Tag Archives: emerging markets

Global Stability, National Responsibilities

The global financial crisis demonstrated clearly how the flow of money across borders could deepen and widen a financial crisis. A decline in U.S. housing prices led to a re-examination of the safety of financial securities based on them and an implosion in credit markets as financial institutions sought to re-establish their soundness by shedding the securities that were now seen as toxic. These institutions included European banks that had purchased mortgage-backed securities and other collateralized debt obligations. Eventually the emerging markets were brought into the vortex by capital outflows that disrupted their own financial markets. But are we ready to change the rules governing global finance if they impinge on national sovereignty?

Andrew Haldane, chief economist of the Bank of England, spoke last October about the need to manage global finance as a system. He identified four areas that require strengthening: global surveillance, improvements to national debt structures, the establishment of macro-prudential and capital flow management policies, and improved international liquidity assistance. Advances have been made in all these areas since the crisis.

The IMF, for example, has expanded the scope of its surveillance activities to focus more on the spillovers of national policies on other countries and regions. The latest Pilot External Sector Report, for example, examines global imbalances and finds that

“…disorderly external adjustment in some deficit economies remains a risk, particularly in an environment of tightening external financial conditions, and if the policy/institutional environment were to deteriorate or other idiosyncratic shocks materialize. Moreover, country-level risks would have spillovers and carry the potential of becoming systemic, e.g., if a group of EMs (Emerging Markets) with excess deficits were simultaneously affected by negative shocks.”

But is calling attention to possible adverse shocks sufficient? Biagio Bossone and Roberta Marra (see also here) of The Group of Lecce have called for a new commitment by the members of the IMF to be “Global Good Citizens.” This would entail amending the IMF’s Articles of Governance to include ‘global systemic stability’ as a mission of the Fund and its members. This new goal would be defined to include sustainable equilibria in the members’ balance of payments, high levels of domestic employment and income and reasonable price stability, and management of the cross-border transmission of shocks. To achieve these goals, all members would be responsible for implementing external adjustment programs as well as ensuring domestic employment and low inflation, and cooperating with other members to minimize the international transmission of shocks. Moreover, the IMF would be granted the authority to assess whether the policies of its members were consistent with global stability. The Fund could use multilateral consultations to address systemic issues and to call on policymakers to take the cross-national effects of their actions into account.

How good is the IMF’s record on calling out members who have violated existing obligations? Not so good. There were consultations with Sweden and Korea in the 1980s regarding their exchange rates, and discussions in 2006 with China, the U.S., Japan, Saudi Arabia and the Eurozone regarding global imbalances. But the latter were unsuccessful in changing the national policies that led to the imbalances.  Large nations traditionally place little weight on the welfare of other countries when formulating policies, and, if pressed, will claim that their actions benefit the global economy.

But it would be short-sighted to dismiss Bossone and Marra’s innovative proposal to expand the responsibilities of national policymakers to include spillovers. Ignoring cross-border effects is at best myopic and possibly self-defeating. Charles Engel of the University of Wisconsin in a survey of research on spillovers concludes that:

“An optimal policy aimed at inflation and employment will increasingly need to take into account the impact of events in other countries, including the effects of foreign monetary policy. It may ultimately be the case that greater stability and growth at home depends on international coordination.”

Financial markets will continue to grow in the emerging markets as well as frontier markets, and financial flows across national borders will continue to rise. These flows may bring benefits but they also increase financial and economic linkages. Soon the question may be not whether to coordinate, but how and when.

Dealing with the Fallout from U.S. Policies

The divergence of monetary policies in the advanced economies continues to roil financial markets. The Federal Reserve has reacted to better labor market conditions by ending its quantitative easing policy. The Bank of Japan, on the other hand, will expand its purchases of securities, and the European Central Bank has indicated its willingness to undertake unconventional policies if inflation expectations do not rise. The differences in the prospects between the U.S. and Great Britain on the one hand and the Eurozone and Japan on the other has caused Nouriel Roubini to liken the global economy to a jetliner with only one engine still functioning.

The effect of U.S. interest rates on international capital flows is well-documented. Many countries are vulnerable to changes in U.S. policies that can reverse financial flows. Countries that have relied on capital flows searching for a higher yield to finance their current account deficits are particularly susceptible. Declining commodity prices reinforce the exposure of commodity exporters such as Brazil and Russia.

