Tag Archives: IMF

The IMF and Ukraine

The International Monetary Fund last week announced an agreement with Ukraine on a two year Stand-By Arrangement. The amount of money to be disbursed depends on how much other financial support the country will receive, but will be total at least $14 billion. Whether or not this IMF program will be fully implemented (unlike the last two) depends on the government’s response to both the economic crisis and the external threat that Russia poses. There is also the interesting display of the use of the IMF by the U.S., the largest shareholder, to pursue its international strategic goals even though the U.S. Congress will not approve reforms in the IMF’s quota system.

Ukraine’s track record with the IMF is not a good one. In November 2008 as the global financial crisis intensified, the IMF offered Ukraine an arrangement worth $16.4 billion. But only about a third of that amount was disbursed because of disagreements over fiscal policy.  Another program for $15.3 billion was approved in 2010, but less than a quarter of those funds were given to the country.

The recidivist behavior is the product of a lack of political commitment to the measures contained in the Letters of Intent signed by the government of Ukraine. Ukraine, like other former Soviet republics, was slow to move to a market system, and therefore lagged behind East European countries such as Poland and Romania in adopting new technology. Andrew Tiffin of the IMF attributed the country’s economic underachievement to a “market-unfriendly institutional base” that has allowed continued rent-seeking. Promises to enact reform measures have been made but not fulfilled.

Are the chances of success any better now? Peter Boone of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics and Simon Johnson of MIT are not convinced that there has been a change in attitude within the Ukrainian government, despite the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych (see also here). Consequently, they write: “There is no point to bailing out Ukraine’s creditors and backstopping Ukrainian banks when the core problems persist: pervasive corruption, exacerbated by the ability to play Russia and the West against each other.”

Leszek Balcerowicz, a former deputy prime minister of Poland and former head of its central bank, is more optimistic about the country’s chances. The political movement that drove out Yankovich, he claims, is capable of promoting reform. Further aggression by Russia, however, will threaten whatever changes the Ukrainian people seek to undertake.

The “back story” to the IMF’s program for Ukraine has its own intramural squabbling. The U.S. Congress has not passed the legislation needed to change the IMF’s quotas so that voting power would shift from the Europeans to the emerging market nations. The changes would also put the the Fund’s ability to finance its lending programs on a more regular basis. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid sought to insert approval of the IMF-related measures within the bill to extend assistance to the Ukraine, but Republicans lawmakers refused to allow its inclusion. While U.S. politicians expect the organization to serve their political ends, they reject changes that would grant the IMF credibility with its members from the developing world.

The Economist has called the failure of Congress to support the IMF “shameful and self-defeating.” Similarly, Ted Truman of the Peterson Institute for International Economics warns that the U.S. is endangering its chances of obtaining support for Ukraine. The Europeans, of course, are delighted, as they will keep their place in the Fund’s power structure while the blame is shifted elsewhere. And the response of the emerging markets to another program for Ukraine, despite its dismal record, while they are refused a larger voice within the IMF? That will no doubt make for some interesting discussions at the Annual Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank that begin on April 11.

The Spirit of Versailles?

The newly-approved U.S. budget bill did not include authorization for changes at the IMF in funding and quotas (see also here). Those measures require approval of 85% of the voting power of the IMF’s members, and since the U.S. controls 17.67%, the reforms cannot be enacted. This leaves the U.S and the Fund in difficult positions.

The IMF received loans from its members during the 2007-09, but has sought to convert these to increases in the quotas that provide the funding for the IMF’s lending programs. The IMF is not about to run out of money, but the opportunity to put its financing on a regular basis has been (at best) delayed.  The IMF’s members also agreed to shift quota shares, which also determine voting powers, to the emerging market nations while reducing the European presence on its Executive Board. China has made clear that it wants a larger voting share, and the other middle-income countries have taken a similar position. The postponement in increasing their quotas allows their governments to adopt a position of high dudgeon when the IMF next advocates policy changes in their countries. The Europeans, on the other hand, must be delighted that the they are no longer on the spot for obstructing the realignment.

What important Constitutional principle was at stake in the refusal of Congress to approve the measures? According to the New York Times, it was a lack of willingness to support multilateral financial institutions. This ties in with popular opposition in the U.S. to foreign aid, always a perennial target of right-want opprobrium, and it bodes poorly for the future. If a significant segment of political opinion consistently opposes U.S. involvement in international ventures and forums, then the U.S. will pay a price in diminished global influence.

Is it too dramatic to compare this event with the failure of the U.S. Senate to approve the Treaty of Versailles? Probably, but the similarities are suggestive of what is driving the rejection. A significant part of the American electorate was tired then of foreign wars and wished to retreat from foreign obligations, just as many do today. Anything that seems to support the financial sector is also viewed with suspicion.  Personal enmity between President Woodrow Wilson and Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge is echoed in the animosity between President Barak Obama and members of the Republican Congressional delegation. Lodge was concerned that the League would supersede the U.S. government’s ability to conduct foreign affairs, just as many contemporary conservatives are worried about the influence of the United Nations on domestic matters. Both Wilson and Obama have been accused of being unwilling (or unable) to persuade opponents of the need to approve the desired measures.

While the U.S. never joined the League of Nations, it is not about to leave the IMF. But the refusal to ratify the changes in the IMF’s governance will leave the U.S. vulnerable to the charge that it seeks to retain control of an organization that was established at the end of World War II long after its hegemonic position had ebbed. If this were the reason for these developments, it would at least be understandable from a realpolitik perspective. The truth may be more dispiriting: perhaps we do not understand what we have to lose.

