Is Inflation a Global Phenomenon?

The persistence of inflation at relatively low rates despite years of monetary stimulus has led to wide-ranging investigations into its determinants. Traditionally the rate of inflation has been linked via a Phillips curve relationship to domestic factors, such as slack in the labor market. But is there also a global element?

Maurice Obstfeld, who has returned to UC-Berkeley from his post as chief economist at the International Monetary Field, examines some of the mechanisms by which global factors could affect U.S. inflation in a new National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, “Global Dimensions of U.S. Monetary Policy.” He reviews the evidence on the Phillips curve, and reports that there is little evidence that globalization has had a direct impact on the response of wages to unemployment. An indirect linkage, however, may exist through labor’s lower share of GDP, which could respond to foreign factors such as global supply chains. There may also be a relationship through the correlation of import prices and Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation.

Another mechanism is based in the linkages of U.S. financial markets with those abroad. If these markets are integrated, then the natural rate of interest (r*) depends on foreign savings and investment as well as the domestic counterparts. An increase in foreign savings will lower the global r* which will stimulate domestic spending. Former Federal Reserve Board Chair Ben Bernanke claimed that this effect the cause of the housing boom in the U.S. that led to the global financial crisis.

Obstfeld points out this financial linkage is intensified by the status of the U.S. dollar as a safe asset and as a reserve currency. He also cites the special role of the U.S. currency as an invoice currency for international trade and a vehicle currency for cross-border lending. Consequently, actions taken to affect domestic spending have significant spillover effects.

Kristin Forbes of MIT also examined the role of global factors in the determination of prices in her Bank for International Settlements working paper, “Has Globalization Changed the Inflation Process?” In this analysis she uses three methodologies: principal components, the Phillips curve and trend-cycle decomposition. In the principal component investigation she looks at inflation in 43 advanced economies and emerging market countries from 1990 through 2017. She reports that 40% of the total variance in CPI inflation is explained by one common principal component. Moreover, this global component of CPI inflation has increased over time. On the other hand, the common component of core inflation (a measurement of inflation without volatile food and energy costs) is smaller and has fallen.

In the Phillips curve analysis, she includes changes in the real exchange rate, the world output gap, changes in oil and other commodity prices, and world producer price dispersion, with the domestic variables. The results for CPI inflation indicate that the foreign variables are significant in explaining inflation. The results for core inflation, however, do not show the same pattern of responses.

When Forbes tests the stability of the coefficients over time, she finds that the global output gap and world commodity prices, which were insignificant in the determination of CPI inflation at the beginning of the sample period, were significant during the period that began in 2007. But these changes are not seen when the measure of inflation is core inflation. As a further test, she compares the predicted changes in CPI and core inflation in regressions using the full set of variables and others with only the domestic variables. The results indicate that the models using the full set of coefficients do better in predicting both inflation rates than the domestic alternatives.

Finally, Forbes utilizes a “trend-cycle” approach that separates inflation into a persistent trend component and a cyclical component. She calculates these components of CPI and core inflation, and then investigates how the trend component and the variables in the Phillips curve analysis affect cyclical inflation. As in the Phillips curve results, she reports that most of the global variables are significant in the regressions for CPI inflation, but not core inflation. She also finds that there was a change in these relationships over time. But when she uses trend inflation as the dependent variable, she finds that the global variables are less significant, even with CPI trend inflation.

Forbes concludes that the evidence she has presented show that global variables should not be considered as ancillary in models of inflation dynamics. Moreover, these dynamics are evolving. Changes in the world output gap and commodity prices now have an impact on CPI inflation that was not evident before the most recent period. Whether or not they will continue to do so is a topic for future research.

Obstfeld’s and Forbes’ results pose a challenge for monetary policymakers. If it is difficult to formulate policies based on domestic economic conditions, it is even more so with foreign factors. This challenge is exacerbated by the constraints on central bank actions due to the current low levels of interest rates. Coordination among central bankers could provide some assistance, but it comes with its own limitations.