U.S. markets affect capital flows in other ways. Erlend Nier, Tahsin Saadi Sedik and Tomas Molino of the IMF have investigated the key drivers of private capital flows in a sample of emerging market economies during the last decade. They found that changes in economic volatility, as measured by the VIX (the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, which measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options), are the “dominant driver of capital flows to emerging markets” during periods of global financial stress. During such periods, the influence of fundamental factors, such as growth differentials, diminishes. Countries can defend themselves with higher interest rates, but at the cost of slowing their domestic economies.

When the IMF’s economists included data from advanced economies in their empirical analysis, they found that the impact of the VIX was higher in those economies. They inferred that as countries develop financially, “capital flows could therefore be increasingly influenced by external factors.” Financial integration, therefore, will lead to more vulnerability to the VIX.

Volatility in U.S. equity markets drives up the VIX. Moreover, empirical analyses, such as one by Corradi, Distaso and Mele, find that U.S. variables, such as the Industrial Production Index and the Consumer Price Index, explain part of the changes in the VIX. U.S. economic conditions, therefore, affect global capital flows through more linkages than interest rates alone.

What are the implications for U.S. policymakers? The Federal Open Market Committee does not usually consider the impact of its policy directives on foreign economies. On the other hand, the Fed is well aware of the feedback from foreign economies to the U.S. Moreover, there are measures the U.S. could undertake to lessen the impact of its policy shifts on foreign markets.

During the global financial crisis, for example, the Federal Reserve established swap arrangements for 14 foreign central banks, including those of Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and South Korea. These gave the foreign financial regulators the ability to lend dollars to their banks that had financed holdings of U.S. assets by borrowing in the U.S. However, not all emerging markets’ central banks were deemed eligible for this financial relationship, leaving some of them disappointed (see Prasad, Chapter 11).

Federal Reserve officials have signaled that they are not interested in serving again as a source of liquidity. One alternative would be to allow the IMF to take over this capacity. But the U.S. Congress has not passed the legislation needed to implement long-overdue governance reforms at the Fund, and it is doubtful that the results of the recent elections will lead to a different stance. Not many foreign countries will be in favor of enabling the IMF to undertake new obligations until the restructuring of that institution’s governance is resolved.

Volatile capital flows have the potential of sabotaging already-anemic recoveries in many emerging market countries. The global financial architecture continues to lack reliable backstops in the event of more instability. The U.S. should cooperate with other nations and international financial institutions in addressing the fallout from its economic policies, either by directly providing liquidity or allowing the international institutions to do so.

Volatility in the Emerging Markets

Volatility has returned to the financial markets. Stock prices in the U.S. have fallen from their September highs, and the return on 10-year Treasury bonds briefly fell below 2%.  Financial markets in emerging markets have been particularly hard hit. The Institute for International Finance estimates that $9 billion was withdrawn from equity markets in those countries in October, while the issuance of new bonds fell.

The increased volatility follows a period of rising allocations of portfolio investments by advanced economies to assets in the emerging market economies. The IMF’s latest Global Financial Stability Report reported that equity market allocations increased from 7% of the total stock of advanced economy portfolio investments in 2002 to almost 10% in 2012, which represented $2.4 trillion of emerging market equities. Similarly, bond allocations rose from 4% to almost 10% during the same period, reaching $1.6 trillion of emerging market bonds.

The outflows are due to several factors. The first, according to the IMF, is a decline in growth rates in these countries below their pre-crisis rates. While part of the slowdown reflects global conditions, there are also concerns about slowing productivity increases. China’s performance is one of the reasons for the lower forecast. Its GDP rose at a rate of 7.3% in the third quarter, below the 7.5% that the government wants to achieve.

Second, the prospect of higher interest rates in the U.S. following the winding down of the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing has caused investors to reassess their asset allocations. The importance of “push” factors versus “pull” factors in driving capital flows has long been recognized, but their relative importance may have grown in recent years.   A recent paper by Shaghil Ahmed and Andrei Zlate (working paper here) provides evidence that the post-crisis response in net capital inflows, particularly portfolio flows, in a sample of emerging markets to the difference between domestic and U.S. monetary policy rates increased in the post-crisis period (2009:Q3 – 2013:Q2). They also looked at the impact of the U.S. large-scale asset purchases, and found that the such purchases had a statistically significant impact on gross capital inflows to these countries.