As Time Goes By

Depending on how the beginning of the European debt crisis is dated (2010? 2008? 1999?), it has been several years since the governments of several nations have sought to relieve investors’ fears regarding their debt. The governments of four countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal) turned to the IMF and other Eurozone nations for assistance, while Italy and Spain have undertaken policies designed to avoid the need for external assistance. To paraphrase a former mayor of New York, how are those governments doing?

To answer that question, we can draw upon Jay Shambaugh’s insight that there are actually three interlocking crises: a macroeconomic crisis, a debt crisis and a banking crisis.

First, we examine current data for the prevailing (2013) macro conditions in the (in)famous PIIGS, as well as the entire Euro area and, for the sake of comparison, the U.S. and Japan. We exclude Cyprus as its crisis occurred more recently:

%

GDP Growth

Unemployment Budget/GDP

Cur Acc/GDP

Greece

-4.0

27.3 -2.4 0.1
Ireland

0.3

13.2 -7.4

4.0

Italy

-1.8

12.5 -3.3

0.4

Portugal

-1.8

15.6 -5.9

0.3

Spain

-1.3

26.6 -7.1

0.8

Euro Area

-0.4

12.2 -3.0

1.9

U.S.

1.6

7.3 -4.0

-2.5

Japan

1.9 4.0 -8.3

1.2

In the Eurozone countries, only Ireland (barely) has avoided a negative growth rate, while both the U.S. and Japan are doing better. The unemployment rates reflect the depths of the continuing downturns. The budget balances continue to record deficits that largely reflect cyclical conditions; Greece and Italy have primary budget surpluses. The current accounts all register surpluses, unlike the U.S. Nikolas Schöll at Bruegel examined the data to uncover the sources of the reversals of the trade deficits, and pointed out that Ireland, Portugal and Spain recorded large increases in exports, while Greece had a dramatic drop in imports.

Will 2014 be any better? The IMF’s October 2013 World Economic Outlook forecasts a swing to positive growth rates in all of Europe except Slovenia. But, it warned, “Additional near-term support will be needed to reverse weak growth…” and called for further monetary easing. The ECB has obliged by lowering its refinancing rate to 0.25% in response to falling inflation, not a hopeful sign of recovery.

How do these countries do on their sovereign debt? We can compare the debt/GDP data for 2010 with this year’s and next year’s expected levels:

Debt/GDP

2010

2013

2014

Greece

148.3

175.7

174.0

Ireland

91.2

123.3

121.0

Italy

119.3

132.3

133.1

Portugal

94.0

123.6

125.3

Spain

61.7

93.7

99.1

Euro Area

85.7

95.7

96.1

U.S.

95.2

106.0

107.3

Japan

216.0

243.5

242.3

Several years of recession have pushed the ratios up despite fiscal constraint, and the IMF’s October 2013 Fiscal Monitor does not see any short-term improvement outside of Ireland. The increase in the U.S. ratio is not quite as large thanks to its economic recovery, while Japan continues to serve as an outlier. Charles Wyplosz thinks that Greece will require another debt rescheduling, and there are concerns regarding the need for another bailout in Portugal. Falling real estate prices in Spain continue to threaten its banks, while Italy’s largest burden is its politics. Ireland no longer needs external assistance, but it will take years to pay back the loans it received from the IMF and other European governments.

And interest rates? With the 10-year rate on German government bonds at 1.72%, the spreads for the other European countries last week were (in ascending order): Ireland 1.81%; Spain, 2.36%; Italy, 2.38%; Portugal, 4.29%; and Greece, 7.09%. The rates are not onerous despite mediocre economic conditions and steady debt burdens, and have fallen over the last year. What accounts for this remarkable sangfroid by investors?

The answer may be the status of the third crisis: banking. Last year the European Central Bank (ECB) under Mario Draghi instituted a new three-year Long-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO). Banks in southern Europe took the relatively cheap funds and bought the bonds of their own governments, which still carry zero-risk weights in the Basel capital regulations. As a result, according to Silvia Merler (also at Bruegel), banks in those European countries have “renationalized,” with domestic debt accounting for large proportions of their portfolios, and much of this debt consisting of government debt. Moreover, the ECB also announced that it would purchase a government’s sovereign bonds under its Outright Monetary Transactions program if necessary to maintain its target interest rate. Combine bank purchases of government debt with a guarantee of central bank intervention if markets deteriorate and the fall in yields is the obvious result.

All this has the appearance of a Rube Goldberg machine, with a feedback loop uniting the ECB, European banks and sovereign debtors. But is it sustainable? Must the ECB continue renewing the LTRO to keep the banks solvent? Will the European Banking Authority, currently undertaking stress tests of the banks, accept the arrangement? What if the fragile recovery turns out to be really fragile? And what will happen if/when the Federal Reserve does taper off its asset purchases? However many years this crisis has been going on, the exit is not visible yet.

 

Here and There: Nov. 5, 2013

  1. Jérémie Cohen-Sutton has a review at the Bruegel blog of the recent discussion regarding the impact of the choice of exchange rate regimes on economic performance. He provides links to the relevant posts.
  2. The IMF holds its Fourteenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference at its headquarters in Washington, DC on November 7-8, 2013. The program is here and there is a preview here.
  3. There is an informative summary at Twenty-Cent Paradigms of the discussion over Germany’s current account surplus.