Tag Archives: multinationals

Risk and FDI

While FDI flows recovered in 2021 from the previous year’s decline, not all countries benefitted from the increase. UNCTAD reported that almost three quarters of global FDI flows in 2021 occurred in advanced economies, and China and other Asian economies recorded the largest increases amongst the emerging markets and developing economies. Multinational companies are evaluating the course of the pandemic in those countries and their suitability for new global supply routes. Risk, always a factor in FDI decisions, has become an even more important concern.

There are, of course, many forms of risk. Neil M. Kellard, Alexandros Konotonikas and Stefano Maini of the University of Essex with Michael J. Lamla of Leuphana University Lüneburg and Geoffrey Wood of Western University examined the effects of financial system risk in “Risk, Financial Stability and FDI“, published in the Journal of International Money and Finance this year (working paper version here). They specifically investigated the impact of risk on inward FDI stocks within 16 Eurozone between 2009 and 2016, and used bilateral data drawn from the origin countries and host economies to compare the effects of different forms of risk in both locations.

Their results indicated that an increase in risk in the banking sector of an origin country—as measured by the proportion of non-performing loans—led to a decrease in FDI in the host countries. However, changes in bank risk in the host country had no similar impact. They interpret this result as indicating that multinationals are dependent on bank financing in their origin countries to finance their expansion.

In addition, inward FDI was negatively linked to upturns in sovereign yields in both the origin and host countries. The impact of the sovereign yield variable in the origin countries was larger than that of the corresponding yield in the host countries. They interpret the latter results as showing that an increase in sovereign risk in the origin country discouraged risk-taking by multinational firms based there, while the increase in risk in the host country caused multinationals to turn to other hosts. Moreover, when they separated the Eurozone countries into two groups, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain as the stressed group, they found that the size of the impact of the sovereign risk variables was comparatively larger in the stressed group.

Risk is also the subject of a recent NBER working paper by Caroline Jardet and Cristina Jude of the Banque de France and Menzie Chin of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “Foreign Direct Investment Under Uncertainty: Evidence From A large Panel of Countries.” They examined host country “pull” factors and global “push” factors for inward FDI flows in a panel of 129 advanced, emerging market and developing economies over the period of 1995 to 2019. They focused on domestic and global uncertainty, using the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) and the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index as well as the VIX as measures of risk.

Their initial results indicate that the effects of uncertainty depend on the country group, and therefore they disaggregated the data.  Domestic uncertainty does not appear to be a factor for any of the three groups, but global uncertainty as measured by the WUI has a large and significant negative impact on FDI in the advanced and emerging market economies.

The authors also examined the impact of global financial factors on FDI. They iniitally used the real value of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, and report that an increase in that measure is linked to increases in FDI in the advanced economies but declines in the emerging market and developing economies. The higher returns in the U.S. draw funds away from those propsetive hosts.

Similarly, when they replace the S&P 500 with the nominal shadow Federal Funds rate or a world interest rate, they report that increases in either rate increased FDI in the advanced economies and lowered FDI flows in the developing economies. They suggest that this result reflects the existence of booms in the financial center countries that GDP data do not capture. They also reexamine the significance of the world uncertainty index as the different global financial variables are used, and find that the negative and significant impact holds up in the case of the emerging market economies.

Many types of risk, therefore, have an impact on FDI. Domestic financial risk in an origin country, for example, leads to less outward FDI by multinational firms based in that country. But firms are also affected by global uncertainty, and their response in terms of foreign investment seems to be most evident in the emerging market economies. Geopolitical tensions over the Ukraine,  the possibility of a new variant of the virus and the prospect of higher U.S. interest rates all reinforce global uncertainty and complicate the decision over where to locate new investments.

The Return of FDI

Last year’s collapse in foreign direct investment was seen by many as the first stage of a period of retrenchment. Political pressure to “reshore” production, particularly of goods of national importance such as medical equipment, would cause multinational firms to rearrange their global supply chains to minimize foreign exposure. The data released for FDI in the first half of this year shows that in fact foreign investment has rebounded from last year’s decline. But the largest growth rates were recorded for the upper-income countries, where FDI had fallen precipitously in 2020, and China. FDI also rose in middle-income countries where it  had not fallen as sharply in 2020. Low income countries, on the other hand, did not see any increase in foreign investment.

