked at Germany’s recovery from the framework of The Marshall Plan in The Marshall Plan and Germany. The book presented two major opposing critiques of the Marshall Plan. One of the critics is Werner Abelshauser who believes that Western German recovery was fine without the Marshall Plan. Abelshauser claims that the Marshall Plan was public relations: “Do good and let everyone know about it” (TMPG368)! Abelshauser justified by saying at the second year of the Marshall Plan, economic aid to Europe remained below the planned amount and France, Austria, and the Netherlands received more total per capital aid than Germany (TMPG 389). Abelshauser argues even though Germany was battered with transportation and production bottleneck and weakened by hunger, it was not underdeveloped.

Conversely, Knut Borchardt and Christoph Buchheim believe that the American funds cleared critical bottlenecks and offered partial solutions to the capital shortage and the problem of re-directing the available investment capital to areas of the greatest need. More importantly, bottleneck traced back to shortage of capital. (TMPG 415). The Marshall Plan helped supply raw materials, which was essential for the revival of the textile industry. There was a coal shortage and the counterpart funds helped finance and expand electricity for public consumption (TMPG 433). Moreover, the American initiative helped reinvigorate animal spirits and contributed to psychological buoyancy for generating investments (TMPG 365-366).

Contrasting Borchardt and Buchheim, in Mainsprings of the German Revival, Wallich believes that Germany’s industries and losses were easily made up. He did not think it was a great problem to rebuild a textile machinery industry and believed the amount of war damage was overrated too. Instead, he argues that “Though dismantling did hurt in many places, it often led to the replacement of an old plant by one of the latest design and to an increase in Germany’s power to compete”(MGR 7). While Wallich credits Marshall Plan and other policies like currency reforms, increase of employment, increase of trade and investments, capital-output ratio, savings ratio, he also brings new interesting points about other ongoing events in the world that helped Germany’s economy.

The 1950-1951 Korean War, or the Korea boom, helped Germany’s economy revive because there was demand for German goods and machinery, and this significantly helped Germany’s export industries. German industries specialized in machinery and other capital equipment and Germany had excess capacity for the things that were most in demand (MGR 87). Although Wallich does not state it explicitly, he seems to suggest that Western Germany had preconditions for economic growth from the war that allowed Germany to be in an advantageous situation during this time. Furthermore, Wallich brings the example of entrepreneurs and businessmen that were active and politically powerful, and how they continued to focus on technology and technological inventiveness (MGR 337).

Although the authors present contrasting theories on which aspects contributed most to Germany’s recovery from WWII, it is at least consensual that there were many reasons and channels for Germany to rebound and that Germany was headed in a positive economic direction.

Bibliography:
Maier, Charles S., and Günter Bischof. The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program.  New York: Berg, 1991.
Van Hook, James C. Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945-1957.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Wallich, Henry C. Mainsprings of the German Revival. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.

by Jasmyne Keimig

I decided to focus on West Germany in the immediate postwar period and investigate the economic arguments that political parties/groups had from the end of WWII through the fifties. The first book I read was Modern Germany: Society, economy, and politics in the Twentieth Century by V.R. Berghahn. Broadly speaking, Berghahn discusses Germany society, economy, and politics in the twentieth century (as the title would imply…), but for the purposes of this book review I honed in on his analysis of postwar reconstruction in Germany. Within that context, Berghahn focuses a lot on the broader processes of construction of West and East Germany and emphasizes the role that America and the Soviet Union played in shaping the fractured German state. The Americans were huge proponents of the Open Door theory of free market trade in West Germany. Their eventual hope was to implement a liberal representative democracy in their zone of occupation and actively encourage competitive American style capitalism (B 183). In order to set both of those processes in motion, West Germany could not engage in most of their interwar economic practices, like protective tariffs, cartels, centralized planning, and nationalism. (B 185). The Allies, and especially the Americans, would not endorse any radical restructuring of underlying power structures, especially if it brushed near socialization or redistribution of property. (B 191-192). For Berghahn, Stalin and the Cold War loomed especially large in the eyes of the Americans responsible for moving the West German economy forward.