Part of the increased response in flows between advanced and emerging market economies may reflect the actions of large asset managers. In a paper in the latest BIS Quarterly Review, Ken Miyajima and Ilhyock Shim investigate the response of asset managers in advanced economies to benchmarks of emerging market portfolios. They point out that these managers often rely on performance measures of asset markets in emerging markets, which leads to an increased correlation of the assets under the managers’ control. Moreover, relatively small shifts in portfolio allocation by the asset managers can have a significant impact on asset markets in emerging markets. As a result, in recent years “…investor flows to asset managers and EME asset prices reinforced each other’s directional movements.” Investor flows to the emerging market economies are procyclical. If other factors do not provide a reason to reverse the outflows, they will continue.

The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report also points out that: “An unintended consequence of…stronger financial links between advanced and emerging market economies is the increased synchronization of asset price movements and volatility.” One downside of increased financial globalization, therefore, is a decline in the ability to lower risk through geographic diversification. Similarly, any notion of “decoupling” emerging markets from the advanced economies is a “mirage,” according to Mexico’s central bank head Agustin Carstens. To achieve international financial stability will require monitoring capital flows across asset markets in different countries; volatility does not respect geographic borders.

International Debt and Financial Crises

The latest issue of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook has a chapter on global imbalances that discusses the evolution of net foreign assets (also known as the net international investment position) in debtor and creditor nations. The authors warn that increases in the foreign holdings of domestic liabilities can raise the probability of different types of financial crises, including banking, currency, sovereign debt and sudden stops. A closer inspection of the evidence that has been presented elsewhere suggests that it is foreign-held debt that poses a risk.

The role of international debt in increasing the risk of crises was pointed out by Rodrik and Velasco (working paper 1999), who showed that short-term bank debt contributed to the occurrence of capital flow crises in the period of 1988-98. More recently, Joyce (2011) (working paper here) looked at systemic bank crises in a sample of emerging markets, and found that an increase in foreign debt liabilities contributed to an increase in the incidence of these crises, while FDI and portfolio equity liabilities had the opposite effect. Ahrend and Goujard (2014) (working paper here) confirmed that increases in debt liabilities increase the occurrence of systemic banking crises. Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) (working paper here) found that an increase in net foreign assets lowered the probability of external crises. Moreover, they also reported that this effect was due to net debt. FDI had the opposite effect, i.e., an increase in FDI liabilities lowered the risk of a crisis. Al-Saffar, Ridinger and Whitaker (2013) have looked at external balance sheet positions during the global financial crisis and reported that gross external debt contributed to declines in GDP.

There are also studies that compare the effect of equity and debt flows. Levchenko and Mauro (2007), for example, investigated the behavior of several types of flows, and found that FDI was stable during periods of “sudden stops,” while portfolio equity played a limited role in propagating the crisis. Portfolio debt, on the other hand, and bank flows were more likely to be reversed. Similarly, Furceri, Guichard and Rusticelli (2012) (working paper here) found that large capital inflows driven by debt increase the probability of banking, currency and balance-of-payment crises, while inflows that are driven by FDI or portfolio equity have a negligible effect.

Why are debt liabilities more risky for countries than equity? Debt is contractual: the holder of the debt expects to be paid regardless of economic conditions. Equity holders, on the other hand, know that their payout is tied to the profitability of the firm that issues the debt. Moreover, during a crisis there are valuation effects on external balance sheets. The value of equity falls, which raises the net foreign asset position of those countries that are net issuers of equity, while lowering it for those that hold equity. In addition, debt may be denominated in a foreign currency to attract foreign investors worried about depreciation. A currency depreciation during a crisis raises the value of the debt on the balance sheet of the issuing country.

These results have consequences for the use of capital controls and the sequence of decontrol. Emerging markets should be careful when issuing debt. However, the evidence to date of trends in the international capital markets shows a rise in the use of debt by these countries. Emerging market governments, for example, issued $69 billion in bonds in the first quarter. In addition, the BIS has drawn attention to the issuance of debt securities by corporations in emerging markets.