The October issue of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s FDI In Figures reports that global FDI flows rose to $870 billion in the first half of 2021. These flows were more than double those of the last half of 2020 and even higher than pre-pandemic flows. The largest increase was recorded in China, the world’s major recipient of FDI. But the second and third largest inward flows were recorded in the U.S. and the U.K. FDI inflows to the Group of 20 economies increased by 42% in the first half of this year as compared to the previous half-year. They were up in 83% in the OECD G20 countries, and 12% in the non-OECD G20, reflecting a split by income level.

Earnings on inward OECD FDI increased by about 30% in the first half of the year, from the previous half-year. About half of this amount was distributed to affiliates and the remaining funds reinvested. Earnings on outward FDI increased by 28%, and a larger share of these payments were reinvested rather than distributed. Compared to pre-pandemic levels, these earnings were 14% higher. Growth in the earnings of outward FDI was particularly noticeable in the U.S., France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, all home countries of multinational firms.

Much of the FDI activity in the OECD economies consisted of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as both M&A deal values and the number of acquisitions rose in the advanced economies. Many of these deals were made in the healthcare and technology sectors. M&A activity in the emerging market and developing economies, however, was much less.

Investment in greenfield projects was relatively low compared to pre-pandemic levels. Announced greenfield projects increase by 9% in advanced economies but fell by 6% in the emerging market and development economies. Corporations are holding back from building new production facilities in those countries that saw large amounts of investment in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The difference in FDI activity amongst countries also appears in the October issue of UNCTAD’s  Investment Trends Monitor. It reports that FDI recorded growth rates of 117% in the high-income countries, 30% in the middle-income countries but a decline of 9% in the low-income group. The report cites “the duration of the health crisis and the pace of vaccinations, especially in developing countries” as “factors of uncertainty.”  This report also noted the decline in greenfield projects.

A similar discrepancy in national growth prospects was noted by the IMF in the latest issue of the World Economic Report. The report stated:

Advanced economy output is forecast to exceed pre-pandemic medium-term projections—largely reflecting sizable anticipated further policy support in the United States that includes measures to increase potential. By contrast, persistent output losses are anticipated for the emerging market and developing economy group due to slower vaccine rollouts and generally less policy support compared to advanced economies.

As noted above, China is a conspicuous exception to the FDI trends for emerging market and developing economies. Megan Greene of Harvard’s Kennedy School, in a column “Don’t Believe the Deglobalisation Narrative” in the Financial Times, interpreted the data on the inflows of FDI and other financial flows as showing that there isn’t any evidence of a corporate retreat from China. The country continues to offer modern infrastructure for the movement of parts and goods, domestic supplier networks and a large labor force. Moreover, China’s own markets represent potential sources of profits if consumption expenditures increase.

FDI may have rebounded from its downturn in 2020, but the increase in investment flows has been distributed unevenly. Part of the unequal allocation is due to the virus, with a new mutation appearing in some African countries. As long as the virus evolves into more virulent strains, there will always be the threat of another outbreak. Only a truly global effort that includes the delivery of vaccines to those nations most in need can stop the cycle and reorient foreign investment.

“The Sources of International Investment Income in Emerging Market Economies”

The Review of International Economics has published my paper on “The Sources of International Investment Income in Emerging Market Economies” in its latest issue. You can find the paper here, and this is the abstract:

We investigate international investment income flows in 26 emerging market countries during the period of 1998–2015. Net investment income registered a deficit for this group of countries of between 2% and 3% of GDP during this period. This deficit has been dominated by payments on foreign direct investment liabilities, which is consistent with the change in the composition of the external liabilities of these countries. Our results indicate that both capital account and trade openness are associated with the deficits on direct investment income. In addition, there was a small deficit in portfolio investment income, which is affected by the development of domestic financial markets and investor protection. Other investments’ income and the income from foreign exchange reserves have a negligible role in total investment income.