Even if the Trump administration is successful in scaling back the trade and financial ties of the U.S. with the rest of the world, inflation will continue to possess a global dimension. The cross-border integration of markets will not be reversed, and domestic prices will respond to foreign shocks. Central bankers are expected to avert another slowdown,  but their ability to maneuver the economy has become more constrained.

Conference on “Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Policies”

A conference on “Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Policies: Recent Developments” will be held on December 2-3, 2019, at City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. The conference is organized by the Global Research Unit, Department of Economics & Finance, City University of Hong Kong; the Center for Analytical Finance, University of California, Santa Cruz; and the Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrück University, Germany.

About the Conference

In the globalized economy, countries have to deal with an increasing interlinkage between exchange rate movements and macroeconomic policies. For instance, domestic interest rate policies, targeted to combat inflation, have repercussions via the exchange rate on the current account and capital flows. Parity conditions that need to hold in the short or the longer term are the theoretical conduits through which exchange rates exert their influence on an open economy. The use of exchange rate policies to enhance competitiveness can have unintended side effects; especially, when debts are denominated in foreign currencies. Furthermore, the choice of exchange rate regime may limit the range of instruments available to manage the economy. Under certain circumstances, exchange rate arrangements can trigger speculative flows and constitute a threat to financial stability.

The prolonged recession and low interest rate environment triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis have rekindled discussions of exchange rate determination and the roles of exchange rates as a source of economic instability, or as an effective policy tool. The objective of this conference is to take stock of the latest research on exchange rates and macroeconomic policies 10 years after the crisis, and to provide a forum for academics and practitioners to share the latest research results on topics, which include but are not limited to:

– Advances in exchange rate economics
– Puzzles in international financial markets
– Conventional and unconventional policies
– Macroprudential policies and foreign currency borrowing
– Capital flows and capital flight
– Exchange rate policies/regimes
– Global financial system, global cycles, and global re-balancing

Those interested in participating should send a complete paper or an extended abstract in WORD or PDF format via email to gruhkg@cityu.edu.hk by August 22, 2019. Authors of accepted papers will be notified by September 15, 2019.

Final versions of the accepted papers will be posted on the conference website (http://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/ef/conference/2019_IEER). Presenters may apply for financial support to cover economy class airfare and local accommodation expenses.

See the conference website for more information:

http://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/ef/conference/2019_IEER

The Change in the U.S. Direct Investment Position

The U.S. has long held an external balance sheet that is comprised of foreign equity assets, mainly in the form of direct investment (DI), and liabilities held abroad primarily in the form of debt, including U.S. Treasury securities. This composition is known as “long equity, short debt.” Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas of UC-Berkeley and Hélène Rey of the London Business School claim that this allocation has allowed the U.S. to serve as the “world’s venture capitalist,” issuing short-term debt in order to invest in high-yield assets. But the U.S. direct investment position has changed from a surplus to a deficit, with uncertain consequences for the international monetary system.

There is more than one reason for the change. To see this, it is important to understand that the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, which reports these data, uses several methods to value direct investment. One of these utilizes stock market prices to calculate the market values of the assets and liabilities. The second method is the use of the historical costs of the investments when they were made. The third is the current, or replacement, costs of the direct investment assets and liabilities.

Direct investment includes equity and debt instruments. The latter is based on intra-company borrowing. Historically, the equity component has registered a net positive position that outweighed the negative debt position. But the net direct investment equity position, which had been falling for several years, plunged in late 2017. The falloff continued in 2018 and led to a negative balance, which combined with the negative net direct investment debt position, turned the overall net direct investment balance negative.

What was the cause of the dropoff in direct investment equity? An examination of the assets and liabilities based on their market value shows both falling, with the decline in asset values outweighing a fall in the value of liabilities. These drops are based in large part on last year’s domestic and foreign stock market declines.

