Category Archives: China

China’s Missing Income

The earnings of a country’s multinational firms appear in its balance of payments in the primary income component of the current income balance. Primary income includes the net flow of income received for the provision of a factor of production, such as labor, financial or other assets, to and from nonresidents. Investment income is usually the largest component of these income flows, and income from FDI appears there with income from portfolio and other types of investments (such as banks) as well as income from the central bank’s reserves.

The countries with the largest net flows of foreign direct investment income in 2021 were:

U.S.                    $348.9 billion

Japan                 $95.4 billion

Germany           $90.4 billion

France               $54.1 billion

Netherlands    $34.7 billion

U.K.                  $25.6 billion

(The Netherlands data exclude income flows associated with Special Purpose Entities, which serve as conduits for FDI flows.)

The ranking of countries by FDI income receipts can be compared with the listing of countries by the number of multinational firms with headquarters located in their borders. Pizzola, Carroll and Mackie (2020) of Ernst & Young provide a ranking of countries by the number of Fortune Global 500 firms headquartered in their jurisdictions. The U.S., Japan, France, Germany and the U.K. all appear at the top of the list. But the country at the number one position with the largest number of multinationals is China. Why doesn’t China also appear in the list of top FDI recipients?

There are several answers. First, China does not report the values of the components of its primary income, so we do not know what its net FDI income is. But it does report total net primary income, and that balance has almost always been negative. If FDI income is the largest component of primary income as it is for many other emerging market countries, then it has been contributing to the primary income deficit.

Second, while China is a net creditor nation with an overall net international investment position in 2021 of $2.2 trillion, its direct investment assets are less than its liabilities: $2.79 trillion vs $3.60 trillion, or net $ -0.82 trillion, according to the IMF’s Balance of Payments data. Similarly, while China has become a major source of FDI outflows, FDI inflows are larger: $178.8 billion in the acquisition of assets vs. $344.1 in the acquisition of liabilities in 2021. As long as investments into China exceed its own foreign acquisitions, the flow of income derived from these activities will be negative.

Brad Setser of the Council of Foreign Relations has also written about China’s primary account. He is puzzled by is decline in the decline in the balance in the second quarter of 2022 at a time when foreign holdings of Chinese bonds were falling. He also writes that:

“China was locked down and its economy shrank—not an ideal environment for foreign firms to make large profits.”

Pizzola, Carroll and Mackie point out that the headquarters of the multinational firms have over time shifted away from the U.S. and other members of the Group of 7 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.) While the U.S. still accounts for the second largest number of headquarters, its total declined between 2000 and 2020. Japan also registered a decline in the number of multinational firms headquartered there. As other counties become the headquarters of multinational firms, their FDI income receipts will rise as well

The primary account balance plays an important role in many countries’ current accounts. In China, for example, in 2022 the surplus in the current account of $401.9 billion was smaller than the trade balance surplus of $576.3 billion because of the deficit in the primary account of  $193.6 billion. (Secondary income, which includes remittances, registered a surplus of $19.1 billion.)  It would be useful to have the full data on primary income to understand what is driving this component of China’s balance of payments.

China and the Debt Crisis

Sri Lanka is not the first developing economy to default on its foreign debt, and certainly won’t be the last. The Economist has identified 53 countries as most vulnerable to a combination of “heavy debt burdens, slowing global growth and tightening financial conditions.” The response of China to what will be a rolling series of restructurings and write-downs will reveal much about its position in the 21st century international financial system.

Debt crises are (unfortunately) perennial events. In the 1970s many developing countries, particularly in Latin America, borrowed from international banks to pay energy bills that had escalated after oil price increases enacted by the Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC). Repaying those loans became more difficult after the Federal Reserve raised interest rates in 1979 to combat U.S. inflation. Mexico announced that it could no longer make debt payments in August 1982, and other governments soon followed (see here for more detail).

The U.S. government supported negotiations that brought together the governments unable to make payments, the banks that had made the loans, and the International Monetary Fund. The banks were willing to restructure the debt while the IMF lent funds to the governments that allowed them to keep up their interest payments while staving off acknowledging their inability to pay off the debt. But this only delayed a final resolution of the crisis and led to a “lost decade” in Latin America. In 1989 Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady proposed a plan that led to reductions of the loan principals in return for the issuance of “Brady bonds” by the debtor governments.