The Need for a Global Corporate Tax Regime

When the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development began its call for a reform of the rules of global taxes in order to clamp down on the avoidance of taxes by multinational corporations, its efforts looked quixotic. But the OECD persisted, and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is now participating in negotiations with the other OECD members to reform the (non-)system. While there is much left to negotiate, the broad framework of an agreement to establish a new regime, which governs where taxes are assessed and the determination of a global minimum tax, now exists.

A new volume edited by IMF economists Ruud A. de Mooij, Alexander D. Klemm and Victoria J. Perry, Corporate Income Taxes under Pressure : Why Reform Is Needed and How It Could Be Designed, presents the case for implementing a global approach. The first part of the volume describes the reasons for taxing corporate profits, explains the emergence of the rules governing how multinationals could be treated, and shows the complications that the growth in services and digital trade placed on an already fragile system. The second section examines the workings of the current system, including the difference between source-based and residence-based taxes, the use of bilateral tax treaties to allocate taxing rights, and the ability of corporations to use the differences amongst tax regimes to lower their liabilities by shifting the source of their profits to low-tax jurisdictions. The third section analyzes the relative merits of various reform proposals.

The magnitude of lost tax revenues can only be estimated, since multinationals are not required to report all the data on their operations. But economists have used the available data in inventive ways to estimate the losses.  Kimberly Clausing of Reed College explains the data limitations and the attempts to provide reasonable estimates with the data that are available in a recent paper,  “How Big is Profit Shifting?”. Most of the profit shifting undertaken by U.S.-based multinationals occurs with a few tax havens: Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands. Singapore, and Switzerland. Clausing calculates that U.S. tax revenue losses from such activities may gave reached $100 billion in 2017, about a third of federal corporate tax revenues.

The OECD has made available a great deal of documentation on the challenges of profit shifting and the proposals to arrest these activities. Many of these analyses are summarized in Addressing the Tax Challenges from the Digitalisation of the Economy: Highlights. The first part of the document explains the proposals under negotiation, known as Pillar One and Pillar Two. Pillar One expands the right to tax a firm beyond its physical presence in a jurisdiction to include “…a significant and sustained participation of a business in the economy of the jurisdiction, either physically or remotely.” Pillar Two ensures a minimum level of tax on the profits of multinationals.

The OECD estimates that if both proposals were implemented, there would be revenue gains for low, middle and high income jurisdictions. The impact of “investment hubs” is more ambiguous, but they would lose some of their tax base. But could these changes adversely affect business activity? The OECD acknowledges that investment costs would rise, but estimates that the impact on investment would be minor.

Tibor Hanappi amd Ana Cinta González Cabral of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration present a detailed examination of the effect on investment costs in their paper, “The Impact of the Pillar One and Pillar Two Proposals on MNE’s Investment Costs: An Analysis Using Forward-Looking Effective Tax Rates.” They estimate that the rise in the effective average tax rates (EATR) of multinationals in their sample of 70 jurisdictions would be 0.4 of a percentage point, which is small compared to the existing weighted average 24% EATR. Moreover, the reduction in tax differentials would make other factors, such as education and infrastructure in host countries, more important in determining the location and scale of investments.

An agreement on multinational taxes would benefit the Biden administration, which needs revenue to pay for its ambitious infrastructure plans. The administration could use the implementation of a global tax to counter claims that an increase in the U.S. corporate income tax rate, which fell from 35% to 21% in the Trump administration, would make U.S. firms uncompetitive. A coordinated system of taxes would also be a response to the challenge to the ability of governments to tax businesses that profit shifting has posed. Only a global system would stop the “race to the bottom” of national corporate taxes that has resulted in the current tax regime.

Financial Globalization and Inequality

The global financial crisis slowed the pace of financial globalization, while the impact of the pandemic on its future course is unclear. But enough time has elapsed to assess the record of integrated financial markets that greatly expanded in the 1990s and early 2000s. The evidence on one issue—financial openness and inequality—is clear: financial globalization has increased inequality.