The second book I read was Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany 1918-1963 by A.J. Nicholls. Nicholls had a “people” based as opposed to structure-based approach to the economic theories and forces at work in postwar Germany. In particular, he focuses on Ludwig Erhard (FRG Economics Minister 1949-63, Federal Chancellor 1963-66) and the decisions he made during this period. The most compelling and in-depth idea throughout the book is the theory of the social market economy in Germany.  Nicholls defines the social market economy coined and developed by Alfred Müller-Armack in 1946, as being “the third form of economic system” between laissez-faire and collectivism, a liberal market economy  “steered in a socially acceptable direction.” (N 142-143). By socially acceptable he meant overcoming “unhealthy inequalities of wealth” through taxation, family alliances, and rent assistance for the needy. (144) At the time, the implementation of the theory itself was quite controversial, but was reluctantly taken up by the Free Democratic Party (FDP),  though Nicholls notes the party did not take the social aspect seriously until the sixties (N 150). The author believed that Müller-Armack’s theory hit just the right note for the collectivist and Communist averse, yet extremely socially aware, post-war West Germany.

The third and final book in my short reading list was A Nazi Legacy: Right-Wing Extremism in Post War Germany by Rand C. Lewis. Upon closer reading and reflection, I think this book was not the best choice for this book review because I think it reflected my desire to study radical thought in this context than prominence of said thought in this context. That being said it was not my intention at all to keep associating Germans with Nazism (some stereotypes never die), but I suppose my inclination to include this book on my reading list was to see how the change in leadership and ideology in the immediate aftermath of the war affected those who were complicit (that’s a big word) in Hitler’s regime. Actually, Berghahn talks a lot about the nightmare of de-Nazification in Germany and how if it were thoroughly and completely done, there would not be administrative support or knowledge within German bureaucracy to have a somewhat functioning government (B 187). Anyway, Lewis writes about how this ineffectual method of rooting out Nazi sympathizers within Germany led to the rise of radical right-wing parties with the government (L 38). However, Germany was still quite war-weary and despite some sympathy for some radical right ideology, by and large, right-wing efforts to retake Germany were virtually nonexistent.

Both of the first two books discuss and outline the conflict of interests in postwar West Germany. There was a desire to dispel Communist and collectivist ideals, but, in light of the immense devastation the war wrought on the country, a sense of also rebuilding social and community ties. Both books mention the rise and growing strength of the social market economy, but situate it differently. Berghahn turns to America’s wants and wishes while Nicholls emphasizes the man behind the theory. What I found interesting about the theory + power of the social market economy is that it tries to create a system of (relatively) ethical consumption and production under capitalism.  But as we approach neoliberal theory in class, and in light of our conversation about planning re: democracy, I feel very conflicted about economic “middle-ground” theories between capitalism and socialism. I think this conversation is still relative today, and going forward, I hope that we can look critically at neoliberal ideals and implementation.

Bibliography

Berghahn, V.R. Modern Germany: Society, economy, and politics in the twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Lewis, Rand C. A Nazi Legacy: Right-Wing Extremism in Postwar Germany. New York: Praeger, 1991.

Nicholls, A.J. Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany 1918-1963. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Many studies on globalization in modern China are predicated on the basis that the nation’s economic development was a product of foreign influence during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is contention amongst scholars regarding the nature of external competition over and influence in the Chinese polity. Historian Robert Bickers argues that foreign intervention permitted political actors in control of regional and provincial administrations to quickly accrue both capital and coercion. Others, such as scholars Rune Svarverud, and Sherman Cochran have produced work that offer alternative narratives for the study of identifying the roots of Chinese economic development by not uniquely focusing on the European powers.  Examining existing literature and criticism regarding Chinese economic development during this time period is necessary not only to understand the effects of foreign encroachment, but also to recognize its broader implications for understanding the foundations for the later development of a centralized, sovereign Chinese state.