The IMF has warned of a slowdown in the emerging market countries, with the Fund’s economists forecasting GDP growth rates below the pre-crisis rates.  Speculation about the impact of changes in the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing policies has contributed to concerns about these countries. If a slowdown does materialize, the debt that was issued by these countries may become a burden that requires outside intervention.

The IMF and Ukraine

The International Monetary Fund last week announced an agreement with Ukraine on a two year Stand-By Arrangement. The amount of money to be disbursed depends on how much other financial support the country will receive, but will be total at least $14 billion. Whether or not this IMF program will be fully implemented (unlike the last two) depends on the government’s response to both the economic crisis and the external threat that Russia poses. There is also the interesting display of the use of the IMF by the U.S., the largest shareholder, to pursue its international strategic goals even though the U.S. Congress will not approve reforms in the IMF’s quota system.

Ukraine’s track record with the IMF is not a good one. In November 2008 as the global financial crisis intensified, the IMF offered Ukraine an arrangement worth $16.4 billion. But only about a third of that amount was disbursed because of disagreements over fiscal policy.  Another program for $15.3 billion was approved in 2010, but less than a quarter of those funds were given to the country.

The recidivist behavior is the product of a lack of political commitment to the measures contained in the Letters of Intent signed by the government of Ukraine. Ukraine, like other former Soviet republics, was slow to move to a market system, and therefore lagged behind East European countries such as Poland and Romania in adopting new technology. Andrew Tiffin of the IMF attributed the country’s economic underachievement to a “market-unfriendly institutional base” that has allowed continued rent-seeking. Promises to enact reform measures have been made but not fulfilled.

Are the chances of success any better now? Peter Boone of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics and Simon Johnson of MIT are not convinced that there has been a change in attitude within the Ukrainian government, despite the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych (see also here). Consequently, they write: “There is no point to bailing out Ukraine’s creditors and backstopping Ukrainian banks when the core problems persist: pervasive corruption, exacerbated by the ability to play Russia and the West against each other.”

Leszek Balcerowicz, a former deputy prime minister of Poland and former head of its central bank, is more optimistic about the country’s chances. The political movement that drove out Yankovich, he claims, is capable of promoting reform. Further aggression by Russia, however, will threaten whatever changes the Ukrainian people seek to undertake.

The “back story” to the IMF’s program for Ukraine has its own intramural squabbling. The U.S. Congress has not passed the legislation needed to change the IMF’s quotas so that voting power would shift from the Europeans to the emerging market nations. The changes would also put the the Fund’s ability to finance its lending programs on a more regular basis. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid sought to insert approval of the IMF-related measures within the bill to extend assistance to the Ukraine, but Republicans lawmakers refused to allow its inclusion. While U.S. politicians expect the organization to serve their political ends, they reject changes that would grant the IMF credibility with its members from the developing world.

The Economist has called the failure of Congress to support the IMF “shameful and self-defeating.” Similarly, Ted Truman of the Peterson Institute for International Economics warns that the U.S. is endangering its chances of obtaining support for Ukraine. The Europeans, of course, are delighted, as they will keep their place in the Fund’s power structure while the blame is shifted elsewhere. And the response of the emerging markets to another program for Ukraine, despite its dismal record, while they are refused a larger voice within the IMF? That will no doubt make for some interesting discussions at the Annual Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank that begin on April 11.

Tapering and the Emerging Markets

The response of the exchange rates of emerging markets and their equity markets to the Federal Reserve’s “taper,” i.e., reduction in asset purchases, continues to draw comment (see, for example, here). Most analysts agree that these economies are in better shape to deal with capital outflows than they were in the past, and that the risk of another Asian-type crisis is relatively low. But that does not mean that their economies will react the way we expect.