Enrico D’Elia of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and Roberta De Santiss, also of ISTAT, analyzed this issue in their 2019 working paper, “Growth Divergence and Income Inequality in OECD Countries: The Role of Trade and Financial Openness.” They used an error-correction model to differentiate between short- and long-run effects on the Gini index, and divided the OECD countries into low-, middle- and high income over the period of 1995-2016. Increases in financial integration, as measured by foreign assts and liabilities scaled by GDP, increased income disparities in both the short- and long-run in the total sample. In the long-run there is a negative effect on the Gini index within the low-income countries, but there is a much larger positive impact within the high-income group. They attribute this finding to the advantage that the financial sector derives from financial innovation in those countries. In their results relating to growth, they reported that financial openness had a positive impact on the economic growth of the middle-income group alone, and it only occurred in the short-run.

Xiang Li of the Halle Institute for Economic Research and Dan Su of the University of Minnesota investigated the impact of capital account liberalization in their 2020 article, “Does Capital Account Liberalization Affect Income Inequality?” in the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. They used several measures of capital account openness, and both Gini coefficients and the income shares of different groups as their measures of inequality in samples of OECD and non-OECD countries. In their panel data analysis, they found that capital account liberalization had positive impacts on the Gini coefficients in the non-OECD countries, but not the OECD sample. They also found that capital account liberalization increased the income share of the top 10% of households. They reported similar results from a difference-in-differences analysis.

Philipp Heimberger of the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies offered a summary of the empirical analyses of economic globalization and inequality in his paper, Does Economic Globalisation Affect Income Inequality? A Meta-analysis, which was published in The World Economy in 2020. He undertook a meta-analysis of 123 peer-reviewed papers and a meta-regression empirical analysis. In his results he found that financial globalization has had a sizeable and significant inequality-increasing impact, which is not true of trade globalization. Moreover, this result holds for advanced countries as well as developing nations.

The evidence, therefore, seems clear: increased capital flows do lead to more income inequality. But what are the channels of transmission? Barry Eichengreen of UC-Berkeley, Balazs Csonto and Asmaa A. El-Ganainy of the IMF, and Zsoka Koczan of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development investigate this issue in their IMF working paper, “Financial Globalization and Inequality: Capital Flows as a Two-Edged Sword.” They point out that the various types of capital flows will have different effects and review the separate impacts to explain why inequality increased in both advanced and developing economies.

In the case of inward FDI in developing economies, the inflow of foreign capital could increase the return to labor. But, the authors point out, if capital substitutes for labor or works with skilled labor, then wage inequality will increase amongst laborers. This effect will be magnified when foreign capital flows to sectors that are dependent on external capital and are also complementary with skilled labor. Similarly, outward FDI reduces the demand for less skilled labor in the home countries of the multinationals responsible for the FDI. The outflows can also lower the bargaining power of labor in those countries.

The authors also examine portfolio capital, which can have many of the same distributional consequences as FDI in the host countries. Moreover, inflows of portfolio capital can lead to increased macroeconomic and financial volatility, and culminate in crises. Aggregate volatility heightens inequality because the poor suffer more the effects of economic downturns. In addition, portfolio flows can lead to increased demand for assets and higher prices. A rise in housing prices helps their owners, and the distributional impact depends on the pattern of ownership. In the case of higher stock prices, the benefits flow to stockholders who almost always are located in high-income households.

FDI, portfolio capital and bank flows also affect tax payments. Multinationals can use financial centers with low tax rates to minimize their tax liabilities across nations. Portfolio and bank flows can be used by the rich to shelter their asset holdings to avoid taxes. The loss of tax revenues decreases the ability of governments to deliver services that may benefit poorer households.

What can be done in the face of these impacts on income inequality? The authors of the IMF paper point out that adverse consequences are lessened when there are higher levels of educational achievement in the population. More educated workers benefit from the increased skill premium paid by multinationals. Capital flow measures can be used to control short-run inflows that can lead to “sudden stops” that overwhelm domestic financial markets.

A multilateral initiative seeks to reform the tax treatment of multinationals to avoid base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) that result in lower tax revenues for governments. The OECD has organized negotiations amongst governments to coordinate the tax treatments of multinational firms. The OECD proposals have two sections: the first deals with the allocation of the right to levy taxes on corporations by nations and the second would establish a minimum global tax. These issues are particularly relevant for digital companies that have minimum physical presence in many countries where they do business. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has announced that the U.S. would reverse its position under the Trump administration and engage in these talks.