Robert Bicker’s Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire analyzes and recounts the massacres, treaties and ‘incidents’ that led to what is known as A Century of Humiliation in a linear fashion (Scramble for China 4-5). As noted in Jeffrey Friedan’s book Global Capitalism, “China had been one of the most tortured victims of Western imperialism.” (Global Capitalism 308) Bicker’s intent is to reveal the unfair advantages imposed upon the nation following the Opium Wars. He does so by sensationalizing a wide range of primary sources including newspaper articles and anecdotes of foreign encroachment in order to get the message across as to how far Western powers went.

Although Bicker’s account might appear to offer a revision of conventional narratives, at times he constructs a passive-victim image of the Chinese people as having been overtaken forcibly and thereby denying their agency (SC 77-85.) Playing along the Eurocentric trope of victimizing the “East” was a questionable facet when reading the book. After all, if foreign forces were so powerful, how and why did much of the Chinese polity avert collapse into several mandates?

Conversely, Svarverud’s International Law as a World Order in Late Imperial China argues that the need to reform and build a legal system that would support economic growth and integrate with the world order did not commence until after 1895 (International Law as a World Order in Late Imperial China 163). China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War raised the prospect that both legal and economic reform would secure stronger links between the two. The book offers a rich understanding of Chinese law, providing both the external and internal observer’s perspectives. Svarverud asserts that China’s delayed entry into the world order occurred because of Chinese and European officials hostility towards the introduction of international law (ILWOLIC 91). Svarverud cites the French chargé d’affaires M. Klecskowsky stating in the year 1900, “Who is this man who is going to give the Chinese an insight into our European international law? Kill him– choke him off; he’ll make us endless trouble (ILWOLIC 91).” Although Svarverud’s book particularly serves foreign readers who seek to understand China’s legal developments during the late Qing, he also warns of historical traps and encourages a comprehensive study of foreign legal institutions and theories (ILWOLIC 1).

Sherman Cochran’s Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia argues Chinese businessmen were not just ciphers upon which Western merchants projected their ideas, but instead decisive agents in their own right (Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia 2.) Cochran has organized his book topically within a chronological framework in which he presents case studies of the development of five Chinese firms in the pharmaceutical industry, demonstrating how they established commodity empires within China and Southeast Asia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The striking capability of pharmaceutical entrepreneurs to adapt to changing operational environments did not stop with foreign concessions nor the military invasion and occupation of China by Japan (CMM 135-141). Cochran’s account exemplifies a new mode of historical scholarship that leaves behind Eurocentric inquiries of expansion and convergence in favor of a historical narrative of global conjunctures and interconnections. Cochran rightly informs us that global historical scholarship has to broaden its perspective and to take into account these “agents of consumer culture” in order to fully understand the connection between consumerism and globalization (CMM, 3.)  However, Cochran could have gone into more detail discussing his definition of consumer culture, particularly as it was being constructed and developed through the early twentieth century by Chinese businessmen in China.  Such a charge does not belie Cochran’s overall thesis; it simply elucidates the complexity of the subject. Nevertheless, Cochran succeeds in his goal of restoring agency to the Chinese pharmaceutical entrepreneurs and how they adjusted to dramatic changes in Chinese society and foreign affairs.

Bickers, Robert A. The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914. London: Allen Lane, 2011.

Cochran, Sherman. Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Friedan, Jeffry. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007.

Svarverud, Rune. International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

The signing of the Treaty between Ireland and Great Britain on December 6th, 1921 has been, and remains to be the subject of endless political scrutiny. The Treaty agreement resulted in the division of the island of Ireland into the twenty six counties of the “Free State” (now the Republic of Ireland) and the six counties of Northern Ireland which to this day, remain under British rule. Much of the debate on the signing of the Treaty has been concentrated on the decision by Eamonn de Valera, the President of Dail Eireann at the time to distance himself from the Treaty negotiations in London and instead, send his Finance Minister Michael Collins to negotiate the future of Ireland. Not only did the result of Michael Collins’ negotiations physically divide Ireland in two, it also divided the society of the newly independent Irish Free State into those who accepted the terms of the Treaty and those who vehemently opposed them. Interestingly, Eamonn de Valera fell into the latter category; he became a staunch opponent of the Treaty despite having chosen not to be part of its negotiation. Arguably, the Treaty was the pivotal event that shaped the culture, society, politics and economics of Ireland as we know it today. To that end, I will discuss three books that look at how the signing of the Treaty affected Ireland from an economic perspective.