But an examination of the assets and liabilities valued at historic costs reveals that there was also a decline in direct investment assets. This fallback is due to the repatriation of earnings that U.S. based multinationals had accumulated and kept abroad in order to avoid paying corporate taxes on them. When changes in U.S. tax laws went into effect last year, many firms brought their earnings back, which led to negative U.S. direct investment outflows. Our direct investment assets fell, therefore, both because of the fall in their market value but also due to the reduction in U.S. foreign holdings. Inward investment, on the other hand, continued to grow.

What does this portend for the future? U.S. direct investment outflows became positive again in the second half of 2018. But they are unlikely to return to the same amounts as they had registered before the change in the tax laws due to concerns of the firms over U.S. trade policy. This year’s rising U.S. stock market will increase the value of our liabilities, most likely at a faster rate than the corresponding change in the market value of our assets. Consequently, the net debtor DI position will continue at least for the short-term.

This imbalance in our direct investment assets and liabilities contributes to the deterioration in the U.S. net international investment position. In addition, once the repatriation of foreign earnings is complete, the positive income we receive on our net foreign assets that partially offsets the deficit in the trade balance may fall. Moreover, the ability to serve as the world’s venture capitalist will weaken, which will affect our response to the next major financial crisis. The U.S. may not undertake the stabilizing role it has played in the past, and there is no other nation that can or will take on that role. At a time when the U.S. is withdrawing from political commitments that it has maintained since the end of World War II, this change is yet one more sign of a self-imposed diminution in our ability to deal with global issues.

(Note: a major thanks to the economists at the Bureau of Economic Analysis for guiding me through the data on direct investment.)

 

 

West Coast Workshop in International Finance

8th Annual

West Coast Workshop in International Finance

November 9, 2019

at the University of Washington, Seattle

Call for papers and workshop announcement

Submission Deadline: Friday, August 23rd, 2019

The 8th annual West Coast Workshop in International Finance will be held at the University of Washington, Seattle, on Saturday, November 9th.

We encourage submissions in all areas of open-economy macroeconomics and international finance. Policy-relevant theoretical work, empirical research, computational work, and historical approaches are all welcome. (Past workshop agendas can be seen here.)

Please submit full papers via email to: oemacro@uw.edu.

The deadline for paper submissions is Friday, August 23, 2019.

The WCWIF organizing committee will select the papers to be presented at the conference and will notify presenters in the first week in September. Please note that paper presenters will be responsible for their own travel expenses.

The WCWIF 2019 organizing committee includes:

Paul Bergin, UC Davis

Viktoria Hnatkovska, University of British Columbia

Kenneth Kasa, Simon Fraser University

Kenneth Kletzer, UC Santa Cruz

Helen Popper, Santa Clara University

Mark Spiegel, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Yu-chin Chen, University of Washington (co-host)

Stephen Turnovsky, University of Washington (co-host)

The workshop is sponsored by the Department of Economics at the University of Washington and by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

The Parting of Ways: The U.S. and China

The agreement of U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jingping to restart trade talks put offs planned increases of tariffs on Chinese exports. But there is little doubt that the U.S. intends to move ahead with its intention to undo the economic integration that has been underway since the 1990s. Even when it proves impossible to reverse history, the consequences of such a move will have long-lasting consequences for the global economy.

To understand what is at stake, think of the following simple guide to the status of the world’s nations in the aftermath of World War II. Countries separated into three groups, each anchored on its own tectonic plate. The “first world” consisted of the advanced economies of the U.S., Canada, the West European nations, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. These economies enjoyed rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s, due in part to the expansion of trade amongst them. The formation of the European Community (now Union) eventually led to a single market in goods and services, capital and labor for its members. The largest of the advanced economies exerted their control through the “Group of Seven,” i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S. Their leaders met periodically to discuss economic and other types of policies and issued communiques that listed their agreements. Their predominance extended to their control of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The “second world” included the Communist nations: the Soviet Union and the countries it controlled in Eastern Europe, as well as China and North Korea. These were command economies, run by government ministers. There was some commerce between the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, but all trade was managed. There were virtually no commercial or financial interactions with the first world.