Finance, if designed properly, need not be exclusionary. Indeed, in some countries financial inclusion has helped low-income households to increase their living standards. International financial flows are not the only cause of increased inequality, but they have played a role. International finance in all its forms can have adverse consequences and governments need to acknowledge these and plan to offset them if/when financial globalization resumes.

FDI and the Pandemic

The fluctuations in portfolio capital flows to emerging markets over the past year have been well documented. But foreign direct investment (FDI) has also plunged in those countries as well as in the advanced economies. Moreover, FDI faces more long-term challenges than other forms of capital flows.

In October the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported FDI data for the first half of the year. The OECD found that global FDI flows fell by half in the first six months as compared to the second half of 2019. Inflows to the OECD area countries fell by 74%, driven by lower flows to the U.S. and reverse flows from Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Outflows fell by 43%. FDI inflows to the non-OECD members of the Group of Twenty (G20) decreased by 30% and outflows decreased by 60%.

These declines followed a period of reduced FDI flows (see here and here). The OECD had reported in April that FDI flows in 2019 were below the levels recorded between 2010 and 2017. U.S.-based firms were reassessing their foreign operations in the wake of changes in the U.S. tax regulations governing the taxation of foreign profits. The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on Chinese goods affected multinational activities in that country, while Chinese acquisitions of U.S. firms came under much stricter government scrutiny. Similarly, the vote in favor of Brexit forced firms to reconsider supply chains that linked the U.K. with the rest of Europe.

Pol Antrás of Harvard provides an insightful examination of the future of global supply chains in a recent NBER working paper, “De-Globalisation? Global Value Chains in the Post-Covid-19 Era.” He points out that rapid pace of globalization that began in the late 1980s and extended through the early 2000s was unsustainable, and that some slowdown was inevitable. The rapid expansion reflected the development of information and communication technology, as well as a fall in trade costs due to declines in government barriers as well as faster methods of shipping. He also cites the expansion of the global economy to include the former Communist countries, as well as the Asian countries that expanded the market-based sectors of their economies.

Could these developments be reversed? Antrás writes that while the impact of automation and 3D printing on globalization is unclear, there are digital technologies that may give a new impetus to trade and investment. Moreover, the economies of scale associated with global supply chains make their dismantling unlikely.

On the other hand, the policy and institutional factors that fueled the previous expansion of globalization could come to a halt or be reversed. Antrás attributes the fall in support for international trade to its impact on income distribution. While technology and other factors have contributed to the rise in inequality, there is sufficient evidence that trade integration has been a factor as well. Recent studies have linked support for protectionist measures to trade-induced inequality.

Antrás also provides some conjectures about the consequences of COVID-19 on globalization. Once the pandemic is behind us, international travel will most likely be more expensive, and this may affect the initiation of new enterprises, although the increased use of technology to provide contacts between people may offset that effect. On the other hand, the political response to the pandemic threatens to exacerbate already existing tensions between China and the U.S., and could lead to a global partition. Moreover, the cost of the pandemic has been borne disproportionately by low-wage earners, and any increase in inequality will further weaken support for global trade.

The pandemic heightened the awareness of global supply chains, and last spring there was a great deal of discussion of “reshoring,” i.e., bringing foreign operations back to the home countries of multinationals.  The Economist reports that to date there is little sign that U.S. firms are replacing operations in other countries with domestic production. However, the article points out that the expansion of global production networks was based in part on the belief that governments would not hamper their activities since interference would hurt importers and exporters. But recent events have shown that political divisions can affect trade policy in unexpected ways. The steps that the Biden administration to reengage with international agencies, such as the World Trade Organization, and trade partners, particularly China, will be carefully watched.

FDI in a Risky World

The pandemic has shown that global supply chains are vulnerable to shocks. Output contracted as factories were closed in China and the impact was transmitted to firms further along the chains and the distributors of the final goods. Foreign direct investment had already slowed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-09, and there were questions about its future (see here). How will multinational firms respond to the new shock?

