Tag Archives: emerging markets

Capital Flows and Financial Crises

The impact of capital flows on the incidence of financial crises has been recognized since the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Inflows before the crisis contributed to the expansion of domestic credit and asset booms, while the liabilities they created escalated in value once central banks abandoned their exchange rate pegs and their currencies depreciated. More recently, evidence that foreign direct investment lowers the probability of financial crises has been reported. A new paper by Atish R. Ghosh and Mahvash S. Qureshi of the IMF investigates how the different types of capital flows affect financial stability.

The authors point out that capital inflows can be problematic when they lead to appreciations of real exchange rates and increases in domestic spending. The empirical evidence they report from a sample of 53 emerging market economies over the period of 1980-2013 does show linkages between capital inflows on the one hand and both GDP growth and overvaluation of the real exchange rate. But when the authors distinguish among the different types of capital inflows, they find that FDI, which has the largest impact on GDP growth and the output gap, is not significantly associated with overvaluation. Net portfolio and other investment flows, on the other hand, do lead to currency overvaluation as well as output expansion.

Ghosh and Qureshi investigated next the impact of capital flows on financial stability. Capital inflows are associated with higher domestic credit growth, bank leverage and foreign currency-denominated lending. When they looked at the composition of these capital flows, however, FDI flows were not linked to any of these vulnerabilities, whereas portfolio—and in particular debt—flows were.

Ghosh and Quershi also assessed the impact of capital flows on the probability of financial crises, and their results indicate that net financial flows raise the probability of both banking and currency crises. When real exchange rate overvaluation and domestic credit growth are included in the estimation equations, the significance of the capital flow variable falls, indicating that these are the principal transmission mechanisms. But when the capital flows are disaggregated, the “other investment” component of the inflows are significantly linked to the increased probabilities of both forms of financial crises, whereas FDI flows decrease banking crises.

The role of FDI in actually reducing the probability of a crisis (a result also found here and here) merits further investigation. The stability of FDI as opposed to other, more liquid forms of capital is relevant, but most likely not the only factor. Part of the explanation may lie in the inherent risk-sharing nature of FDI; a local firm with a foreign partner may be able to withstand financial volatility better than a firm without any external resources. Mihir Desai and C. Fritz Foley of Harvard and Kristin J. Forbes of MIT (working paper here), for example, compared the response of affiliates of U.S. multinationals and local firms in the tradable sectors of emerging market countries to currency depreciations, and found that the affiliates increased their sales, assets and investments more than local firms did.  As a result, they pointed out, multinational affiliations might mitigate some of the effects of currency crises.

The increased vulnerability of countries to financial crises due to debt inflows makes recent developments in the emerging markets worrisome. Michael Chui, Emese Kuruc and Philip Turner of the Bank for International Settlements have pointed to the increase in the debt of emerging market companies, much of which is denominated in foreign currencies. Aggregate currency mismatches are not a cause for concern due to the large foreign exchange holdings of the central banks of many of these countries, but the currency mismatches of the private sector are much larger. Whether or not governments will use their foreign exchange holdings to bail out over-extended private firms is very much an open issue.

Philip Coggan of the Buttonwood column in The Economist has looked at the foreign demand for the burgeoning corporate debt of emerging markets, and warned investors that “Just as they are piling into this asset class, its credit fundamentals are deteriorating.” The relatively weak prospects of these firms are attributed to the slow growth of international trade and the weakening of global value chains. Corporate defaults have risen in recent years, and Coggan warns that “More defaults are probably on the way.”

The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook forecasts increased growth in the emerging market economies in 2016. But the IMF adds: “However, the outlook for these economies is uneven and generally weaker than in the past.” The increase in debt offerings by firms in emerging market economies will bear negative consequences for the issuing firms and their home governments in those emerging market economies that do not fare as well as others. Coggan in his Buttonwood column also claimed that “When things do go wrong for emerging-market borrowers, it seems to happen faster.” Just how fast we may be about to learn. Market conditions can deteriorate quickly and when they do, no one knows how and when they will stabilize.

The Search for an Effective Macro Policy

Economic growth in the advanced economies seems stalled. This summer the IMF projected increases in GDP in these economies of 1.8% for both 2016 and 2017. This included growth of 2.2% this year in the U.S. and 2.5% in 2017, 1.6% and 1.4% in the Eurozone in 2016 and 2017 respectively, and 0.3% and 0.1% in Japan. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has called on the Group of 20 countries to use all available tools to raise growth, as has the IMF’s Managing Director Christine Lagarde. So why aren’t the G20 governments doing more?

The use of discretionary fiscal policy as a stimulus seems to be jammed, despite renewed interest in its effectiveness by macroeconomists such as Christopher Sims of Princeton University. While the U.S. presidential candidates talk about spending on much-needed infrastructure, there is little chance that a Republican-controlled House of Representatives would go along. In Europe, Germany’s fiscal surplus gives it the ability to increase spending that would benefit its neighbors, but it shows no interest in doing so (see Brad Setser and Paul Krugman). And the IMF does not seem to be following its own policy guidelines in its advice to individual governments.

One of the traditional concerns raised by fiscal deficits rests on their impact on the private spending that will be crowded out by the subsequent rise in interest rates. But this is not a relevant problem in a world of negative interest rates in many advanced economies and very low rates in the U.S. The increase in sovereign debt payments should be more than offset by the increase in economic activity that will be reinforced by the effect of spending on infrastructure on future growth.