The U.S. allowed the IMF to take the lead during subsequent crises, including the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2000. As the member with the largest quota, the U.S. could influence the design and implementation of the IMF’s programs. It also took a more active role when U.S. interests were directly affected, as it did with Mexico in 1994-95. While U.S. attention was focused on its own crisis in 2008-09, the IMF took on the task of lending to middle- and low-income countries that were caught up in the economic shock waves of the financial collapse. The Federal Reserve, however, established currency swap lines with the central banks of other advanced economies as well as those of four emerging markets: Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and Singapore.  The Fed reactivated the swap lines in March 2020 in response to the disruption in international credit markets caused by the pandemic and also set up a new facility to provide dollar funding to foreign official institutions.

China has taken a different position with regards to the debt of developing nations. Its state-owned banks have made bilateral loans as part of the Belt and Road initiative, with many of these loans made to African governments for infrastructure projects. But the amount of lending and the terms have not always been made transparent. Sebastian Horn of the University of Munich, Carmen Reinhart, currently Chief Economist at the World Bank while on leave from Harvard University’s Kennedy School, and Christoph Trebesch of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy developed a database of Chinese lending over the period of 1949-2017 which they published in a 2021 NBER paper, “China’s Overseas Lending.” They found “…that a substantial portion of China’s overseas lending goes unreported and that the volume of “hidden” lending has grown to more than 200 billion USD as of 2016.” Another study from AidData, a research lab at William & Mary, also documented Chinese lending to low- and middle-income countries, and found that many loans are collateralized against future commodity export receipts.

Some of these loans have already been restructured, with China pushing back repayment dates. If there is a systemic wave of defaults, the Chinese government must decide whether it will continue to negotiate directly with the governments that borrowed, or whether it will join the governments that belong to the Paris Club, a group of official creditors that attempt to devise sustainable solutions to debt problems, in designing a mechanism to reduce the volume of debt.

In 2020, the Group of 30 working with the IMF and the World Bank instituted the Debt Service Initiative (DSSI), which suspended debt service payments from low-income countries to official creditors, including China. Forty-eight countries participated in the program, which ended in December 2021.  The DSSI has been followed by the Common Framework, which brings together official creditors and low-income borrowers to provide some form of assistance to insolvent nations. However, private lenders have not agreed to participate and only three nations have requested relief through the Common Framework. There are concerns about the process, and there will undoubtedly be calls for broad-based debt cancellation as countries with mounting food and energy bills seek relief.

The decisions that China makes regarding its participation in new initiatives have implications for its future role in the international financial system. The government has sought to enhance the role of its currency, the renminbi, and its share in the foreign exchange reserves of central banks has risen as trade with China has grown. Serkan Arslanalp of the IMF, Barry Eichengreen of UC-Berkeley and Chima Simpson-Bell, also of the IMF, have documented the decline in the relative share of dollar-denominated foreign reserves and the increase in renminbi-denominated reserves in “The Stealth Erosion of Dollar Dominance and the Rise of Nontraditional Reserve Currencies” in the Journal of International Economics (working paper here). They find, however, that the changes in the composition of foreign reserves involve more than the Chinese currency, and show increases in the relative shares of the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, the Korean won, the Singapore dollar and the Swedish krona as wells. They attribute these changes in part to more active management of reserves by central bankers and also the existence of more liquid foreign exchange markets that facilitate non-dollar trading.

The use of the dollar-based international financial system as a financial weapon against Russia, including seizure of more than $300 billion of its central bank assets, could be an opportunity for another system to take its place, and there has been much speculation about the emergence of a Chinese-based rival. But Adam Tooze of Columbia University has pointed out that

“It (the dollar system) is a sprawling, resilient network of state-backed, commercially driven, profit-orientated transactions, lubricated by the easy availability of dollars, interwoven with American geopolitical influence, a repeated game in which intelligent players continuously gauge their advantages and disadvantages and the (very few) alternatives open to them and then, when all is said and done, again and again come back for more.”

A new system would take years to establish. Whether China’s government wants to allow its financial markets to become enmeshed in a global system by removing the remaining capital controls is unclear. The combination of drought, COVID-19 and its real estate crisis fully occupy the attention of the Chinese government. It may have to deal with a debt crisis among the developing nations however, and its response will be monitored for signs of how it sees its position within the global financial network of rules and institutions.