In considering the post-Treaty economy of the Free State in his book “Ireland: A New Economic History” Cormac O’Grada, notes that in the wake of ratification of the Treaty, the government of Fianna Fail adopted a protectionist attitude towards new industries and “sought to reserve the domestic market for Irish capital”(CO’D 407.) The Fianna Fail government were committed to ensuring the success of Ireland’s infant industries and thus implemented an economic strategy that embraced the creation of tariffs (CO’D 406, 407.) Furthermore, the Control of Manufacturers Act was subsequently set up to legislate against foreign businessmen being able to find a way around the tariffs by building ‘tariff factories” in the new Free State (CO’D, 407.) However, O’Grada argues that this favoritism towards protectionism was entirely problematic for the success of the Irish economy. He notes that “policies of creating employment through protection and of protecting Irish capitalists through the Control of Manufacturers Acts were in conflict” (CO’D, 407.) O’Grada makes the point that what the Irish economy actually needed most was foreign direct investment; the very thing they were protecting themselves against (CO’D, 407, 408.)

In direct contrast to Cormac O’Grada, David Fitzpatrick in his book “Two Irelands 1912-1939” laments the existing economic connections between Ireland and Britain following the ratification of the Treaty. Fitzpatrick argues that despite the fact that “constitutional leaders” thought that the implementation of the Treaty would bring Ireland economic freedom from Britain, the Free State was still very much reliant economically on Britain even after it broke free from its governance  in 1921(DF, 26.) In fact in the aftermath of the ratification of the Treaty, England still “supplied four-fifths of [Ireland’s] imports and received almost all of its exports…”  (DF, 112.) Fitzpatrick further notes the irony of the fact that the large amount of emigrants from Ireland (due to unemployment) faced only Britain as an option to move to because the United States had placed a quota on the amount of immigrants it would accept (DF, 115.) Thus he finds that “National freedom had brought [Ireland] no economic transformation or marked material betterment…” or indeed economic autonomy from Britain (DF, 114.) Essentially, Fitzpatrick argues that Ireland was still heavily reliant on Britain economically.

Thomas Bartlett provides yet a third hypothesis on the post-Treaty economic state of Ireland in his book “Ireland.” Bartlett argues that the economy of Ireland’s new Free State was very much shaped by the previous colonial institutions set up by Britain. Thus he posits that the social and economic shape that the new Irish Free State took on was a product of the institutions set up by Britain prior to independence. In support of this, he notes that “there was almost no area of government, law, education, or social policy that did not bear the stamp of the former [British] rulers” (TB, 420.) Bartlett observes that the Irish government thought that there was no need to do anything  to help the economy because the freedom of the Republic would automatically lead Ireland to prosperity (TB, 424, 425.) Because of this, Bartlett argues that any success gained by the Irish economy post-Treaty was a result of the prior institutional foundations of the British.

These three authors each provide unique and interesting perspectives on how the economy of the newly independent Ireland was shaped after the signing of the Treaty. Of the three books, the most intriguing is Cormac O’Grada’s due to his exceptional attention to detail.

Bartlett, Thomas. Ireland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Fitzpatrick, David. The Two Irelands 1912-1939. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1998.

O’Grada, Cormac. Ireland: A New Economic History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Today, Norway, Sweden and Denmark are lauded for their social welfare programs. Each nation consistently ranks among the highest in terms of literacy levels, life expectancy, overall quality of life and happiness. However, there is another side to these welfare systems, from eugenics- and anti-immigration-driven programs to the very adaptability of the economic system itself, that sees little investigation. Three works, Alternatives for Welfare Policy, by Torben M. Andersen and Per Molander, Eugenics and the Welfare State, by Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen and Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State by Grete Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund, seek to shed light on the darker aspects of the Scandinavian social welfare state, breaking the pattern of more revisionist scholarship.