The McKinsey Global Institute seeks to answer this question in a new report, Risk, Resilience and Rebalancing In Global Value Chains. The authors point out that the pandemic is only one of a range of shocks that can disrupt production. They distinguish between catastrophes that are foreseeable (such as financial crises) and those unanticipated (acts of terrorism), as well as disruptions that take place on a smaller scale. The latter can also be divided between those that are foreseeable (climate change) and those that are unanticipated (cyberattacks).

The report then measures the exposure of different business sectors to the various shocks. Those that are heavily traded are more vulnerable. These include communication equipment, computers and electronics, and semiconductors and components, all industries that are seen as promoting growth. Apparel is another sector that is vulnerable to risks, such as the pandemic and climate change.

These risks will motivate firms to reconfigure their supply chains. The political fissure between China and the U.S., as well as government policies to ensure self-sufficiency in some sectors, will also induce firms to reorganize production. The report’s authors estimated that 16% to 26% of current exports could be shifted. They find that “…the value chains with the largest potential to move production to new geographies are petroleum, apparel, and pharmaceuticals.” In some cases governments may need to provide financial support to induce firms to relocate to domestic economies where the governments seek domestic self-sufficiency.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in its World Investment Report 2020 also considers the future of FDI (see here for a summary). It identifies three trends that will shape the future of international production. These include technology trends that contribute to a “New Industrial Revolution;” growing nationalism that leads to more protectionism; and the need to achieve sustainability.  As these forces evolve, they will push firms to increase supply chain resilience and increase national and regional productive ability.

The authors of the UNCTAD point out that economic sectors differ in terms of the length of their existing value chains, their geographical distribution and their governance. Consequently, multinational firms will respond in different ways to the trends the authors identify. But they identify three overall trajectories–reshoring, regionalization and replication–that all involve scaling down global value chains. A fourth trajectory–diversification–would transform existing operations but include a lower geographical distribution of value added and less investment in capital goods.

These changes represent challenges to government policymakers, particularly those in developing economies. A retreat of international production will hamper the prospects of lower-income countries where the global supply chains have been a driver of growth. But there is also the opportunity to attract new investment. Among the measures that the report’s authors recommend are investment promotion strategies in infrastructure and services, and participation in regional initiatives.

The reconfiguration if international production systems will shape FDI in the years to come. But the formation of new production chains will only take place as the global economy recovers from the current collapse. UNCTAD reports that global FDI flows are forecast to fall by up to 40% in 2020 from their 2019 value of $1.54 trillion, and could decline by another 5% to 10% in 2021. All these predictions come with large degrees of uncertainty about the future of the global economy. Multinational firms will hold back on new expenditures until they see a consistent recovery and learn how governments will seek to influence their foreign operation.

International Factor Payments and the Pandemic

I have written a piece on international factor payments (migrants’ remittances, FDI income) and the pandemic for Econbrowser, the widely followed blog of Menzie Chinn of the University of Wisconsin and James Hamilton of the University of California-San Diego.

You can find it here:

http://econbrowser.com/archives/2020/07/guest-contribution-international-factor-payments-and-the-pandemic

Is There a Future for FDI?

Among the economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic will be a drop in foreign direct investment activity. The latest issue of the OECD’s FDI In Figures forecasts a decline of more than 30% in 2020 in FDI flows, even under an optimistic scenario of a recovery in the second half of this year. The falloff reflects not only the deterioration in global economic activity, but also the responses of firms to policies that governments may enact to protect their economies.

The OECD reported that global FDI flows of $1,426 billion, while higher in 2019 than in 2018, nonetheless were below the levels recorded between 2010 and 2017. The increase from the previous year reflected in part that year’s depressed investment expenditures following tax reform in the U.S. and a return to positive outflows from the U.S. FDI inflows to the G20 nations, on the other hand, decreased in 2019, largely due to a drop in inflows to China to the lowest level since 2010.

The decline in FDI flows to China reflects in part the deterioration in relations between the U.S. and China, which has intensified during the pandemic. President Trump blames China for the outbreak of the virus and has threatened to implement new tariffs. The Trump administration is preparing a plan to bring medical supply chains back to the U.S.  Even if Joe Biden is elected President next fall, U.S. and other multinational firms are reconsidering their reliance on Chinese manufacturers in global supply chains.