Gavyn Davies of Fulcrum Asset Management, who has a blog at the Financial Times, has posted the transcript of a “debate” he organized with Maurice Obstfeld of UC-Berkeley, Alan M. Taylor of UC-Davis and Dominic Wilson, chief economist and co-head of Global Economics Research at Goldman Sachs, on the financial turbulence in the emerging markets. “Debate” is not the best word to describe the discussion, as there are many areas of agreement among the participants. Obstfeld points out that there are far fewer fixed exchange rate regimes in today’s emerging markets, and many of their monetary policymakers have adopted policy regimes of inflation targeting. Moreover, the accumulation of foreign exchange by the central banks leaves them in a much stronger position than they were in the 1990s. Taylor adds fiscal prudence and less public debt to the factors that make emerging markets much less risky.

But all the participants are concerned about the winding down of the credit booms that capital inflows fueled. Wilson worries about economies with current account deterioration, easy monetary policy, above-target inflation, weak linkages to the recovery in the developed markets and institutions of questionablestrength. He cites Turkey, India and Brazil as countries that meet these criteria. Similarly, Taylor lists countries with relatively rapid expansion in domestic credit over the 2002-2012 period, and Brazil and India appear vulnerable on these dimensions as well.

Another analysis of the determinants of international capital flows comes from Marcel Förster, Markus Jorra and Peter Tillmann of the University of Giessen. They estimate a dynamic hierarchical factor model of capital flows that distinguishes among a common global factor, a factor dependent on the type of capital inflow, a regional factor and a country-specific component. They report that the country component explains from 60 – 80% of the volatility in capital flows, and conclude that domestic policymakers have a large degree of influence over their economy’s response to capita flows.

But are “virtuous” policies always rewarded? Joshua Aizenman of the University of Southern California, Michael Hutchison of UC-Santa Cruz and Mahir Binici of the Central Bank of Turkey have a NBER paper that investigates the response in exchange rates, stock markets and credit default swap (CDS) spreads to announcements from Federal Reserve officials on tapering. They utilize daily data for 26 emerging markets during the period of November 27, 2012 to October 3, 2013. They looked at the response to statements from Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke regarding tapering, as well as his comments about the continuation of quantitative easing. They also looked at the impact of statements from Federal Reserve Governors and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents on these topics, as well as official Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements.

Their results show that Bernanke’s comments on winding down asset purchases led to significant drops in stock markets and exchange rate depreciations, but had no significant impact on CDS spreads. There were no significant responses to statements from the other Fed officials. On the other hand, there were significant responses in exchange rates when Bernanke spoke about continuing quantitative easing, as well as to FOMC statements and announcements by the other policymakers.

The countries in the sample were then divided between those viewed as possessing “robust” fundamentals, with current account surpluses, large holdings of foreign exchange reserves and low debt, and those judged to be “fragile” due to their current account deficits, small reserve holdings and high debt. Bernanke’s tapering comments resulted in larger immediate depreciations in the countries with current account surpluses as oppose to those with deficits, more reserves and less debt.  Similarly, Bernanke’s statements led to increased CDS spreads in the countries with current account surpluses and large reserve holdings, while lowering equity prices in countries with low debt positions. The immediate impact of the news regarding tapering, therefore, seemed to be tilted against those with strong fundamentals.

The authors provide an explanation for their results: the robust countries had received larger financial flows previous to the perceived turnaround in Fed policy, and therefore were more vulnerable to the impact of tapering. Moreover, as the change in the Federal Reserve’s policy stance was assimilated over time, the exchange rates of the fragile nations responded, and by the end of the year had depreciated more than those of the more robust economies. Similarly, their CDS spreads rose more. By the end of 2013, Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey had been identified as the “Fragile Five.”

What do these results tell us about the impact on emerging markets from future developments in the U.S. or other advanced economies? There may be a graduated response, as the relative standings of those nations that have attracted the most capital are reassessed. However, if capital outflows continue and are seen as including more than “hot money,” then the economic fundamentals of the emerging markets come to the fore. But financial markets follow their own logic and timing, and can defy attempts to foretell their next twists and turns.

Riding the Waves

The volatility in emerging markets has abated a bit, but may resume in the fallout of the Russian takeover of the Crimea. The capital outflows and currency depreciations experienced in some emerging market nations have been attributed to their choice of policies. But their economic situations reflect the domestic impact of capital inflows as well as their macroeconomic policies.