Finally, there was the “third world,” consisting of the remaining nations located in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and South and East Asia. These countries, also known as the developing economies, encompassed a wide range of economic and political models. Many of them formed an association of “nonaligned” countries that sought to preserve their political independence from the first and second worlds.

The third world had limited trade with the first world nations, and this usually consisted of commodity exports in exchange for imports of industrial goods. Import substitution, i.e., the domestic production of manufactured goods, was proposed in the 1950s as a means to counteract the disadvantageous terms of trade these nations faced for their goods. There was some migration between the first and third worlds, and there was a shift in the home countries of U.S. immigrants from Europe to Latin American and Asia. But the movements of people never approached the magnitudes of the first wave of globalization of 1870-1914.

This account is simplistic, and there are important exceptions. Yugoslavia, for example, escaped the control of the Soviet Union and had its own form of a command economy. Taiwan and South Korea began implementing export-led development policies in the 1970s. There were important differences between the capitalist economies of the U.S. and the Scandinavian nations. But the relative separation of the three “worlds” did limit their interaction, as did the political tensions between the U.S. and its allies on the one hand and the Communist governments on the other.

The partition, however, began to dissolve at the end of the 1980s as the economic tectonic plates underneath these clusters of countries began to split and move. China sought to grow its economy through the use of markets and private firms. The government promoted foreign trade, and allowed investments by foreign firms that could provide capital, technology and managerial expertise.

The dissolution of the Soviet bloc of nations was followed by the integration of the eastern European nations with the rest of Europe. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries provided workforces for foreign–particularly German–firms and their economies grew rapidly. The European Union expanded to include these new members, Russia itself was less successful in adapting its economy to the new configuration, and remained dependent on its oil and natural gas resources.

While the nations of the second world were moving towards those of the first world, the countries in the third world also sought to become part of the global economy. Asian nations, such as India, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, adopted pro-market policies in order to accelerate development. Their expanded trade brought these countries closer to the first world. Global poverty fell, principally due to a fall in the proportion of the poor in the populations of China and India.

But there were serious disruptions to these advances, particularly in those emerging market economies that suffered financial crises: Mexico in 1995, several of the East Asian countries in 1997, Russia in 1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2001. While some of the crises were the result of unsustainable government policies, there were also outflows of private capital that had fueled credit bubbles. The massive disruption of economic activity in the wake of these “sudden stops” necessitated outside assistance for the countries to recover. The reputation of the IMF suffered a serious blow for its slow response to the Asian crisis, and the Fund subsequently acknowledged that it had underestimated the extent and consequences of their financial fragility.

Moreover, there was collateral damage accompanying the melding of the economic tectonic plates. China’s emergence as a mega-trader had an impact on the production of manufactured goods in the U.S. and other nations. The resulting job losses, that were often conflated with those lost due to technology, turned parts of the populations of the advanced economies against globalization. Migrants were also blamed for the loss of jobs, as were global supply chains by multinational firms.

The global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the ensuing weak recovery increased the questioning of the policies of the previous two decades. Unemployment in the U.S. fell slowly, and debt crises in several European nations kept growth rates depressed. There was an acknowledgement that the benefits of globalization had not been shared equally as public awareness of income and wealth inequality increased.

There was also adverse reactions to political integration. European governments bristled against EU restrictions on their budgetary policies, while In the United Kingdom nationalists argued that EU officials in Brussels had usurped their government’s sovereignty. The waves of refugees who fled to Europe from Syria and elsewhere awakened fears of a loss of national identity.

The election of Donald Trump and the vote in the United Kingdom in favor of leaving the EU made clear the depth of the reaction against the global integration of 1990-2006. Trump’s campaign was based on a pledge to return to some past era when America had been “great,” while proponents of Brexit promised that their country would prosper outside the boundaries of the EU. The bases of support for these policies were not always wide, but they were strongly motivated.