On the other hand, there has been no hesitation by monetary policymakers in responding to economic conditions. They initially reacted to the global financial crisis by cutting policy rates and providing liquidity to banks. When the ensuing recovery proved to be weak, they undertook large-scale purchases of assets, known in the U.S. as “quantitative easing,” to bring down long-term rates that are relevant for business loans and mortgages.The asset purchases of the central banks led to massive expansions of their balance sheets on a scale never seen before. The Federal Reserve’s assets, for example, rose from about $900 billion in 2007 to $4.4 trillion this summer. Similarly, the Bank of Japan holds assets worth about $4.5 trillion, while the European Central Bank owns $3.5 trillion of assets.

The interventions of the central banks were successful in bringing down interest rates. They also elevated the prices of financial assets, including stock prices. But their impact on real economic activity seems to be stunted. While the expansion in the U.S. has lowered the unemployment rate to 4.9%, the inflation rate utilized by the Federal Reserve continues to fall below the target 2%. Investment spending is weaker than desired, despite the low interest rates. Indeed, many firms have sufficient cash to finance capital expenditures, but prefer to hold it back. The situations in Europe and Japan are bleaker. Investment in the Eurozone, where the unemployment rate is 10.1%., remains below its pre-crisis peak. Japan also sees weak investment that contributes to its stagnant position.

If lower interest rates do not stimulate domestic demand, there is an alternative channel of transmission: the exchange rate, which can improve the trade balance through expenditure switching. But there are several disturbing aspects of a dependence on a currency depreciation to increase output (see also here). First, there is an adverse impact on domestic firms with liabilities denominated in a foreign currency, as the cost of servicing and repaying that debt rises. Second, expansionary monetary policy does not always have the expected impact on the exchange rate. The Japanese yen appreciated last spring despite the central bank’s acceptance of negative interest rates to spur spending. Third, a successful depreciation requires the willingness of some other nation to accept an appreciation of its currency. The U.S. seems to have accepted that role, but Mohammed A. El-Erian has pointed out, U.S. firms are concerned “…about the impact of a stronger dollar on their earnings…” He also points to “…declining inward tourism and a deteriorating trade balance…” Under these circumstances, the willingness of the U.S. government to continue to accept an appreciating dollar is not guaranteed.

There is one other consequence of advanced economies pushing down their interest rates: increased capital flows to emerging market economies. Foreign investors, who had pulled out of bond markets in these countries for much of the last three years, have now reversed course. The inflows may help out those countries that face adverse economic conditions. But if/when the Federal Reserve resumes raising its policy rate, the attraction of these markets may pall.

The search for an effective macro policy tool, therefore, is constrained by political considerations as much as the paucity of options. But there is another factor: is it possible to return to pre-2008 economic growth rates? Harvard’s Larry Summers points out that those rates were based on an unsustainable housing bubble. He believes that private spending will not return us to full-employment, and urges the Fed to keep interest rates low and the government to engage in debt-financed investments in infrastructure projects. Ken Rogoff (also of Harvard), on the other hand, believes that we are suffering the downside of a debt supercycle. Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University blames deficient aggregate demand in part on income inequality.

The one common theme that emerges from these different analyses is that there is no “quick fix” that will restore the advanced economies to some economic Eden. Structural and other forces are acting as headwinds to slow growth. But voters are not interested in long-run analyses, and many will turn to those who claim that they have solutions, no matter how potentially disastrous those are.

 

Capital Flows and Financial Activity in Commodity Exporters

Emerging markets and developing economies have struggled in recent years to regain the growth rates of the last decade before the global financial crisis. The slowdown has been particularly evident in commodity-exporters that face declining prices. The World Bank’s most recent Global Economic Prospects, for example, projects growth for those countries of only 0.4% in 2016. Moreover, the fall in commodity prices is linked to capital flows to those countries and an increase in the fragility of their financial sectors.

In a recent paper in the Journal of International Money and Finance, Joseph P. Byrne of Heriot-Watt University and Norbert Fiess of the World Bank examined the determinants of capital inflows to 64 emerging market economies. Among the drivers of capital flows were real commodity prices: an increase in these prices increased flows to the emerging markets, particularly total equity and bank flows. Real commodity prices also contributed to an increase in the global volatility of capital flows.

Commodity price cycles, therefore, should be associated with capital flow cycles, and declines in both may lead to financial crises. Carmen Reinhart of Harvard’s Kennedy School, Vincent Reinhart of the American Enterprise Institute and Christoph Trebesch of the University of Munich documented such a correspondence of capital flows, commodity prices and sovereign defaults during the period 1815 to 2015 in a paper in the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (working paper here). They found evidence of an overlap between booms in capital flows and commodity prices, which resulted in a “double bonanza,” and a “double bust” when capital flows and prices declined. They also recorded the incidence of sovereign defaults, and found that four of six global peaks in defaults followed double busts in capital flows and commodity markets. The most recent boom was exceptionally prolonged, beginning in 1999 and lasting until 2011, and was followed by a “double bust.”