 Fernanda Nechio of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, for example, shows that exchange rate depreciations of emerging markets are linked to their fiscal and current account balances, with larger depreciations occurring in those countries such as Brazil and India with deficits in both balances. Kristin Forbes of MIT’s Sloan School also draws attention to the connection between the extent of the currency depreciations and the corresponding current account deficits. Nechio and Forbes both advise policymakers in emerging markets to make sound policy choices to avoid further volatility.

Good advice! But Stijn Claessens of the IMF and Swati Ghosh of the World Bank have pointed out in the World Bank’s Dealing with the Challenges of Macro Financial Linkages in Emerging Markets that capital flows can exacerbate prevailing economic trends. Relatively large capital inflows to emerging markets (“surges”) tend to take the form of bank and portfolio debt, which contribute to increased domestic bank lending and domestic credit. Claessens and Ghosh write (p.108) that “…large inflows in net terms are the financial counterpart to the savings and investment decisions in the country and affect the exchange rate, inflation, and current account positions.” They also endanger the stability of the financial system as bank balance sheets expand and lending standards deteriorate. These financial flows contribute to increases in asset prices and further credit extension until some domestic or foreign shock leads to an economic and financial downturn.

Are the authorities helpless to do anything? Claessens and Ghosh list policies that may reduce macro vulnerability, which include exchange rate appreciation, monetary and fiscal policy tightening, and the use of capital controls. They also mention, as do the authors of the other chapters of the World Bank volume, the use of macro prudential policies (MaPPs) aimed at financial institutions and borrowers. But they admit that the evidence on the effectiveness of the MaPPs is limited.

Moreover, the macroeconomic policies they enumerate may not be sufficient to deal with the impact of capital inflows. Tightening monetary policy can draw more foreign capital. Fiscal policy is not a nimble policy lever, and usually operates with a lag

What about the use of flexible exchange rates as a buffer against foreign shocks? Emerging market policymakers have been reluctant to fully embrace flexible rates. More importantly, as pointed out here, it is not clear that flexible rates provide the protection that the theory of the “trilemma” suggests it does. Hélène Rey of the London Business School claimed last summer that there fluctuating exchange rates cannot insulate economics from global financial cycles in capital flows and credit growth. Macroprudential measures such as higher leverage ratios are needed, and the use of capital controls should be considered.

Last week we learned that capital flows to developing countries fell in February, with syndicated bank lending falling to its lowest level since 2005. This was followed by the news that domestic credit growth is falling in many emerging markets, including Brazil and Indonesia. The ensuing changes in fundamentals in these countries may or may not alleviate further depreciation pressures. But they will reflect the procyclical linkage of capital flows and domestic credit growth as much as wise policy choices. And there is no guarantee that the reversals will not overshoot and bring about a new set of troubles. The waves of capital can be as tricky to ride as are ocean waves.

Been There, Done That

President Barack Obama has nominated Stanley Fischer to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, where he will succeed Janet Yellen as Vice-Chair of the Board. Fischer’s accomplishments are well-known. But he also brings an interesting set of credentials to the Board at a time when it has been criticized for ignoring the impact of its policies on other countries.

Fischer received his doctoral degree from MIT, and returned there after a stint on the faculty at the University of Chicago. During the 1970s and 1980s he taught or advised such future luminaries as Ben Bernanke, Greg Mankiw and Mario Draghi. He served as Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank from 1988 to 1990. He was the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF from 1994 through 2001, a period when financial crises recurred on a regular basis in the emerging market countries.

Fischer’s experience with those crises gives him a perspective that macroeconomists who work only on the U.S. economy do not possess. Paul Krugman has written about how the financial instability of the post-Bretton Woods era has affected the views of those who follow these events. In 2009, for example, when our profession was castigated for not foreseeing the global financial crisis, Krugman wrote: “

…the common claim that economists ignored the financial side and the risks of crisis seems not quite fair – at least from where I sit. In international macro, one of my two home fields, we’ve worried about and tried to analyze crises a lot. Especially after the Asian crisis of 1997-98, financial crises were very much on everyone’s mind.

Similarly, in 2011 Krugman wrote:

Indeed, my sense is that international macroeconomists – people who followed the ERM crises of the early 1990s, the Latin American debt crisis, the Asian crisis of the late 90s, and so on – were caught much less flat-footed.