China’s Outward FDI

Chinese firms that want to list their stock in U.S. equity markets face a series of hurdles. The Securities and Exchange Commission is implementing a new rule that requires the firms to provide information regarding their ties to the Chinese government, while the Biden administration is banning Americans from investing in 59 Chinese firms. Moreover, Chinese authorities have their own concerns about the foreign listing of Chinese firms. Chinese multinationals also face impediments to their foreign expansion through direct investment, but they have been successful in expanding their foreign operations, and this is slowly transforming China’s external balance sheet.

China, of course, is a creditor country, with a net international investment position (NIIP) in 2020 of $2,150 billion. Historically its balance sheet has been characterized as “long debt, short equity,” i.e., China held the debt issued by borrowers in the advanced economies (such as U.S. Treasury bonds) and issued equity liabilities, usually in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). This strategy allowed China to benefit from the expertise of multinational firms and foreign technology, while avoiding the need to depend on its own undeveloped financial markets to arrange financing. But Chinese firms are at the stage where they can compete in foreign markets, and have been acquiring foreign affiliates.

In 2010, Chinese FDI assets were worth $317 billion, while Chinese FDI liabilities were valued at $1,570 billion, for a net FDI position of -$1,252 billion, or -20.6% of Chinese GDP. Chinese  outward FDI flows have grown since then, and the stock of assets reached $2,237 billion in 2019. (These changes also reflect the effects of currency value fluctuations.)  While the stock of liabilities was still larger at $2,796 billion, the gap between them had shrunk to $560 billion, only about 4% of GDP.

Dongkun Li and Yang Zhang provide an occount of the evolution of Chinese outward FDI in their article, “Compressed Development of Outward Foreign Direct Investment: New Challenges to the Chinese Government,” which appeared in the Journal of African and Asian Studes in 2020.  In the 1990s Chinese FDI was usually undertaken by state owned enterprises and focused on the acquisition of natural resources, particularly in developing economies. The government endorsed FDI as part of its growth strategy, however, and FDI outflows grew rapidly after 2001 as private enterprises increased their share of China’s outward expansion. There was a slowdown in 2017 when the Chinese government, concerned about capital outflows, imposed restrictions on outward FDI. Foreign expansion has continued, albeit at a slower pace, and has been given a new focus under the Belt and Road Initiative.

The increase in Chinese firms’ foreign activities has also affected China’s net investment income. Despite its NIIP creditor position, China has recorded deficits on net investment income, as payments on its FDI liabilities traditionally have exceeded the returns China received on its largely debt-dominated assets. But China’s net investment income deficit, which reached $85.3 billion in 2011, had fallen to $43.4 billion in 2019.

There was a reversal in these trends last year. China was the largest recipient of FDI in 2020, bypassing the U.S. Chinese FDI liabilities jumped to $3,179 billion, and the net FDI position fell to -$765 billion, about -5.2% of GDP. The deficit on net investment income rose to $107 billion. FDI inflows continued to be strong in the first quarter of this year. However, outward FDI increased from its depressed 2020 amount.

The future development of FDI both inside and outside China depends a great deal on government policies, as well as the uncertain course of the pandemic. In the U.S., the Committee on Foreign Investment examines proposed acquisitions of U.S. firms,  and blocks access to U.S. technology that could affect U.S. security. European governments are also scrutinizing Chinese investment, and that screening combined with the effect of the pandemic resulted in a large drop in Chinese FDI flows to Europe last year. The Chinese government also seeks to controls foreign ties as part of its overall move to assert more government control of the economy. But Chinese firms are eager to expand, and over time their search for new markets should lead to further shifts in China’s net FDI position and foreign investment earnings.

The Changing Fortunes of the Renminbi and the Dollar

Last fall the International Monetary Fund announced that China’s currency, the renminbi, would be included in the basket of currencies that determine the value of the IMF’s reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right (SDR). The IMF’s statement appeared to confirm the rise in the status of the currency that could at some point serve as an alternative to the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency. But in retrospect the renminbi is a long way from achieving widespread use outside its regional trading partners, and recent policies will only limit the international use of the currency.

It has been widely speculated that the drive to include the renminbi in the IMF’s currency basket was a tool by reformers such as People’s Bank of China governor Zhou Xiaochuan to move their country towards a more liberal economic regime. The SDR currencies are supposed to be “freely usable” by foreign and domestic investors, so capital controls were eased in the run-up to the SDR announcement. But Chinese authorities are loath to give up their ability to control foreign transactions.

This has become particularly true as a result of China’s recent capital outflows. These have in part reflected outward foreign direct investment by Chinese firms seeking to expand. But the outflows are also due to Chinese firms and individuals moving money outside their country. These movements both reflect and contribute to a continuing depreciation of the renminbi, particularly against the dollar. Chinese authorities have burned through almost $1 trillion of their $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves as they sought to slow the slide in the value of their currency.