At the same time, the Chinese government has been keen to assert its control of the country’s economic future and to resist outside interference. The Chinese also seek to establish a zone of political domination in Asia. Similarly, Russia’s President Putin has sought to set up a sphere of political and military influence around its borders. Neither government wants to cut their ties with the U.S. and other advanced economies, but they do want to maintain control over their respective geographic areas.

The China-U.S. split, therefore, is part of a larger reaction to the integration of the global economy. The removal of the barriers separating the three post-World War II “worlds” has led to anxiety and fear in those countries that were part of the first world. They look for a return to the economic dominance that they once enjoyed.

But it is not feasible to undo all the ties that have developed over recent decades, and the nations of what had been the second and third worlds will never accept subordinate status. Moreover, it is possible for the U.S. to place barriers on trade and finance that will undo the gains of the last two decades without any offsetting benefits. Even more worrisome is the possibility that economic and political divisions will exacerbate military division and result in conflict.

The earth has several geographic plates, and they move at a rate of one to two inches (three to five centimeters) per year. Over very long periods of time, the plates do collide, and the force of their movements as they smash into each other creates mountain ranges such as the Himalayas. Economic plates can move more quickly, and their collisions can be equally powerful.

We have entered into a reactionary period as self-proclaimed populists promise to segregate their countries from the outside world to achieve some form of national destiny. But it is not feasible to live in isolation, and ignoring the linkages that exist means that we are not responding to global challenges such as climate change. There may be multiple plates, but they all share one planet.

The Rise and Fall of FDI

After the global financial crisis,  international capital flows contracted, especially bank lending in Europe. Foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational firms, however, provided a steady source of external finance, particularly for emerging market economies. The McKinsey Global Institute has calculated that the global stock of FDI increased from 46% of world GDP in 2007 to 57% in 2016 ($25 trillion to $41 trillion). But FDI flows fell by 27% in 2018 according to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and this drop followed a decline of 16% in the previous year. We have entered a new period of contraction by multinational firms, and in particular, U.S.-based multinationals.

A significant amount of the decline is due to firms based in the U.S. responding to changes in U.S. tax law. The U.S.-based firms repatriated earnings that had been kept abroad to avoid U.S. taxes. As a result, the U.S. recorded a negative FDI outflow of $50 trillion in 2018, down from a positive outflow of $379 billion in the previous year. By the latter half 2018, the acquisition of foreign assets had returned to positive levels, but the long-run changes of the tax code revision on the foreign operations of U.S. firms will only become clear over time.

Ireland and Switzerland were particularly hard-hit by the disinvestments, since these countries had often attracted FDI because of generous tax provisions. There were also reversals of investment in Special Purpose Entities (SPE), which allow the multinationals to channel funds through countries with favorable regulatory and tax practices to their ultimate destination. The OECD reported that FDI flows to SPEs in Luxembourg and the Netherlands fell to negative levels last year.

But the alteration in U.S. tax law is only part of a wider change in policy in the U.S.  President Trump seeks to undo expansion by multinationals by persuading U.S. firms to return their operations to the U.S. During the last several decades, these firms and other multinationals used technological advances in communication and transportation to establish global supply chains of production. They located the production of intermediate goods in those countries where they were cheapest to produce before assembling them and exporting them to their final markets.

This expansion was facilitated by the establishment of stable macroeconomic and political conditions in the host countries where the production facilities were located. In many cases, these were emerging market nations, and their governments welcomed the investments of the multinationals, as the firms hired local labor and transferred capital and technology. Singapore, for example, has used its position as a financial hub and its reputation for pro-business regulatory policies to become a major recipient of FDI flows.

The establishment of production facilities in different countries has benefits and costs for home and host countries. But President Trump views this expansion only through the criterion of its impact on U.S. jobs, and he sees losses. He wants the U.S. firms to base their production in the U.S. where they will hire American workers. The President has frequently claimed that his use of tariffs and other tactics will re-establish manufacturing in the U.S.

Some U.S. firms were already responding to higher costs in China by shifting their supply chains elsewhere. But they often switch their operations to Vietnam and other low-wage countries, not the U.S. A policy of nationalism that forced firms to only operate here would require massive expenditures and higher costs for consumers. It would affect the ability of U.S. firms to export, since our exports often contain foreign components.

