Tag Archives: speculation

2020 “Globie”: The Carry Trade

Leave a reply

It is time to announce the recipient of this year’s “Globie”, i.e., the Globalization Book of the Year. The award gives me a chance to draw attention to a book that is particularly insightful about some aspect of globalization. This year’s winner is The Rise of Carry: The Dangerous Consequences of Volatility Suppression and the New Financial Order of Decaying Growth and Recurring Crisis by Tim Lee, Jamie Lee and Kevin Coldiron. The prize lacks any monetary reward, but no doubt the distinction of having won has value in itself. Previous winners are listed at the bottom.

The classic carry trade involves borrowing and investing in different currencies. For many years the Japanese yen served as the source of cheap loans that could then be exchanged for Australian dollars that yielded a higher return. At the end of the period the dollars would be exchanged for yen, and the loan repaid. As long as the funding currency had not appreciated in value, the trader would profit from the difference in returns. A profitable carry trade, however, violates uncovered interest rate parity, which stipulates that any difference in returns should be offset by an expected appreciation of the funding currency. At times the currencies would realign, and purchasing the originating currency to repay the loan could eliminate any previous gains.

The authors extend the concept of carry trades to include all those transactions that provide a stream of income but are subject to the risk of “…a sudden loss when a particular event occurs or when underlying asset values change substantially.”  Since carry transactions are based on borrowing, leverage is a key component. Buying stock on margin, for example, is another form of carry trade, as is a private equity leveraged buyout.

The trader benefits only as long as asset prices remain close to their current levels. Volatility can wipe out a position, and the financial losses can spill over to the economy. Those negative consequences bring central banks into the financial markets. Their intervention may reestablish stability, but it allows those who would have suffered a loss to transfer that loss to the public sector. Central bankers acting as lenders of last resort, the authors write, “…underwrite some of the losses associated with carry. This encourages further growth of carry, and a self-reinforcing cycle develops.”

The authors investigate the spread of carry trade and its broad scope, including the transformation of global financial markets. Firms in emerging markets use capital markets to obtain finance from cheaper foreign sources. Changes in the VIX measure of volatility have international reverberations and engender global financial cycles.The Federal Reserve’s use of swap facilities to help their counterparts in other countries assist domestic institutions that face a dollar liquidity squeeze demonstrates that carry crashes require global responses.

The authors also claim that the carry trade increases income and wealth inequality, as only those with sufficient assets engage in carry and profit from central bank intervention.  The continuing returns from these transactions flow to those who know how the system works and how to exploit it. These rewards act as an incentive to draw more people to finance, contributing to the growth of the financial sector.

The book was written before the events of this year, but the analysis is very relevant. In March, financial markets crashed as the global extent of the pandemic became evident. Stock prices plunged and foreign capital fled emerging markets. This outbreak of volatility engendered a massive response by the Federal Reserve that dwarfed their actions in the 2008-09 crisis (see here and here for overviews of central bank policies). The markets responded by regaining lost ground, and the Standard & Poor’s 500 has set new highs.

After the latest meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, the Federal Reserve reiterated its pledge to keep  the target range for the Federal Funds Rate at 0 to ¼% “…until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.” The Fed’s commitment to low interest rates provides an incentive for more carry trade activities, and these are appearing. Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPACS), for example, are pools of money that are established to purchase privately-held firms and take them public, profiting from the IPO price. The SPACS investors do not know which company will be acquired or when, and they may not realize a return for years. But they are providing liquidity, and at minimal cost due to the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy.

Lee, Lee and Coldiron convincingly demonstrate that the carry trade has contributed to the financialization of the economy, which has grave and disturbing implications. As the subtitle of the book indicates, the suppression of volatility leads to lower growth and recurring crises. When a vaccine for the coronavirus is available, there will undoubtedly be a burst of financial activity that will prepare the way for the next crisis. We will not be able to say that we were never warned.

An interview with the authors is available on the podcast Hidden Forces.

2019    Branko Milanovic, Capitalism Alone: the Future of the System That Rules the World

2018    Adam Tooze,  Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World

2017    Stephen D. King, Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History

2016    Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality

2015    Benjamin J. Cohen. Currency Power: Understanding Monetary Rivalry

Venezuela and the Next Debt Crisis

Leave a reply

The markets for the bonds of emerging markets have been rattled by developments in Venezuela. On November 13,Standard & Poor’s declared Venezuela to be in default after that country missed interest payments of $200 million on two government bonds. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro had pledged to restructure and refinance his country’s $60 billion debt, but there were no concrete proposals offered at a meeting with bondholders. By the end of the week, however, support from Russia and China had allowed the country to make the late payments.

Whether or not Venezuela’s situation can be resolved, the outlook for the sovereign debt of emerging markets and developing economies is worrisome. The incentive to purchase the debt is clear: their recent yields of about 5% and total returns of over 10% have surpassed the returns on similar debt in the advanced economies. The security of those returns seem to be based on strong fundamental condtions: the IMF in its most recent World Economic Outlook has forecast growth rates for emerging market and developing economies of 4.6% in 2017, 4.9% next year and 5% over the medium term.