To reduce pressure on the renminbi, the authorities are imposing controls on the overseas use of its currency. But these regulations to protect the value of the currency reduce the appeal of holding the renminbi. As Christopher Balding of the HSBC Business School in Shenzhen points out, monetary authorities can not control the exchange rate and the money supply while allowing unregulated capital flows.

Even if the authorities manage to weather the effects of capital outflows, the long-term prospects of the renminbi becoming a major reserve currency are limited. Eswar Prasad of Cornell University has written about the role of the renminbi in the international monetary system in Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi. After reviewing the extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy and the increased use of the renmimbi, Prasad evaluates China on the criteria he believes determine whether it will graduate to the status of a global currency. China had until recently been removing capital controls and allowing the exchange rate to become more flexible, benchmarks followed by foreign investors. Its public debt is relatively low, so there are no fears of sovereign debt becoming unmanageable or inflation getting out of hand.

On the other hand, the rise in total debt to GDP to 250% has drawn concerns about the stability of the financial sector. This is troubling, because as Prasad points out, this is the area of China’s greatest weakness. This vulnerability reflects not only on the increasing amount of private debt but also precarious business loans on the books of the banks, the growth of the shadow banking system and stock market volatility. Prasad writes: “China’s financial markets have become large, but they are highly volatile, poorly regulated, and lack a supporting institutional framework.” This is crucial, since ”… financial market development is likely, ultimately, to determine winners and losers in the global reserve currency sweepstakes.”

The growth in the use of renminbi has not eroded the primacy of the dollar in the international monetary system.. An investigation by Benjamin J. Cohen of UC-Santa Barbara and Tabitha M. Benney of the University of Utah of the degree of concentration in the system indicates that there is little evidence of increased competition among currencies. The dollar is widely used as a vehicle currency for private foreign exchange trading and cross-border investments, as well as for official holdings of reserves. Expectations for the euro have been scaled back as the Eurozone area struggles with its own long-term stability.

Carla Norrlof of the University of Toronto examines the sources of the dominance of the dollar. She investigates the factors that contribute to “monetary capability,” the resources base necessary for exercising currency influence. These include GDP, trade flows, the size and openness of capital markets, and defense expenditures. Norrlof’s empirical analysis leads her to confirm the status of the U.S. as the monetary hegemon: “The United States is peerless in terms of monetary capability, military power and currency influence.”

Cohen and Benney stress that their analysis holds for the current system, which could change. What could undermine the status of the dollar? Benjamin Cohen worries that President-elect Trump’s policies may increase the government’s debt and restrict trade, and possibly capital flows as well. These measures need not immediately demolish the role of the dollar. But Cohen writes, “…the dollar could succumb to a long, slow bleeding out, as America’s financial rivals try to make their own currencies more attractive and accessible.”

The renminbi, therefore, does not represent any short-term threat to the dollar’s place in the international monetary system. But the U.S. itself could undermine that status, and a potential opening may spur Chinese efforts to establish a firmer basis for the use of its currency, just as it has done in international trade in the wake of the demise of the Trans-Pacific pact. The transition could take decades, and during that period the global system could disintegrate into regional alliances that encourage unstable trade and financial flows. Those in the U.S. who voted for change may rue the consequences of President-elect Trump’s efforts to deliver on that electoral promise.

China’s Vulnerable External Balance Sheet

China’s capital outflow last year is estimated to have totaled $1 trillion. Money has been channeled out of China in various ways, including individuals carrying cash, the purchase of foreign assets, the alteration of trade invoices and other more indirect ways. The monetary exodus has pushed the exchange rate down despite a trade surplus, and raised questions about public confidence in the government’s ability to manage the economy. Moreover, the changes in the composition of China’s external assets and liabilities in recent years will further weaken its economy.

Before the global financial crisis, China had an external balance sheet that, like many other emerging market economies, consisted largely of assets held in the form of foreign debt—including U.S. Treasury bonds—and liabilities issued in the form of equity, primarily foreign direct investment, and denominated in the domestic currency. This composition, known as “long debt, short equity,” was costly, as the payout on the equity liabilities exceeded the return on the foreign debt. But there was an offsetting factor: in the event of an external crisis, the decline in the market value of the equity liabilities strengthened the balance sheet. Moreover, if there were an accompanying depreciation of the domestic currency, then the rise in the value of the foreign assets would further increase the value of the external balance sheet. and help stabilize the economy.