The Trump administration’s hostility to trade and outward FDI also affects inward FDI by foreign multinationals. These firms are often courted by state governments that want the high-paying jobs that they provide. Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service have calculated that in 2013 the wages paid to the U.S. employees of foreign-owned multinationals exceeded those of U.S. workers of U.S. multinationals, which in turn exceeded those paid to workers in all firms by more than 10%. The U.S. and foreign multinationals accounted for 30 million workers, who in 2013 represented 22% of all jobs in the U.S.

But foreign firms have cut down on further expansion in the U.S.  Foreign capital inflows to the U.S. fell from $509 billion in 2015 to $267 billion in 2018. Some of this downturn may have been cyclical, but foreign firms also have to consider the effect of tariffs on U.S. production. Adam Posen of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has warned “…that this shift of corporate investment away from the U.S. will decrease long-term U.S. income growth, reduce the number of well-paid jobs available, and accelerate the shift of global commerce away from the U.S.”

The decline in FDI last year reflected other factors than U.S. policy measures. While 2018 initially was characterized as a period of widespread growth, this expansion slowed during the year in response to instability in Turkey and Argentina, credit tightening in China, and other developments. This global slowdown in growth is expected to persist and the IMF forecasts economic growth in 2019 of 3.3%, down from 3.6% in 2018.

There is evidence that the rapid pace of expansion of the pre-global crisis has come to an end. The return on equity of multinationals has fallen from its pre-crisis peak. The ability of firms such as Apple to continue to post continued growth in global sales is being questioned. Governments such as India’s seek to protect domestic firms from foreign competition. Moreover, as pointed out above, China no longer is a source of cheap labor, and firms need to adapt to changing cost structures.

The immediate impact of the change in the U.S. tax provisions on FDI has most likely ended. But the fall-off in corporate expansion over the last two years is also a response to the changes in international trade and finance. The Trump administration has made clear that it wants to reverse the globalization of recent years, and the imposition of tariffs on Chinese and other goods will lead to a reorientation of business models. Over time this may be seen as the last gasp of a reactionary regime that was reversed under a future president. But the President’s Democratic challengers seem equally reluctant to support trade and expansion by U.S. firms. Until the status of trade in the global economy is clarified, multinationals will be reluctant to commit to foreign expansion.

The Exorbitant Privilege in a World of Low Interest Rates

The U.S. dollar has long enjoyed what French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing called an “exorbitant privilege.”  The U.S. can finance its current account deficits and acquisition of foreign assets by issuing Treasury securities that are held by foreign central banks as reserves. The dollar’s share of foreign reserves, while falling, remains over 60%.  But in a world of low interest rates, how exorbitant is this privilege, and is it solely a U.S. phenomenon?

John Plender of the Financial Times has pointed out that U.S. Treasury bonds offer a rate of return that matches or is higher than that of other government bonds with similar risk ratings.  This is true whether we look at nominal returns or real rates of return. The nominal returns reported below are those available on the ten-year government bonds of Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S., while the changes in prices are those reported for their Consumer Price Indexes :

 

Nominal Return Change in Prices Real Return
Germany -0.05% 2.0% -2.05%
Japan -0.06% 0.5% -0.56%
U.K. 1.13% 1.9% -0.77%
U.S. 2.47% 1.9% 0.57%

 

The bonds of other advanced economies offer higher yields but more risk. The rate of return on ten-year Italian government bonds is 2.68% and on Greek bonds 3.49%. An investor in government bonds can do better in Brazil (8.76%) or Mexico (8.09%), but these securities also come with the risk of depreciation.