The Quarterly Review of the Bank for International Settlements last September reviewed the government debt of 23 emerging markets, worth $11.7 trillion. The BIS economists found that much of this debt was denominated in the domestic currency, had maturities comparable to those of the advanced economies, and carried fixed rates. These trends, the BIS economists reported, “..should help strengthen public finance sustainability by reducing currency mismatches and rollover risks.”

It was not surprising, then when earlier this year the Institute for International Finance announced that total debt in developing countries had risen by $3 trillion in the first quarter. But surging markets invariably attract borrowers with less promising prospects. A FT article reported more recent data from Dealogic, which tracks developments in these markets, that shows that governments with junk-bond ratings raised $75 billion in syndicated bonds this calendar year. These bonds represented 40% of the new debt issued in emerging markets. Examples of such debt include the $3 billion bond issue of Bahrain, Tajikistan’s $500 million issue and the $3 billion raised by Ukraine. These bonds offer even higher yields, in part to compensate bondholders for their relative illiquidity.

The prospects for many of these economies are not as promising as the IMF’s aggregate forecast indicates. The IMF’s analysis also pointed out that there is considerable variation in performance across the emerging market and developing economies. The projected high growth forecast for the next several years is based in large part on anticipated growth in India and China, which account for more than 40% of the collective GDP of these nations. Weaker growth is anticipated in Latin America and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East.

The IMF also raised concerns about the sustainability of the sovereign debt of these countries in October’s Global Financial Stability Report. In the case of low-income countries, the report’s authors warned: “…this borrowing has been accompanied by an underlying deterioration in debt burdens… Indeed, annual principal and interest repayments (as a percent of GDP or international reserves) have risen above levels observed in regular emerging market economy borrowers.” Similarly, Patrick Njoroge, head of Kenya’s central bank, has warned that some African nations have reached a debt-servicing threshold beyond which they should not borrow.

None of these developments will surprise anyone familiar with the Minsky-Kindleberger model of financial crises. This account of the dynamics of such crises begins with an initial change in the economic environment—called a “displacement”—that changes the outlook for some sector (or nation). The prospect of profitable returns attracts investors. Credit is channelled by banks to the new sector, and the increase in funds may be reinforced by capital inflows.The demand for financial assets increases their prices. There is a search for new investments as the original investors take profits from their initial positions while new investors, regretful at missing earlier opportunities, join the speculative surge. The pursuit of yield is met by the issuance of new, increasingly risky assets. The “speculative chase” further feeds a price bubble, which is always justified by claims of strong fundamentals.

At some point there is a reassessment of market conditions. This may be precipitated by a specific event, such as a leveling off of asset prices or a rise in the cost of funding. An initial wave of bankruptcies or defaults leads to the exit of some investors and price declines. Further selling and the revelation of the flimsy undergirding of the speculative bubble results in what Kindleberger calls “revulsion.” In a world of global financial flows there are “sudden stops” as foreign investors pull out their funds, putting pressure on fixed exchange rates. Contagion may carry the revulsion across national boundaries. The end, Kindleberger wrote, comes either when prices fall so low that investors are drawn back; or transactions are shut down; or when a lender of last resort convinces the market that sufficient liquidity will be provided.

The market for the bonds of developing economies has followed this script. The initial displacement was the improvement in the growth prospects of many emerging market countries at a time when the returns on fixed investments in the advanced economies were relatively low. A credible case could be made that emerging market economies had learned the lessons of the past and had structured their debt appropriately. But the subsequent increase in bond offerings by governments with below investment grade ratings shows that foreign investors in their eagerness to enter these markets were willing to overlook more risky circumstances. This leaves them and the governments that issued the bonds vulnerable to shocks in the global financial system. A rise in risk aversion or U.S. interest rates would lead to rapid reassessments of the safety and sustainability of much of this debt.

This potential crisis has caught the attention of those who would be responsible for dealing with its painful termination. The IMF’s Managing Director Christine Lagarde at the Fund’s recent annual fall meeting warned of the risk of “a tightening of the financial markets and the potential capital outflows from emerging market economies or from low‑income countries where there has been such a search for yield in the last few years.” The IMF has dealt with this type of calamity before, and it never ends well.

Too Much of a Good Thing?

1 Reply

Global banks do not have much to cheer about these days. Earnings are falling, and the banks are responding by cutting jobs. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has charged 16 banks of colluding to rig the London Interbank Offer rate (LIBOR). And the Federal Reserve has approved a rule that requires foreign banks with $50 billion of assets in the U.S. to establish holding companies for their American units that meet the same capital adequacy standards as do their U.S. peers. The latter move has been interpreted as a sign of the fragmentation of global finance that will hinder the global allocation of credit.

The Federal Reserve supported the foreign banks in the fall of 2008 when the it lent to distressed institutions. The U.S. units of European banks accounted for $538 billion of the Federal Reserve’s emergency loans, over half of the total. Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke had to answer criticism from U.S. lawmakers that the loans did not benefit U.S. taxpayers. At the same time, the Federal Reserve was establishing swap lines with central banks in 14 countries. The dollars those monetary authorities acquired were used to prop up their banks that needed to finance their holding of U.S. debt.