Commodity prices can also affect the fragility of domestic financial sectors. Tidiane Kinda, Montfort Mlachila and Rasmané Ouedraogo in an IMF working paper looked at the impact of commodity price shocks on the financial sectors in 71 emerging market and developing economies that are commodity exporters. Falling prices weakened the financial sector as manifested through higher non-performing loans and reduced bank profits, and an increased probability of a banking crisis. The transmission channels included an increase in the amount of debt denominated in foreign currency as well as lower economic growth and less government revenues.

The fragility of the financial sectors of the commodity exporters has been exacerbated by a growth in private credit. The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects has reported that credit to the nonfinancial sector in emerging markets and developing economies increased in the five years ending in 2015, and credit growth was particularly pronounced in commodity exporting countries. Much of this credit went to nonfinancial corporations, and the borrowing was concentrated in the energy sector. As a result, credit growth in the commodity exporting emerging market and developing economies has risen to levels of credit/GDP that in the past have been associated with credit booms that have often (but not always) been followed by bank crises.

Commodity price fluctuations, therefore, are accompanied by changes in capital flows and the status of financial sectors in commodity exporters. Booms in domestic credit can further threaten long-term financial stability. More flexible exchange rates may alleviate some of the strain of a downturn in commodity prices and capital inflows. But countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Russia face little relief from the drag on their economic performance as long as commodity prices remain depressed. The accommodative monetary policies of the advanced economies have bolstered asset prices in many emerging markets, but that situation can not be counted on to continue indefinitely.

The IMF and the Next Crisis

The IMF has issued a warning that “increasing financial market turbulence and falling asset prices” are weakening the global economy, which already faces headwinds due to the “…modest recovery in advanced economies, China’s rebalancing, the weaker-than-expected growth impact from lower oil prices, and generally diminished growth prospects in emerging and low-income economies.” In its report to the finance ministers and central bank governors of the Group of 20 nations before their meeting in Shangahi, the IMF called on the G20 policymakers to undertake “…bold multilateral actions to boost growth and contain risk.” But will the IMF itself be prepared for the next crisis?

The question is particularly appropriate in view of the negative response of the G20 officials to the IMF’s warning. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Law sought to dampen expectations of any government actions, warning “Don’t expect a crisis response in a non-crisis environment.” Similarly, Germany’s Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schaeuble stated that “Fiscal as well as monetary policies have reached their limits…Talking about further stimulus just distracts from the real tasks at hand.”

The IMF, then, may be the “first responder” in the event of more volatility and weakening. The approval of the long-delayed 14th General Quota Review has allowed the IMF to implement increases in the quota subscriptions of its members that augment its financial resources. Managing Director Christine Lagarde, who has just been reappointed to a second term, has claimed the institution of new Fund lending programs, such as the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), has strengthened the global safety net. These programs allow the IMF to lend quickly to countries with sound policies. But outside the IMF, Lagarde claims, the safety net has become “fragmented and asymmetric.” Therefore, she proposes, “Rather than relying on a fragmented and incomplete system of regional and bilateral arrangements, we need a functioning international network of precautionary instruments that works for everyone.” The IMF is ready to provide more such a network.

But is a lack of liquidity provision the main problem that emerging market nations face? The Financial Times quotes Lagarde as stating that any assistance to oil exporters like Azerbaijan and Nigeria should come without any stigma, as “They are clearly the victims of outside shocks…” in the form of collapses in oil prices. But outside shocks are not always transitory, and may continue over long periods of time.

There are many reasons to expect that lower commodity prices may persist. If so, the governments of commodity exporters that became used to higher revenues may be forced to scale down their spending plans. Debt levels that appeared reasonable at one set of export prices may become unsustainable at another. In these circumstances, the countries involved may face questions about their solvency.

But is the IMF the appropriate body to deal with insolvency? IMF lending in such circumstances has become more common. Carmen M. Reinhart of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Christoph Trebesch of the University of Munich write that about 40% of IMF programs in the 1990s and 2000s went to countries in some stage of default or restructuring of official debt, despite the IMF’s official policy of not lending to countries in arrears. Reinhart and Trebesch attribute the prevalence of continued lending (which has been called “recidivist lending”) in part to the Fund’s tolerance of continued non-payment of government debt.

More recently, the IMF’s credibility suffered a blow due to its involvement with Greece and the European governments that lent to it in 2010. (See Paul Blustein for an account of that period.) The IMF ‘s guidelines for granting “exceptional access” to a member stipulate that such lending could only be undertaken if the member’s debt was sustainable in the medium-term. The Greek debt clearly was not, so the Fund justified its lending on the grounds that there was a risk of “international systemic spillovers.” But the IMF’s willingness to participate in the bailout loan of 2010 only delayed the eventual restructuring of Greek debt in 2012. The IMF now insists that the European governments grant Greece more debt relief before it will provide any more financial government.

Reinhart and Trebesch write that the IMF’s “…involvement in chronic debt crises and in development finance may make it harder to focus on its original mission…” of providing credit in the event of a balance of payments crisis. Moreover, its association with cases of long-run insolvency may “taint all of its lending.” This may explain the limited response to the IMF’s programs of liquidity provision. Only Colombia, Mexico and Poland have shown an interest in the FCL, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Morocco in the PLL.