Private foreign investors also hold U.S. Treasury debt as well as U.S. corporate securities. John Ammer of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) , Stijn Claessens of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Alexandra Tabova (FRB) and Caleb Wroblewski (FDB) analyzed the foreign private holdings of U.S. bonds in “Home Country Interest Rates and International Investment in U.S. Bonds,” published in the  Journal of International Money and Finance in 2018 (working paper here). They collected data for 31 countries where private residents held both U.S. Treasury securities and corporate bonds during the period of 2003-2016.  They found that low domestic interest rates led to increased holdings of U.S. bonds, and in particular, corporate securities. The corporate share of foreign-held U.S. securities in these countries had risen to about 60% by the end of their sample period.

The “long equity, short debt” structure of the U.S. external balance sheet is not unique to the U.S. Robert McCauley of the BIS in “Does the US Dollar Confer an Exorbitant Privilege?”, also published in the JIMF in 2015, shows that foreign holdings of Australian government bonds have allowed that country to accumulate foreign currency assets. Some of these holdings were attributed to the desire of foreign central banks to hold safe and liquid assets.

U.S. Treasury securities possess an appeal besides their relatively attractive rates of return in a world of low interest rates. They are seen as safe assets, and given the size of the U.S. economy and the liquidity of its capital markets, it is not surprising that they hold a predominant role in the global financial system. But Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas of UC-Berkeley, Hélène Rey of the London Business School and Maxime Sauzet of UC-Berkeley have pointed out in “The International Monetary and Financial System” (NBER Working paper #25782) that the mounting size of the eternal debt of the U.S. may lead to a loss of confidence in the U.S. government’s ability to service it without engaging in inflationary finance or triggering a depreciation of the dollar. At the same time, the relative size of the U.S. economy in global output is shrinking while the demand for dollar liquidity is growing. They conclude that this may be the basis of a “New Triffin Dilemma.”

There is, however, another, more immediate danger. The U.S. reached its debt ceiling of $22 trillion on March 2. The Department of the Treasury can engage in various measures to continue paying the government’s bills until next fall. The White House wants to obtain a rise in the debt ceiling this spring before it has to engage in budget negotiations with Congress. But given the toxic relations between the Trump administration and the House of Representatives, the danger of a lack of agreement cannot be dismissed. The Trump administration promised to disrupt the global order, and the full extent of that disruption may have only begun.

Searching for Stimulus

The global economy seems headed for a slowdown. The IMF now expects global growth this year of 3.3%, a drop of 0.2 of a percentage point from its previous forecast. Growth in the advanced economies is projected to be particularly feeble, with expected U.S. economic growth of 2.2%, growth of 1.3% predicted for the Eurozone , and Japan’s growth anticipated to be 1%. Of course, a breakdown of U.S.-China trade talks, the imposition of new U.S. tariffs on European cars or a disorderly Brexit could disrupt the forecasts. Can government policymakers improve these conditions?

Central banks have limited policy space. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve has made clear that it does not expect to raise the Federal Funds rate this year, and retains the option of lowering it if conditions deteriorate. Some–including one of President Trump’s anticipated nominees to the Board, Stephen Moore–are already calling for lower rates. But the current Federal Funds rate of 2.5% does not give the central bank much scope for lowering it.  Japan’s central bank already has negative nominal rate targets, while the European Central Bank’s policy rates include a lending rate of zero percent and a negative deposit facility return.

If monetary policy is constrained, what else can policymakers do? Adair Turner, former chair of the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, believes that zero interest rates means that the time has come for “massive fiscal expansion” financed by central banks. He acknowledges that excessive monetary growth can be harmful. But, he argues, when faced with “slow growth, political discontent and large inherited debt burdens…”, policy measures that in other times would be seen as radical need to be considered.

Martin Wolf of the Financial Times is also concerned about the current low interest rates, which he attributes to secular stagnation. He believes that the low rates have created a disinflationary debt overhang, and calls for the use of fiscal policy to supplement private demand. Similarly, Mohammed El-Erian of Allianz points to Japan’s continued low growth as evidence of the limitations of monetary policy. He calls for looser government budgets that raise productivity through spending on education and infrastructure.