As the OECD data show, however, this consolidation began before the pandemic. Global supply relationships based solely on cost considerations left firms exposed to external shocks of all kinds, ranging from the Brexit vote to the Japanese tsunami in 2011. In addition, the growth in service exports has allowed firms to locate their operations closer to consumers.

Maria Borga, Perla Ibarlucea Flores and Monika Sztajerowska of the OECD have written about the divestment decisions of multinational firms in a 2019 OECD Working Paper on International Investment, “Drivers of Divestment Decisions of Multinational Enterprises – A Cross-country Firm-level Perspective.” They obtained data on 62,000 foreign owned affiliates in 41 OECD and Group of 20 countries over the period 2007-2014. They found that 22% of the firms that were foreign-owned at the beginning of the period were divested at least once by their parent. The number of divestments was the highest at the beginning of the period during the global financial crisis and generally fell in the following years. Overall, foreign acquisitions outnumbered divestments, but there were years when the numbers were similar, and years when divestments outnumbered the acquisitions.

The paper’s authors undertook an empirical analysis of the decision to disinvest, examining characteristics of the host and home countries as well as of the individual firms. They report that an increase in labor costs in the host country was linked to disinvestment, while an increase in labor market efficiency had the opposite impact. An increase in the control of corruption decreases the probability of divestment, while higher tariffs increase it. Trade openness also increases the probability of divestment, which the authors interpret as a sign of substitutability between FDI and trade. In addition, the existence of a regional trade agreement reduces the probability of divestment.

In projecting the future of FDI, it is important to differentiate between horizontal and vertical FDI. The global supply chains, which evolved in the 1990s and 2000s as information and communication technology improved, represent the latter form. However, Ronald B. Davies of University College and James R. Markusen of the University of Colorado point out in a new NBER working paper, “The Structure of Multinational Firms’ International Activities,” that most of U.S. FDI comes from and goes to other advanced economies, which is suggestive of horizontal FDI.  Similarly, when they look at FDI among country groups, they find that most of the FDI of developed economies takes place amongst those countries. On the other hand, the FDI of U.S. firms that does take place in developing countries occurs in industries that use global supply chains.

If/when the global economy recovers, there may be a resumption of horizontal FDI to take the place of international trade. Firms that face trade barriers may seek to go around them by establishing plants in the countries where they seek to operate, just as Japanese automakers established plants in the U.S. in the 1980s when imports of their cars met resistance. Such a development would be consistent with the finding of Borga, Flores and Sztajerowska that disinvestment and trade are inversely linked. FDI may also pick up if multinational firms seek to establish redundancy by setting up plants outside east Asia.

FDI flows, therefore, will fall precipitously in the short-run. Their recovery will depend on the reconfiguration of the global economy, and how firms respond to government attempts to insulate their economies from foreign shocks. Multinationals will not easily give up historically profitable foreign operations, and will attempt to adapt their activities to surmount whatever new barriers they face. Moreover, the governments of emerging market economies with plummeting GDPs may seek to retain foreign capital to offset the deterioration of domestic economic activity. But it will be a long time before any sort of FDI rebound is recorded.

The True Owners of Foreign Capital

Explaining the sources and destinations of capital flows is a key focus of research in international finance. But capital flows between countries can flow through financial centers before they arrive at their ultimate destination, and these intermediary flows distort the record of the actual ownership of investments. Two recent papers seek to provide a more accurate picture of the true sources of foreign finance.

Jannick Damgaard of Danmarks Nationalbank, Thomas Elkjaer of the International Monetary Fund and Niels Johannesen of the University of Copenhagen differentiate between “phantom” and “real” foreign direct investment in their 2019 IMF working paper, “What Is Real and What Is Not in the Global FDI Network?”  Phantom FDI flows to shell companies that do not engage in any business activities, and are used to minimize corporate taxation before the funds are channeled to their final destination. Among the host countries that receive a significant amount of phantom investment are the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Singapore and Ireland. The phantom FDI overstates the actual amount of investment that takes place and obfuscates the ultimate ownership of foreign capital.