Broberg and Roll-Hansen begin Eugenics and the Welfare State by challenging the role that strong central planning played in population control. Eugenics-based programs arrived long before 1940, and the Nazi regime did little to influence any of the Scandinavian policies (EWS, 6-7). By the early 1920s all three nations had both marriage laws and legislation allowing for the sterilization of criminals or other “degenerates”. Out of these “reform eugenics” of the early 20th century, the legalized practice of sterilization became a form of conservative birth control, linked to progressive causes like social improvement and the prevention of sexual crimes(EWS, 260).

The history of eugenics raises questions regarding the links between science, politics, population policies and the rights of the individual. It was not until after World War II that each nation slowly phased the practices from use, and prior to the rise of National Socialism, the very notion of eugenics in social policy raised few questions. Simply put, the use of Eugenics was “a continuation of the enlightenment view of… social and economic  planning based on science” as the “motor of social progress” (EWS, 270). As the notion of Social Welfare was also, arguably, a product of Enlightened ideas, the practice of forced sterilization proved a valuable tool in maintaining the health and homogeneity of the population.

In a similar vein, Grete Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund pose the question of the legitimacy and the longevity of the homogeneous welfare state in their work, Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State. The entire premise of the Scandinavian welfare state operates under the assumptions that high employment serves to both “finance welfare and reduce public spending” (IPSWS, 5), and that the system is universal for all citizens. Thus, those living within as non-citizens are seen as taking advantage of the very system that, through exclusive and poor multicultural policy, prevents their inclusion into Scandinavian society (IPSWS, 4).

Due to the fact that Scandinavia opened its boarders to immigrants in the late 1960s and early 1970s, provisions for a multicultural society were not written into the modern welfare state that was created in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Recent surveys show the Scandinavian nations at the bottom of the spectrum in terms of immigrant integration into the workforce, as well as an increase in multicultural conflicts (IPSWS, 229). In all three countries, immigrants have become a “social problem”, straining the precarious balance of population, participation and taxation that keeps the system afloat (IPSWS, 237, 130).

Immigration integration is similarly critiqued in Torben M. Andersen’ and Per Molander’s Alternatives for Welfare Policy. There is fear that a cycle has developed, in that the universality of the welfare systems makes Scandinavia a “welfare magnate”, but also causes a sort of “wealth-drain”, wherein successful citizens chose to leave in order to escape the rising taxes (AWP, 101). This cyclical trouble, is, as Andersen and Molander argue, the product of the conflict between rigid policies necessitated by the state and the increasingly globalized nature of Scandinavia.

With their entrance into the OECD, as well as Denmark’s entrance into the European Union, the closed borders that perpetuated the success of the welfare state were challenged by internationalism, increased immigration and conflicting EU and global policy (AWP, 347). While Anderson and Molander evaluate the status of the welfare state through more empirical data than historical analysis, the numbers do not lie. The Scandinavian nations face a steep climb to remain economically prosperous due to the number of social programs they currently provide to a changing population demographic. No longer homogeneous, and with a rapidly aging workforce, the longevity of the true universal Scandinavian system is being called into question.

While the quality of living in Scandinavia today remains high, the history of the universal welfare state is not without its dark marks. With globalization and changing demographics putting increasing amounts of pressure on the three systems, the economic health of the three nations is in jeopardy. The carefully-worded history of a homogenous Scandinavia is also being challenged, as it whitewashes the state’s role in birth control, race control and anti-immigration sentiment. These three texts shed light on potential answers to the main issues, immigration, integration and economic longevity, that Scandinavia faces today, they also differ from popular discourse that praises the Social Welfare state as a model of progress and modernity.