The IMF, of course, was widely criticized at the time for its crisis-management policies and its advocacy of deregulating capital flows.  In retrospect, Fischer’s arguments in favor of capital account liberalization appear overly zealous, and he has drawn criticisms for those positions. The IMF has recently adopted a more nuanced position on the use of capital controls as a macro prudential tool.

And yet—in 2000, after the resignation of the IMF’s Managing Director Michel Camdessus, Fischer, who was born in Rhodesia (now Zambia), was nominated to be Camdessus’ replacement by a group of African nations. (Miles Kahler presents the story in his Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals.) This was a challenge to the European governments that had always claimed the prerogative of naming the Managing Directors of the IMF since it commenced operations in 1945. But the nomination was also an indication of the respect that Fischer enjoyed amongst the African and other developing countries. In the end, it was impossible to change the IMF’s traditional governing procedures, and Horst Köhler of Germany became the new Managing Director.

After Fischer left the IMF, he went to work at Citigroup. In 2005 he was appointed Governor of the Bank of Israel, and served there until last year. Under his leadership the Bank received praise for its policies. Fischer was widely admired and received an “A” for his stewardship from the magazine Global Finance. Those pouring through his recent speeches and writings for indications of what he might do as a Federal Reserve Governor believe that he endorses the Fed’s accommodative stance, but may have a nuanced approach on the benefits and costs of forward guidance.

Stanley Fischer, therefore, brings several attributes to the Federal Reserve. First, he has an unquestioned command of macroeconomics, and in particular, monetary policy. Second, he has a wealth of experience in dealing with financial calamities. And third, he earned the trust and respect of policymakers in developing nations while he served at the IMF. Those qualities will be much appreciated as foreign officials and financial markets deal with the Federal Reserve’s policy pivot.

Affairs, Domestic and Foreign

Raghuram Rajan, ex- faculty member of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago, ex-head of the research department of the IMF, and currently Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (its central bank), set off a storm of comment when he warned of a breakdown in the global coordination of monetary policy. Frustrated by the decline in the foreign exchange value of the rupee that followed the cutback in asset purchases by the Federal Reserve, Rajan claimed that the Federal Reserve was ignoring the impact of its policies on the rest of the world.  Does he have a valid cause for concern?

Quite a few folks have weighed in on this matter: see here, here, here, here, here and here. Rodrik and Subramanian make several interesting points. First, the Federal Reserve was criticized when it lowered rates, so complaints that it is now raising them are a bit hypocritical (but see here). Second, blaming the Fed for not being a team player as the emerging markets were when they lowered their rates in 2008-09 is not a valid comparison. The emerging markets lowered their rates then because it was in their interest to do so, not out of any sense of international solidarity. Third, their governments allowed short-term capital inflows to enter their economies; did they not realize that the day could come when these flows would reverse? Finally, their policymakers allowed the inflows to contribute to credit bubbles that resulted in inflation and current account deficits, which are significant drivers of the volatility.

Moreover, the Federal Reserve is constrained by law to promote maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates in the U.S., not the global community But couldn’t turmoil in the emerging markets threaten U.S. conditions? Robin Harding at the Financial Times thinks this is an unlikely scenario. He points to two channels of transmission between the U.S. and the countries that have shown the most turbulence: exports and financial markets. The emerging market nations that have witnessed the most volatility account for very small proportions of U.S. exports. (China, on the other hand, does claim 7.5% of our exports, but so far has not suffered any signs of distress (but see here).) In addition, financial flows might be affected, but to date these have resulted in lower interest rates in the U.S. due to a flight to safety. Previous shocks from the emerging markets pushed U.S. stock prices down, but these effects were short-lived. Therefore, Harding claims, “…it would have to become much more of a crisis…” to endanger the U.S. economy.

The problem with this assessment is that it assumes that we know the extent of our financial vulnerability to a decline in the fortunes of these economies. But one lesson of the 2007-09 global financial crisis is that there may be much we do not know about our financial structure. U.S.-based institutions can be vulnerable to shocks in ways that we do not recognize. Subprime mortgages were not themselves that significant a share of the liabilities of U.S. banks and shadow banks, but they were the foundation of a range of derivatives, etc., that took down the financial markets when these mortgages became toxic.