Banks have various ways to meet the new capital adequacy standards. They can hold back on dividend payouts from their earnings, although that may not be popular with their stockholders. They can raise funds in the capital markets. And some banks, such as Deutsche Bank, will shrink their balance sheets in order to comply with the regulations. This has led to fears of cutbacks in lending.

The announcement of the new standard came as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) was publishing its quarterly report on the international banking markets. The BIS data showed that the cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks fell by $500 billion in the their quarter of 2013, the biggest contraction since the second quarter of 2012. Most of this decline occurred in Europe, as lending between parents banks and their subsidiaries in the Eurozone and the United Kingdom declined.

Would a contraction in bank credit have negative consequences? It certainly will for those firms in Europe that are unable to obtain credit. But there are also grounds for believing that a reduction in banking activity may under some circumstances be advantageous for an economy. The same issue of the BIS Quarterly Review that reported the international banking data also carried an article by BIS economists Leonardo Gambacorta, Jung Yang and Kostas Tsataronis. They compared the impact of bank and capital market activity on economic growth, and found that increases in both contributed to higher growth, but only up to threshold levels of GDP. After those thresholds are reached, further expansion in banking or capital markets had negative impacts on growth. Similar results have been reported by Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes and Ugo Panizza of the IMF, Stephen G. Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi also at the BIS, and Sioong Hook Law of Universiti Putra Malaysia and Nirvikar Sinth of UC-Santa Cruz in the Journal of Banking & Finance (working paper version here).

These studies deal with the domestic impacts of financial activity. How about bank lending across borders? The record there also demonstrates that bank lending can have adverse consequences. Martin Feldkircher of Oesterreichische Nationalbank (the National Bank of Austria) has a paper in the Journal of International Money and Finance (working paper version here) that examines the determinants of the severity of the global financial crisis in 63 countries, using 97 candidate variables. He reports that the change in domestic credit provided by the banking sector is a robust determinant of crisis severity. When he further investigated by interacting the bank credit variable with measures of risk, including macro, external, fiscal, financial and contagion and spillover risk, he found that the interaction of bank credit with foreign claims from banks in advanced countries robustly explained crisis severity. He concludes: “Countries with high credit growth and considerable exposure to external funding saw their economies more severely affected during times of financial distress.”

There is a line between financing new economic activities and bankrolling speculation. The former promotes welfare, the latter ends in volatility and distress. Unfortunately, that line shifts as new opportunities appear. Trying to find it is a constant challenge for regulators.

Nurske and Lagarde

Leave a reply

The outflows of capital from emerging market economies such as Brazil, India, Turkey and Indonesia and accompanying currency depreciations have led to discussions of what has caused the reversals in fortune of these countries (see, for example, here and here and here.). Higher U.S. interest rates and signs of an improving U.S. economy are seen as “pull factors” that lure investors to the U.S.. Deteriorating fundamentals in the crisis countries, such as rising current account deficits or falling growth rates, are portrayed as push factors that drive foreign investors away.

Capital volatility is a familiar and possibly systemic problem. Seventy years ago, Ragnar Nurske (1907-2007) blamed capital flows for destabilizing exchange rates. Nurske served in the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations from 1934 to 1945. While there he wrote most of International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Interwar Period (1944). In this study, Nurske blamed the exchange rate depreciations of the 1930s on destabilizing capital flows:

…As funds moved out to take refuge abroad, pressure on the exchange market was increased and the rate of depreciation accelerated, which resulted in a further loss of confidence and a further flight of capital. In its effects on the balance of payments the capital flow became disequilibrating instead of equilibrating.       (League of Nations 1944:114)

Nurske’s views appear more relevant today than they did during the last decade, when financial globalization was generally viewed as a positive force, despite a lack of supporting evidence. The IMF, which had regarded an unregulated capital account as a suitable long-term goal for developing economies, reversed its stance during the 2008-09 crisis. The IMF now regards capital controls as an appropriate macroprudential tool (see, for example, here.).

Ben Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve Board Governor, issued a now-famous apology to Milton Friedman on the occasion of Friedman’s ninetieth birthday in 2002. Bernanke referred to Friedman’s work with Anna J. Schwarz that showed that the Federal Reserve had exacerbated the Great Recession of 1929 through its monetary policies, and promised: “You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”  Perhaps it is time for a new (albeit belated) apology, in this case from the IMF’s Managing Director Christine Lagarde to Nurske.  Friedman, who believed that successful speculators would return a misaligned exchange rate to its fundamental value, would be aghast. But perhaps the passage of time would allow the views of both Nobel Prize-winners to co-exist and guide current-day policy.

Correction: An alert reader has pointed out that Ragnar Nurske did not win the Nobel Prize. Perhaps I was confusing him with Ragnar Frisch, who shared with Jan Tinbergen the first Nobel prize in economics to be awarded in 1969.