Works:

Andersen, Torben M. and Per Molander, ed. Alternatives for Welfare Policy: Coping with Internationalism and Demographic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Broberg, Gunnar and Nils Roll-Hansen, ed. Eugenics and the Welfare State: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2005.

Brochmann, Grete and Anniken Hagelund, ed. Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State, 1945-2010. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. E-Book Edition.

The extent of British intervention in Egypt has been a source of some contention within academic communities, with regards to the motivations behind it.  Did their presence serve a political purpose?  Or was the drive of economic imperialism the most powerful motivator?  Examination of work on the subject reveals a variety of argued rationales comprised of political and economic incentives.  Channeling Mobilities by Valeska Huber, Gladstone’s Imperialism by Robert T. Harrison, and Ends of British Imperialism by Wm. Roger Louis all combat this topic and offer their own takes on why the British Empire was inspired to assert control within Egypt.

Channeling Mobilities focuses on an investigation of the opening of transportation through Egypt with the construction of the Suez Canal and its opening in 1869.  Huber highlights the economic, political, and social impacts of British control in the region, which relied upon the increased access allowed by the newly constructed Canal.   Despite initial opposition, the British relented to the Canal’s implementation as the potential benefits became clear.  Huber makes the argument that colonial expansion during the mid-late nineteenth century increased the need for increased communication, which could be provided by the waterway (CM 29).  Both politically and economically, this increased in communication speeds benefitted Great Britain, as the extensive empire required the constant exchange of information to function efficiently.  In turn, British control of Port Said to the North served as an important connection between the mainland and her holdings throughout Asia and the Pacific (CM 82).  From this position, the empire exerted economic control and projected political power throughout the region making a presence necessary for the maintenance of effective control.  Huber makes this point through the examination of troop movements through the Canal Zone, particularly during the course of the First World War (CM 72).  This represented a further projection of British political influence throughout the international community, as well the protection of economic interests abroad.

Robert T. Harrison’s work, Gladstone’s Imperialism, largely addresses the political intentions behind British intervention.  Rather than the direct importance of Egypt to the empire, British intervention facilitated the protection of interests in India, the “Jewel of the Empire,” serving as a “lifeline” (GI 52).  Harrison highlights the upheaval brought by Arabi’s nationalist revolt in 1879, which opposed the foreign presence of British and French interests in the Canal Zone (GI 5).   The increasing political radicalism of era threatened the established link between Britain and India through Port Said and challenged the established political order of European dominion.  Harrison argues that it was in British political interests to increase intervention in the region, as it was morally necessary to “[save] Egypt for liberty and from anarchy” (GI 111).  This narrative of political freedom for the Egyptian people appears to have been a common theme throughout the later nineteenth century, particularly following the nationalist upheaval.  The political language of freedom and the preservation of liberty, however, served to camouflage the economic interests of bondholder’s in the Suez Canal Company, many of whom were British (GI 76).  To this end, the language of righteous political intervention still served economic goals for the empire as a whole and individual investors in the Canal project.

In comparison to both Harrison and Huber, in Ends of British Imperialism, Wm. Roger Louis examines the collapse of the British Empire in the mid-twentieth century and the ensuing Suez Crisis in 1956.  While the timeline has progressed almost a full century, the motivations behind British intervention do not vary greatly from those of the 1880s.  Louis operates under the assumption that the empire served to support Britain economically, and the transportation provided by the Canal served as an important cog in that machine (EBI 29).  Prompted by Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956, the British moved to protect the loss of important economic interests, which had persisted beyond the formal dissolution of empire, as well as the financial importance of the Company itself (EBI 478).  The significant variance in this incident, however, was the presence of Cold War political tensions.  The revival of Arab nationalism, reminiscent of Arabi in the previous century, concerned the Western powers in the face of increasing Soviet influence and the instability it brought (EBI 482).  Nasser himself was viewed as a loose cannon in the international order, as an influential member of the Third World and his attempts to remain free of influence from either sphere (EBI 649).  Louis juxtaposes these political concerns with economic arguments framing the Canal’s nationalization as “theft,” highlighting the continued synchronicity of political and economic aims (EBI 653).