The threat of more declines in foreign asset prices does not mean that the Federal Reserve should retreat from its current policies. A situation with some interesting similarities took place in the early 1980s. U.S. banks, awash with recycled oil revenues, had lent extensively to countries in Latin America and elsewhere in the 1970s.  A debt crisis ensued after Paul Volcker and the Federal Reserve raised interest rates (see Chapter 4). Volcker recently reflected on these events in an interview with Martin Feldstein in the fall 2013 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives:

“What were you going to do? Were you going to conduct an easy-money policy and go back on all the policy you’d undertaken to try to save Mexico, which wouldn’t have saved Mexico anyway? We did save Mexico, but by other means.”

U.S. policymakers have always claimed (with some justification) that a healthy U.S. economy is the best remedy for a troubled world economy, and monetary officials will no doubt proceed as they think best. But we should take a look around before we proceed. The February ice underneath our feet may be a bit thinner than we realize.

Desperate Times, Desperate Measures

The selloff of emerging market currencies and equities continued last week. A Bank of America report noted that investors withdrew $6.4 billion last week from emerging market stock funds, while bond investors are also showing signs of retreating. Moreover, the declines in currency values have expanded outside the “Fragile Five” of Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey to include Argentina and Russia. What can policymakers do to offset the declines?

Kristin J. Forbes and Michael W. Klein have examined the policy options available to governments that face crises due to contracting capital flows and their impact on GDP growth, inflation and unemployment. The measures include a rise in interest rates, currency depreciation, the sale of foreign exchange reserves and new controls on capital outflows. They report that currency depreciations and reserve sales will provide support for GDP growth, while increases in interest rates and or imposing capital controls do not. But the beneficial impacts of the first two sets of policies appear with a lag and may generate higher inflation. None of the measures improve unemployment.

Christian Saborowski, Sarah Sanya, Hans Weisfeld and Juan Yepez of the IMF also looked at the effectiveness of capital outflow restrictions. They report that controls on outflows can be effective in reducing net outflows only when countries have good macroeconomic fundamentals, as measured by their records of GDP growth, inflation, fiscal policy and their current account balances, or good institutions. Iceland’s use of controls in 2008 is cited as a recent example of a successful use of controls. Of course, an economy with strong macroeconomic conditions is less likely to face substantial outflows.

We can use the indicators used in the IMF study to assess macroeconomic conditions in the countries in the headlines last week. The data are from 2013:

GDP Growth Inflation Fiscal Budget/GDP Current Acct/GDP
Argentina 5.1% ? -3.3% -0.6%
Brazil 2.2% 6.2% -2.7% -3.7%
India 4.9% 10.1% -5.1% -3.1%
Indonesia 5.6% 7.0% -3.3% -3.9%
Russia 1.5% 6.8% -0.5% +2.3%
South Africa 1.9% 5.8% -4.8% -6.5%
Turkey 3.9% 7.5% -1.2% -7.5%

All the countries had rising inflation rates, with India’s hitting double digits. The current account deficits were particularly high for South Africa and Turkey, while India and South Africa had fiscal deficits of about 5%.  Russia’s growth rate was the lowest in this group.

And then there is Argentina. No one believes the inflation rate that the government reports; unofficial estimates place it at around 28%. The government has sought to restrict capital flows while also pegging the exchange rate. But foreign exchange market intervention by the central bank has not stopped an unofficial market from springing up. Last week the central bank, which saw its foreign exchange reserves shrinking precipitously, stepped back and allowed the peso to fall by more than 15%. The government also enacted a partial liberalization of the controls on the purchase of foreign exchange. But there are no signs of a response to inflation, and President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who faces a term limit, has little incentive to take measures that in the short-term could further anger Argentine citizens.

Turkey’s central bank also acknowledged the strength of the forces arrayed against it when it announced a sharp rise in interest rates.  But foreign investors are concerned about corruption and political instability, and the Turkish currency has continued to slump. The Prime Minister’s opposition to the higher interest rates was not reassuring.

When will the withdrawals of money from the emerging markets end, and how will all this play out? The governments of the affected countries are using combinations of all the measures that Forbes and Klein list. But the most diligent central bank can not neutralize the impact of a weak or conflicted government. The financial volatility will continue until some sort of resolution is found to the political volatility.