Even if the IMF receives the power to implement new programs, therefore, its past record of lending may deter potential borrowers. This problem will be worsened if the IMF treats countries that need to adapt to a new global economy as temporary borrowers that only need assistance until commodity prices rise and they are back on their feet. The day when the emerging market economies routinely recorded high growth rates may have come to an end. If so, debt restructuring may become a more common event that needs to be addressed directly.

Growth in the Emerging Market Economies

In recent decades the global economy has been transformed by the rise of the emerging market economies. Their growth lifted millions out of poverty and gave their governments the right to call for a larger voice in discussions of international economic governance. Therefore it is of no small importance to understand whether recent declines in the growth rates of these countries is a cyclical phenomenon or a longer-lasting transition to a new, slower state. That such a slowdown has wide ramifications became clear when Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen cited concerns about growth in emerging markets for the delay in raising the Fed’s interest rate target in September.

The data show the gap between the record of the advanced economies and that of the emerging markets. I used the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database to calculate averages of annual growth rates of constant GDP for the two groups.

2001-07 2008-09 2010-15
Advanced 2.46% -1.62% 1.82%
Emerging and Developing 6.62%  4.48% 5.47%
Difference: (Emerging + Developing)               – Advanced 4.16%  6.1% 3.65%

The difference in the average growth rates was notable before the global financial crisis, and rose during the crisis. Since then their growth rates have fallen a bit but continue to exceed those of the sclerotic advanced economies. Since the IMF pools emerging market economies with developing economies, the differences would be higher if we looked only at the record of emerging markets such as China, India and Indonesia.

And yet: behind the averages are disquieting declines in growth rates, if not actual contractions, for some members of the BRICS as well as other emerging markets. The IMF forecasts a fall in economic activity for Brazil of -3.03% for 2015 and for Russia of -3.83%, which makes South Africa ’s projected rise of 1.4% look vigorous. Even China’s anticipated 6.81% rise is lower than its extraordinary growth rates of previous years, and exceeded by India’s projected growth of 7.26%. The IMF sees economic growth for the current year for the emerging markets and developing economies of 4% , a decline from last year’s 4.6%.

What accounts for the falloff, and can it be reversed? The change in China’s economic orientation from an economy driven by investment and export expenditures to one based on consumption spending has slowed that country down. The decline in that country’s demand for raw materials to transform into finished goods for export is rippling through the economies of the major commodity exporters, such as Australia and Brazil. The Economist has claimed that the resulting fall in commodity prices constitutes a “great bear market.”

This downturn may be aggravated by a failure in institutions. Bill Emmott writes that emerging markets need political institutions that “…mediate smoothly between competing interest groups and power blocs in order to permit a broader public interest to prevail.” He specifically cites the leaderships of Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey and South Africa as examples of governments that have not been able to achieve that task.

The basic model of economic growth, the Solow-Swan model, predicts that income in the poorer countries should catch up with those of the advanced economies as the former countries adopt the advanced technology of the latter. This basic result is modified if there are higher population growth rates or lower savings levels, which can lead to lower per capita income levels. On the other hand, the Asian countries used high savings rates to speed up their economic growth while their birth rates fell.

But convergence has not been achieved for most economies despite periods of rapid growth. Some economists have postulated the existence of “middle-income traps.” Maria A. Arias and Yi Wen of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank describe this phenomenon in a recent issue of the institution’s publication, The Regional Economist. They explain that while income rose close to U.S. levels in the “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) as well as Ireland and Spain, per-capita income shows no sign of rising in Latin American economies such as Brazil and Mexico. There may also be a “low-income” trap for developing economies that never break out of their much lower per-capita income.

Why the inability to raise living standards? Arias and Wen, after discussing several proposed reasons such as poor institutions, compare the cases of Ireland and Mexico. They claim that the Irish government opened the economy up to global markets slowly in earlier decades, and encouraged foreign direct investment to grow its manufacturing sector. This allowed the country to benefit from the technology embedded in capital goods. Mexico, on the other hand, turned to foreign capital markets to finance government debt, which left the economy vulnerable to currency crises and capital flight. Arias and Wen conclude that governments should manage the composition of capital inflows and control capital flows that seek short-term gain rather development of the manufacturing sector.

But there may be a more basic phenomenon taking place. In 2013 Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers of Harvard presented a paper with the intriguing title, “Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean.” They examined growth rates for a large number of countries for10 and 20 year periods, extending back to the 1950s. They showed that there is ”…very little persistence in country growth rate differences over time, and consequently, current growth has very little predictive power for future growth.” While acknowledging China and India’s achievements, they cautioned that “…the typical degree of regression to the mean imply substantial slowdowns in China and India relative even to the currently more cautious and less bullish forecasts.” They drew particular attention to the lack of strong institutions in the two countries.

If growth does slow for most emerging market economies, then the recent buildup of corporate debt in those countries may be a troubling legacy of the recent, more robust period. Debt loads that looked manageable when borrowing costs were low and future prospects unlimited are less controllable when that scenario changes. While there may not be a widespread crisis that afflicts all the emerging markets, those countries with extended financial sectors are vulnerable to international volatility.

The External Debt of the Emerging Market Economies

The outflow of money from emerging markets this year will most likely surpass inflows for the first time since 2008, and net capital outflows may total $541 billion according to the Institute of International Finance. The flows have been accompanied by currency depreciations, stock market collapses, and in the case of Brazil, a downgrade in its credit rating to junk bond status. The IMF has responded to this turbulence by lowering its forecast for growth in the emerging markets and developing economies this year from 4.2% to 4%.