While these three works ultimately deal with two different instances of intervention in Egypt, they produce a rather coherent narrative of justification.  Economic necessity or benefit appears to inhabit the primary role, but frequently employs elements of political reasoning to validate action.  These themes do vary in strength, but they also transcend temporal barriers.

Works:

Harrison, Robert T. Gladstone’s Imperialism in Egypt: Techniques of Domination. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995.

Huber, Valeska. Channelling Mobilities: Migration and Globalisation in the Suez Canal Region and Beyond, 1869 – 1914. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Louis, Wm. Roger. Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Between 1870-1935, Germany alternated between supporting free trade and turning insular, shifting drastically between different economic policies. Germany’s stance towards free trade was largely shaped by the politicians in power— the political goals of Germany’s leaders overshadowed economic goals of efficiency and growth. Beginning in the late 1870’s, German leaders abandoned liberalism in favor of protectionist and autarkic policies.

The unification of Germany under the Second Reich strengthened economic ties between previously independent German states, encouraged free trade, and propelled Germany into participation in the world economy, where she rose to dominance in steel production and established a worldwide reputation as a leader in the electrical and chemical industries. However, the German leadership would soon reverse its stance towards free trade when the German heavy industries and agriculture faced competitive threats. Farmers and industrialists united against the bankers, finished goods industries, and the export sector in an alliance now known as “the marriage of iron and rye,” opposing free trade in favor of protection for agriculture and heavy industry. The German government shifted its policies again when facing a forced autarky during World War I, adopting a policy of “war socialism.” She commandeered her economy and regulated consumption, eventually rationing food, raw materials, and manpower to extend the life of her resources. After losing the war, post-war reparations further crippled Germany’s economy, slowed her recovery, and diminished her future capacity to pay while hyperinflation destabilized the economy. After the U.S. finally took leadership in the global economy by sponsoring the Dawes and Young Plans, Germany was able to quickly rebuild. Within six to seven years, her industries returned to their pre-war positions as leaders of the chemical, electrical, and optical industries; her exports returned to prewar levels by 1926. However, soon after, the consequences of the Great Depression drove the Nationalist Socialists into power, and Germany shifted its economic policies once again, returning to a planned economy with fixed prices and regulated foreign trade.

Despite the consequences of the German leadership’s political endeavors, Germany’s leading industries established Germany as a global industrial power and returned her to economic leadership and integration, even after facing the disruptions and consequences of a world war.

In my paper I mostly focused on Lenin and the major economic policies he brought into being during his time as head of the Soviet government. Lenin instituted what was known as War Communism from 1918-1921. Essentially, War Communism replaced the market economy of the tsar with socialist allocations of goods and services. The Bolshevik government wanted to “…provide basis for radically different relationships between men out of which a higher form of existence will arise.” And in the Marxist context this meant self-realization, an end to man’s alienated existence. Lenin’s economic plan was to implement socially organized production for use, directly, by the community. This generally meant forced labor and famine and the collapse of Russia’s exports.

In 1921, Lenin established the New Economic Policy (NEP )to combat the failings of War Communism and turn the socialist republic more capitalist in order to grow its industry and production. Under NEP, the state wanted to limit the import of consumer goods. Grain and livestock became the most important export—thus tying the foreign trade sector with government policy towards peasants and agriculture. While Soviets cautiously opening up their borders to foreign trade was good in a free market/capitalist sense, by the end of the NEP, exports were only at about 40 percent of the 1913 level.

Despite the failures of Marxist socialist economic policies at home, there was still significant economic interaction between the Soviet Union and foreign governments. The Leninists and Bolsheviks saw themselves as being a part of a global world order—a global proletariat. While actual economic policy was highly regulated by the state, theoretically, their union was part of a much greater scheme of revolutionary movement. All of their economic policy was aimed at mobilizing a global proletariat. This position in the world economic order will certainly shape the Soviet Union’s relations with other European powers later in the century.