The recent record of increased deficits in the U.S. gives some guidance on the impact of a fiscal stimulus. Lower taxes did increase GDP growth in 2018, but the effect has faded and GDP is returning to its trend growth. Corporate taxes also declined, and as a result, the budget deficit widened. The Congressional Budget Office has forecast that the budget deficit will increase from 3.5% of GDP in 2017 to 5.4% in 2022, and the impact on the budget will persist.

The borrowing required to finance these deficits will reinforce the U.S. position, along with Japan and China, as one of the largest debtor nations. As in Japan, government debt represents a significant amount of U.S. total debt. The U.S. stands out, however, for increasing government debt during an expansionary phase of the business cycle when ordinarily debt shrinks. Other advanced economies have used this opportunity to lower their debt burdens.

Olivier Blanchard, former chief economist of the IMF, spoke about government borrowing at this year’s meetings of the American Economics Association. He pointed out that the ratio of debt to GDP need not rise as long as the growth rate of GDP exceeds the interest rate on government debt. That condition has been met since the 19th century  except during the decade of the 1980s. Moreover, the “crowding out” of private investment is less of a concern in a world of low interest rates.

There is one other aspect of fiscal expansion that should be considered: the impact on a country’s current account, and the impact on other countries. Menzie Chinn of the LaFolette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin and Hiro Ito of Portland State University have investigated the determinants of global imbalances. Using data from 24 industrial and 138 developing countries between 1972 and 2016, they report: “Fiscal factors determine imbalances, and have accounted for a noticeable share of the recent variation in imbalances, including in the U.S. and Germany.” In the group of industrial countries, a one percentage point increase in the deficit scaled by GDP leads to a 0.42% increase in the current account deficit, similarly scaled.  A significant part of the fiscal expansion, therefore, is transmitted to the rest of the world.

If advanced economies do share low growth rates and constrained monetary policies in common, then a coordinated fiscal expansion may be the best way of generating growth amongst them. But the record on fiscal coordination is, at best, mixed. All the members of the Group of Twenty enacted stimulus policies of different magnitudes during the global financial crisis. However, an earlier agreement in 1978 by Japan and Germany to enact expansionary fiscal measures while the U.S. decontrolled energy prices did not turn out so well. The German fiscal stimulus coincided with the second oil price shock of the decade, but the former was blamed for the subsequent increase in inflation. This experience confirmed German views of the futility of discretionary policies.

The chances, therefore, of a coordinated fiscal expansion among the advanced economies in the absence of another global shock are low. If this means that we do not have temporary surges in growth fueled by lower tax rates, then the long-run cost is low. But all the calls for fiscal policy cited above are for spending measures that would boost productivity. In the long-run, growth will only return if productivity increases, as it did in the 1990s in the U.S. In addition, any tax cuts should be designed to benefit those who have not shared in the gains of globalization. The largest increases in income in the U.S. have accrued to those in the upper tiers of the income distribution. Those below deserve a stimulus that actually benefits them.

Partners, Not Debtors: The External Liabilities of Emerging Market Economies

My paper,  “Partners, Not Debtors: The External Liabilities of Emerging Market Economies,” has been published in the January 2019 issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Here is the abstract:

This paper investigates the change in the composition of the liabilities of emerging market countries from primarily debt (bonds, bank loans) to equity (foreign direct investment, portfolio) in the decades preceding the global financial crisis. We examine the determinants of equity and debt liabilities on external balance sheets in a sample of 21 emerging market economies and 20 advanced economies over the period of 1981-2013. We include a new measure of domestic financial development that allows us to distinguish between financial institutions and financial markets. Our results show that countries with higher economic growth rates have larger amounts of equity liabilities. The development of domestic financial markets is also linked to an increase in equity liabilities, and in particular, portfolio equity. In addition, larger foreign exchange reserves are associated with larger amounts of portfolio equity. FDI liabilities are more common when domestic financial institutions are not well developed.

The publisher, Elsevier, provides a link to provide free access to the paper for 50 days. You can find it here:

https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1YoqV_3pQ3g~6e