The emerging market nations that export commodities have been particularly hard hit, as China cuts back on its imports of raw materials and commodity prices plunge. Other factors that could signal further weakness are declining foreign exchange reserves, current account deficits and political uncertainty. Countries besides Brazil that have been identified as most vulnerable to further downturns include Russia, Venezuela, Turkey and Indonesia. When the long-awaited increase in U.S. interest rates finally does take place, the rise in the cost of borrowing in dollars will exacerbate the position of these countries.

There is another factor that will affect how an external shock will affect economic performance: the composition of a country’s external balance sheet. This records the holdings of foreign assets held by domestic residents and domestic liabilities held by foreigners. A country’s net international investment position (NIIP) as a creditor or debtor depends on the difference between its assets and liabilities. Both assets and liabilities can take the form of equity, which includes foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity, or debt in the form of bonds and bank loans. In addition, countries may hold assets in the form of foreign exchange reserves at their central banks.

Assets are denominated in foreign currencies, particularly the dollar, while equity liabilities are denominated in the home currency. Debt liabilities may be denominated in the domestic or a foreign currency. Foreign lenders who are concerned about the government’s macroeconomic policies—a phenomenon known as “original sin”—may insist that bonds be issued in dollars.

After the financial crises that afflicted many emerging markets during the late 1990s and early 2000s, many of these nations altered the composition of their external balance sheets. Countries that had obtained external funds primarily through debt turned to equity for sources of finance. As a result, their equity liabilities grew steadily, both in terms of absolute magnitude and relative to their debt liabilities. Their assets, on the other hand, largely consisted of foreign exchange reserves, held in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds, and other debt holdings. This profile is known as “long debt, short equity,” and differed from the “long equity, short debt” composition of most advanced economies that held equity and issued debt.

The payout on equity is contingent on the profitability of the firms that issue it, while debt payments are contractual. As a result, over time equity carries a higher return than debt—the “equity premium.” Consequently, the “long equity, short debt” profile in normal times is profitable for those countries that are net holders of equity.

But the situation changes during a crisis. The decline in the value of equity liabilities raises the NIIP of the countries that issued them. In addition, a depreciation of the domestic currency increases the value of the foreign assets while lowering those liabilities denominated in the domestic currency. Bonds issued in a foreign currency, however, will rise in value—a phenomenon observed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98. In addition, short-term liabilities may not be rolled over by foreign lenders, while FDI is much more stable.

Phillip Lane of Trinity College (working paper here) has claimed that the composition of the emerging market economies’ external balance sheets served as a buffer against the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09, while the structure of the advanced economies’ external assets and liabilities heightened their vulnerability. In a recent paper I investigated this claim and found that countries with FDI liabilities had higher growth rates, fewer bank crises and were less likely to borrow from the IMF during the GFC. Countries with debt liabilities, on the other hand, had more bank crises and were more likely to use IMF credit. The “long debt, short equity” strategy of emerging markets did mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis, and acted as a countercyclical crisis buffer.

But the balance sheet profiles of the emerging market economies has changed in the wake of the crisis. The corporate debt of nonfinancial firms in many emerging market economies, particularly bonds denominated in dollars, grew rapidly during this period. The IMF in its latest Global Financial Stability Report has drawn attention to this shift, which it reports has been driven by global drivers, such as the decline in U.S. interest rates.

A newly-issue report by the Committee on International Economic Policy, Corporate Debt in Emerging Economies: A Threat to Financial Stability?, views this increase in debt as a threat to financial stability. The report, written by Viral Acharya of New York University, Stephen Cecchetti of Brandeis University, José De Gregorio of the University of Chile, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan of the University of Maryland, Philip Lane of Trinity and Ugo Panizza of the Graduate Institute in Geneva, reviews the changes in the balance sheets of the emerging markets. They find that “…there has been a deterioration in the net foreign debt positions of many emerging economies in recent years.” While the amounts of corporate debt are limited, the authors point out, “…even a category that appears relatively small can be a source of systemic financial stability.” Moreover, bonds denominated in a foreign currency have accounted for a large component of the growth in corporate debt, and there has been “…an overall decline in the net foreign currency position of many emerging economies.” As a result, “…this has made emerging economies vulnerable to a shift in international funding conditions and macroeconomic slowdown.”

Moreover, the amount of emerging market debt may be underestimated. Carmen Reinhart of Harvard’s Kennedy School points out that debt may go undetected until the outbreak of a crisis. She points to the Mexican crisis of 1995-95, the Asian debt crisis of 1997-98 and the current Greek crisis as examples of the detection of “hidden debt” that became visible as the crisis emerged. She fears that lending by Chinese development banks for infrastructure projects in other emerging and developing economies may not be included in the data for their external debt, and could add to their vulnerability.

The authors of the report on corporate debt in emerging economies point out that policymakers have a variety of policy tools to deal with the risks of external borrowing. These include capital and liquidity regulations, directly lending to small and medium-sized enterprises when banks are constrained by exposure limits, and central clearing of derivative contracts. But all this will come after the deterioration to the external balance sheets has taken place. Governments should monitor the external borrowing of domestic firms and public agencies during “boom” periods to track their vulnerability to shocks to global liquidity. Meanwhile, the IMF is preparing for the next crisis.