Damgaard, Elkjar and Johannsen use several sources of data in order to uncover the actual owners of FDI. These include the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, which reports foreign investments in 110 countries by the country of the immediate owner; the OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, which differentiates between FDI in Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), a form of shell company, and non-SPE investment, and also includes information on the ultimate owners of investment; and Orbis, a global database of corporate data, including ownership information. Since the OECD data are incomplete, they estimate the share of real FDI in total FDI by using the negative relationship of real FDI/total FDI and total FDI/GDP.

Their results show that in 2017 global FDI of almost $40 trillion included real FDI of $25 trillion and phantom FDI of about $15 trillion. Moreover, the share of phantom FDI in total FDI has risen from above 30% in 2009 to just below 40% in 2017. Luxembourg reported the largest amount of phantom FDI of $3.8 trillion, followed by the Netherlands with around $3.3 trillion. The largest stock of real FDI, on the other hand, was located in the U.S., which also owned the largest amount of outward FDI. China has been a significant recipient of inward FDI (but see below), as were the United Kingdom, Germany and France. The authors also found evidence of “round tripping,” i.e., supposedly inward foreign investment that is actually held by domestic investors. In the case of China and Russia about 25% of real FDI is owned by investors in those countries.

Another investigation of the data on international capital was undertaken by Antonio Coppola of Harvard, Matteo Maggiori of Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, Brent Neiman of the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business and Jesse Schreger of the Columbia Business School, and they report their results in “Redrawing the Map of Global Capital Flows: The Role of Cross-Border Financing and Tax Havens.” Global firms have increasingly issued securities through affiliates in tax haven, and these authors seek to uncover the ultimate issuers of these securities. Their results allow them to distinguish between data reported on a “residency” basis based on the country where the securities are issued versus a “nationality” basis, which shows the country of the ultimate parent.

The authors begin with data from several databases that allows them to uncover global ownership chains of securities through tax haven nations such as Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands.  They use this mapping to determine the ultimate issuers of securities held by mutual funds and exchange traded fund shares that are reported by Morningstar. Finally, they use their reallocation matrices to transform residency-based holdings of securities as reported in the U.S. Treasury’s International Capital data and the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey to nationality-basis holdings.

Their results lead to a number of important findings. Investments from advanced economies to emerging market countries, for example, have been much larger than had been reported. For example, U.S. holdings of corporate bonds in the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) total $99 billion, much larger than the $17 billion that appears in the conventional data. U.S. holdings of Chinese corporate bonds alone rises from $3 billion to $37 billion, and of Brazilian bonds the total increases from $8 billon to $44 billion. These figures are even higher when the U.S. subsidiaries of corporations in emerging markets which issue securities in the U.S. are accounted for. Similarly, holdings of common equities in the emerging markets by investors in the U.S. and Europe are much larger when the holdings are reallocated from the tax havens to the ultimate owners. This is particularly evident in the case of China.

The reallocation also shows that the amount of corporate bonds issued by firms in the emerging markets has been more significant than realized. While the issuance of sovereign bonds is accurately reported, the issuance of corporate bonds has often occurred via offshore subsidiaries. These bonds are often denominated in foreign currencies, so their reallocation to their ultimate issuers results in an increase in foreign currency exposure for their home countries.

As in the previous study, Coppla, Maggiori, Neiman and Schreger also find that some “foreign” investment represents domestic investment routed through a tax haven, such as the Cayman Islands. These flows are particularly significant in the case of the U.S. In addition, some FDI flows to China should be classified as portfolio, since they reflect foreign participation in offshore affiliates that is channeled to China. FDI positions are not revalued as often as portfolio holdings, and as a result the authors claim that China’s net foreign asset position is overstated.

The results of these ground-breaking papers have important implications. First, the international ownership of capital is more concentrated than realized. The “Lucas paradox” of international capital flowing from developing to advanced economies was based on misleading data. The U.S. and several other advanced economies have large stakes in the emerging markets. Second, some of emerging markets are more vulnerable to currency depreciations than the official data suggest because their corporations have issued debt through subsidiaries in ta haven countries. Third, multinational corporations have been successful in shielding their income from taxation by using tax havens. The OECD has been working to bring this profit shifting under control, but effective reform may require a fundamental change in how multinationals are taxed by national governments.