Capital Flows, Credit Booms and Bank Crises

Studies of the impact of capital inflows have established that debt inflows can lead to bank crises (see here and here). Unlike equity, payments on debt are contractual and can not be cancelled if there is an economic downturn, which intensifies any shocks to the financial system. In the case of short-term debt, a foreign lender may decide not to roll over credit at the time when it is most needed. But recent papers have shown that foreign debt can also be a determinant of the credit booms that lead to the bank crises.

Philip Lane of Trinity College and Peter McQuade of the European Central Bank (working paper version here) looked at the relationship of domestic credit growth and capital flows in Europe during the period of 1993-2008. They suggest that financial flows can encourage more rapid credit growth by increasing the ability of domestic banks to extend loans, while also contributing to a rise in asset prices that encouraged financial activity. They found that debt flows contributed to domestic credit growth but equity flows did not. Moreover, the linkage of debt and domestic credit was strongest during the 2003-08 pre-crisis period.

Similarly, Julián Caballero of the Inter-American Development Bank (working paper here) investigated capital inflow booms, known as “bonanzas,” in emerging economies between 1973 and 2008. He reported that capital inflow bonanzas increased the incidence of bank crises. When he distinguished among foreign direct investment, portfolio equity and debt bonanzas, the results indicated that only the portfolio equity and debt bonanzas were associated with an increased likelihood of crises. More analysis revealed that the impact of increased debt was due in part to a lending boom. Caballero suggested that the capital inflows could also have increased asset prices, generating an asset bubble and an eventual collapse.

Deniz Iagan and Zhibo Tan of the IMF used both macroeconomic and micro-level firm data to examine the relationship of capital inflows and credit growth. They first examined the impact of capital inflows on aggregate credit to households and non-financial corporations in advanced and emerging market economies during the period of 1980-2011. They distinguished among FDI, portfolio and other inflows. They reported that portfolio and other inflows contributed to rises in household credit, and only the other inflows were significant for corporate credit.

Iagan and Tan also had data on firms in these countries, and sought to identify the determinants of leverage in these firms. They calculated an index, based on work done by Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (RZ), of a firm’s dependence on external financing. When they interacted the RZ indicator with the different types of capital inflows, the interactive term was always significant in the case of the other inflows, significant with portfolio flows in some specifications, and never significant in the case of FDI flows. The authors concluded that the results of the macro and firm level analyses were consistent: the composition of capital matters. In additional analysis, they found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the capital inflows led to higher asset prices.

What can be done to insulate an economy from lending booms that may lead to bank crises? Nicolas E. Magud and Esteban R. Versperoni of the IMF and Carmen R. Reinhart of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government (working paper here) examined whether the nature of the exchange rate regime was relevant. They found that less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with increases in bank credit and a higher share of foreign currency in bank credit. On the other hand, the exchange rate regime had no impact of the size of the capital inflows. The authors of the Bank for International Settlements 85th Annual Report 2014/15, however, wrote that the insulation property of flexible exchange rates is “overstated.” An exchange rate appreciation can raise the value of firms with debt denominated in foreign currency, which increases the availability of credit.

How can regulators lower the danger of more bank crises due to debt inflows? Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni suggest the use of macroprudential measures that affect the incentives to borrow in a foreign currency, such as currency-dependent liquidity requirements. But Caballero warns that capital controls on debt inflows may be insufficient if portfolio equity flows also contribute to lending booms that result in banking crises.

These research papers find that domestic asset prices respond to international financial flows. This makes it harder to insulate the domestic financial markets from foreign markets, and leaves these markets vulnerable to spillovers from changes in foreign conditions. The emerging markets already face downturns in their markets, and the combination of increased global volatility with a rise in the costs of servicing the dollar-denominated debt of corporations in emerging markets if the Federal Reserve raises interest rates will only add to their burdens.

Global Volatility, Domestic Markets

Unlike the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the current disruption in the financial markets of emerging market nations was anticipated. The “taper tantrum” of 2013 revealed the precarious position of many of these nations, particularly those dependent on commodity exports. The combination of a slowdown in Chinese growth, collapsing stock prices and a change in the Chinese central bank’s exchange rate policy indicated that the world’s second-largest economy has its own set of problems. But global volatility itself can roil financial markets, and good fundamentals may be of little help for a government trying to shelter its economy from the instability in world markets.

The importance of global (or “push”) factors for capital flows to emerging markets was studied by Eugenio Cerutti, Stijn Claessens and Damien Puy of the IMF. They looked at capital flows to 34 emerging markets during the period of 2001-2013, and found that global factors such as the VIX, a measure of anticipated volatility in the U.S. stock market, accounted for much of the variation in flows. Not all forms of capital were equally affected: bank-related and portfolio flows (bonds and equity) were strongly influenced by the global factors, but foreign direct investment was not.

Cerutti, Claessens and Puy also investigated whether the emerging markets could insulate themselves from the global environment with good domestic macro fundamentals. They reported that the sensitivity of emerging markets to the external factors depended in large part upon the identity of a country’s investors. The presence of global investors, such as international mutual funds in the case of portfolio flows and global banks in the case of bank finance, drove up the response to the global environment. The authors concluded: “…there is no robust evidence that “good” macroeconomic (e.g., public debt, growth) or institutional fundamentals (e.g., Investment Climate and Rule of Law) have a role in explaining EM different sensitivities to global push factors.”

A similar finding was reported in a study of corporate bond markets in emerging markets, which have grown considerably since the 2007-09 crisis. Diana Ayala, Milan Nedeljkovic and Christian Saborowski, also of the IMF, studied the share of bond finance in total corporate debt in 47 emerging market economies over the period of 2000-13. Domestic factors contributed to the development of bond markets. But the growth in these markets in the post-crisis period was driven by global factors, such as the spread in U.S. high yield bonds, a proxy for global risk aversion, and U.S. broker-dealer leverage. The authors conjecture that the growth in bond finance in the emerging markets was due to a search for higher yields than those available in advanced economies during this period. If this interpretation is correct, then these countries will see capital outflows once interest rates in the U.S. and elsewhere rise.

A third paper from the IMF, written by Christian Ebeke and Annette Kyobe, looked at the markets for emerging market sovereign bonds. Their results are based on data from 17 emerging markets over the 2004-13 period. They found that foreign participation in the market for domestic-currency denominated sovereign bonds increased the impact of U.S. interest rates on the yield of these bonds once a threshold of 30 percent had been reached. Similarly, an increase in the concentration of the investor base made the bond yields more sensitive to global financial shocks.

Are domestic “pull” factors always irrelevant for capital flows? Ahmed Shaghil, Brahima Coulibaly and Andrei Zlate of the Federal Reserve Board constructed a “vulnerability index” of macroeconomic fundamentals for a sample of 20 emerging market economies during 13 periods of financial stress, beginning with the Mexican crisis of 1994 and ending with the 2013 taper tantrum. They looked at the impact of their index upon a measure of depreciation pressure, based on changes in exchange rates and losses in foreign exchange reserves. They found that there was evidence of a linkage between the macro fundamentals and depreciation pressure during the global financial crisis and then again during the European sovereign debt crisis and the taper tantrum, but not before.

Why would the response of emerging market economies to domestic fundamentals become stronger during the most recent crises? Shaghil, Coulibaly and Zlate offer two reasons: first, it may be that foreign investors investors did not distinguish among the emerging market economies until the 2000s. But as the governments of these countries implemented different policy frameworks and the costs of gathering information about them fell due to technology, it became worthwhile to distinguish amongst them based on their individual characteristics. An alternative reason for the change over time could lie in a shift in the origin of the crises away from the emerging markets themselves. Therefore, investors have become more careful in examining the vulnerabilities of individual countries.

The analysis of the relative importance of domestic “pull” vs. global “push” factors should not be posed as a “one or the other” contest (see here). There is ample evidence to indicate that global factors have become increasingly important in driving capital flows across borders. If so, then the news that the VIX hit record levels last week is disturbing. Stock markets in the U.S. and other advanced economies have rebounded, but the emerging market nations face a period of sustained retrenchment as investors reallocate their funds in response to the surge in global volatility.

Morality Tales and Capital Flows

When the Federal Reserve finally raises its interest rate target, it will be one of the most widely anticipated policy moves since the Fed responded to the global financial crisis. The impact on emerging markets, which have already begun to see reversals of the inflows of capital they received when yields in the U.S. were depressed, has been discussed and analyzed in depth.  But the morality tale of errant policymakers being punished for their transgressions may place too much responsibility for downturns on the emerging markets and not enough on the volatile capital flows that can overwhelm their financial markets.

Capital outflows—particularly those large outflows known as “sudden stops”—are often attributed to weak economic “fundamentals,” such as rising fiscal deficits and public debt, and anemic growth rates. Concerns about such flows resulted in the “taper tantrums” of 2013 when then-Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke stated that the Fed would reduce its purchases of assets through its Quantitative Easing program once the domestic employment situation improved. The “fragile five” of Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey suffered large declines in currency values and domestic asset prices. Their current account deficits and low growth rates were blamed for their vulnerability to capital outflows. There have been subsequent updates of conditions in these countries, with India now seen as in stronger shape because of a declining current account deficit and lower inflation rate, whereas Brazil’s situation has deteriorated for the opposite reasons.

But this assignment of blame is too simplistic. Barry Eichengreen of UC-Berkeley and Poonam Gupta of the World Bank investigated conditions in the emerging markets after Bernanke’s announcement. The countries with largest current account deficits also recorded the largest combination of currency depreciations, reserve losses, and stock market declines. But Eichengreen and Gupta found little evidence that countries with stronger policy fundamentals escaped foreign sector instability. On the other hand, the size of their financial markets as measured by capital inflows in the period before 2013 did contribute to the adverse response to Bernanke’s statement. The co-authors interpreted this result as showing that foreign investors withdrew funds from the financial markets where they could most easily sell assets.

These results are consistent with work done by Manuel R. Agosin of the University of Chile and Franklin Huaita of Peru’s Ministry of Economics and Finance. They reported that the best predictor of a “sudden stop” was a previous capital inflow, or “surge.” Sudden stops are more likely to occur when the capital inflow had consisted largely of portfolio investments and cross-border lending.  Moreover, they claimed, capital surges worsen the current account deficits that precede sudden stops (see also here).

Stijn Claessens of the IMF and Swait Ghosh of the World Bank also looked at the impact of capital flows on emerging markets. They found that capital flows to these countries are usually large relative to their domestic financial systems. Capital inflows contribute to the pro-cyclicality of their business cycles by providing funding for increased bank lending, which are dominant in the financial systems of emerging markets. The foreign money also puts pressures on exchange rates and asset prices, and can lead to higher debt ratios. All these lead to buildups in macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities, which are manifested when there is negative shock, either in the form of a domestic cyclical downturn or a global shock.

What can the emerging market counties do to protect themselves from the effects of volatile capital inflows? Claessens and Ghosh recommend a combination of macroeconomic measures, such as monetary and fiscal tightening; macro prudential policies that include limits on bank credit; and capital flow management measures, i.e., capital controls. However, they point out that the best combination of these policy tools has yet to be ascertained.

Hélène Rey of the London Business School has written about the global financial cycle, which can lead to excessive credit growth that is not aligned with a country’s economic conditions, and subsequent financial booms and busts. The lesson she draws is that in today’s world Mundell’s “trilemma” has become a “dilemma”: “independent monetary policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed, directly or indirectly, regardless of the exchange-rate regime.” Joshua Aizenman of the University of Southern California, Menzie Chinn of the La Folette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Hiro Ito of Portland State University, however, report evidence that exchange rate regimes do matter in the international transmission of monetary policies.

Whether or not flexible exchange rates can provide some protection from foreign shocks, the capital controls that have been implemented in recent years will receive a “stress test” once the Federal Reserve does raise its interest rate target. Policymakers will be forced to make difficult decisions regarding exchange rates and monetary policies. Moreover, this tale of financial volatility may have a different moral than the usual one: bad things can happen even to those who follow the rules.

The U.S.: Inept Diplomacy, Indispensable Currency

The announcements by several European governments that they would join the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have been widely seen as indicators of the declining position of the U.S.  The AIIB had been proposed by China for the purpose of funding much-needed infrastructure projects in Asian countries. The U.S. had discouraged other governments from joining, ostensibly on the grounds that the new institution would overlap with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. But the real reason seemed to be a concern that the Chinese would have a regional forum to wield power.

The New York Times held both the Congress and President Obama responsible for mishandling the issue. The U.S. claimed it sought to ensure better governance in the new institution, but gave no signal of being willing to work with the Chinese and others to make the AIIB an effective agency. The continuing refusal of Congress to approve reforms in the IMF’s governance structure gives the Chinese and other emerging markets ample cause to look elsewhere. The Economist put it starkly: “China has won, gaining the support of American allies not just in Asia but in Europe, and leaving America looking churlish and ineffectual.”

And yet: the same issue of The Economist stated that “In the world of economics, one policy maker towers above all others…,”, and named Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen as holder of that position due to the sheer size of the U.S. economy. The influence of the U.S. in financial flows extends far outside national borders. A study by Robert N.McCauley, Patrick McGuire and Vladyslav Sushko of the Bank for International Settlements estimated that the amount of dollar-denominated credit received by non-financial borrowers outside the U.S. totaled $9 trillion by mid-2014. Over two-thirds of the credit originated outside the U.S., with about $3.7 trillion coming from banks and $2.7 from bond investors. The report’s authors found that dollar credit extended to non-U.S. borrowers grew much more rapidly than did credit within the U.S. during the post-global financial crisis period.

Almost half of this amount went to borrowers in emerging markets, particularly China ($1.1 trillion), Brazil ($300 billion), and India ($125 billion). In the case of Brazil, most of the funds were raised through the issuance of bonds, while bank lending accounted for the largest proportion of credit received by borrowers in China. Much of this credit was routed through the subsidiaries of firms outside their home countries, and balance of payments data would not capture these flows.

The study’s authors attributed the rise in borrowing in emerging markets to their higher interest rates. Consequently, any rise in U.S. interest rates will have global repercussions. The growth in dollar-denominated credit outside the U.S. should slow. But there may be other, less constructive consequences. Borrowers will face higher funding costs, and loans or bonds that looked safe at one interest rate may be less so at another. This situation is worsened by an appreciating dollar if the earnings of the borrowers are not also denominated in dollars. The rise in the value of the dollar has already prompted reassessments of financial fragility outside the U.S.

All this puts U.S. monetary policymakers in a delicate position. Ms. Yellen has made it clear that the Fed is in no hurry to raise interest rates. The Federal Reserve wants to see what happens to prices and wages as well as unemployment before it moves. The appreciation of the dollar pushes that date further into the future by keeping inflation rates depressed while cutting into the profitability of U.S. firms. While the impact of higher rates on credit markets outside the U.S. most likely has a relatively low place on the Fed’s list of concerns, Fed policymakers certainly are aware of the potential for collateral damage.

All this demonstrates the discrepancy between the diplomatic and financial power of the U.S. On the one hand, the U.S. must deal with countries that are eager to claim their places in global governance. The dominance of the U.S. and other G7 nations in international institutions is a relic of a world that came to an end with the global financial crisis. On the other hand, the dollar is still the predominant international currency, and will hold that place for many years to come. The use of the renminbi is slowly growing but it will be a long time before it can serve as an alternative to the dollar. Consequently, the actions of the Federal Reserve may have more international repercussions than those of U.S. policymakers unable to cope with the shifting landscape of financial diplomacy.