After the crisis, however, there was a change in the nature of China’s assets and liabilities. Chinese firms acquired stakes in foreign firms, while also investing in natural resources. The former were often in upper-income countries, and were undertaken to establish a position in those markets as much as earn profits. Many of these acquisitions now look much less attractive as the world economy shows little sign of a robust recovery, particularly in Europe.

Moreover, many of these acquisitions were financed with debt, including funds from foreign lenders denominated in dollars. Robert N McCauley, Patrick McGuire and Vladyslav Sushko of the Bank for International Settlements estimated that Chinese borrowing in dollars, mostly in the form of bank loans, reached $1.1 trillion by 2014. The fall in the value of the renminbi raises the cost of this borrowing. Menzie Chinn points out that if the corporate sector’s foreign exchange assets are taken into account, then the net foreign exchange debt is a more manageable $793 billion. But not all the firms with dollar-denominated debt possess sufficient foreign assets to offset their liabilities.

Declines in the values of the foreign assets purchased through Chinese outward FDI combined with an increase in the currency value of foreign-held debt pushes down the value of the Chinese external balance sheet. This comes at a time when the Chinese central bank is using its foreign exchange assets to slow the decline of the renminbi. The fall in reserves last year has been estimated to have reached $500 billion. Moreover, foreign firms and investors are cutting back on their acquisition of Chinese assets while repatriating money from their existing investments. China’s external position, therefore, is deteriorating, albeit from a strong base position.

Policymakers have a limited range of responses. They are tightening controls on the ability of households and companies to send money abroad, as the head of the central bank of Japan has urged. But controls on capital outflows are often seen as a sign of weakness, and do not inspire confidence. Raising interest rates to deter capital outflows would only further weaken the domestic economy, and may not work. Such moves would be particularly awkward to defend in the wake of the IMF’s inclusion of the Chinese currency in the basket of currencies that the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights are based on.

China’s remaining foreign exchange reserves and trade surplus allow policymakers some breathing room, as Menzie Chinn points out. The Chinese authorities retain a great deal of administrative control over financial transactions.  As policy officials are shuffled around, those still in office seek to reassure investors that the economy remains in good shape. But injecting more credit into the economy does not alleviate concerns about mounting debt. The economic measures promised by the leadership are being judged in the financial markets, and the verdict to date seems to be one of little or no confidence.

On the Road

Next week I will be in Beijing to teach international macroeconomics at the Hanqing Harris Summer School at Renmin University. I will also be attending a forum on the internationalization of the renminbi organized by the International Monetary Institute of Renmin University. I am looking forward to many interesting conversations with Chinese economists.

I will resume posting after I return.

China’s Outward FDI

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s latest World Investment Report Overview 2014, Foreign Direct Investment inflows to China reached $124 billion last year, while outflows rose to $101 billion. The Report anticipates that outflows will surpass inflows within the next few years, changing China from a net recipient of FDI to a net supplier. This change will affect China’s external balance sheet, and its response to financial crises.

China’s foreign assets have traditionally been overwhelmingly concentrated in foreign exchange reserves. In 2011, for example, reserves accounted for two-thirds of all the country’s foreign assets.  While the central bank’s holdings of foreign currencies (mostly held as U.S. Treasury securities) allowed it to deter any speculative currency attacks, they carried a low rate of return. That return fell even further during and after the global financial crisis as the Federal Reserve drove down interest rates, both short- and long-term. Therefore, China’s assets have not been very profitable. In addition, the foreign exchange reserves have lost value over time as the dollar depreciated. Menzie Chinn has pointed out that the political theater in Washington, DC only heightened Chinese concerns about their holdings of dollars.

A very large proportion of China’s foreign liabilities, on the other hand, has consisted largely of FDI; in 2011, the share of FDI in foreign liabilities was 59%. These investments were very profitable for the foreign firms that held them, producing a substantial stream of income. Consequently, as Yu Yongding, director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has emphasized, China’s net return on international investments has usually been negative, despite its status as a net international creditor.  China’s net international investment position in 2011 represented +21% of its GDP, but it recorded a negative net primary income flow of about -1% of its GDP.

More assets held in the form of FDI, therefore, will raise the income that China receives from its assets.  Holding FDI in other countries will also give China a chance to diversity the currency composition of its assets. But there is a downside: equity holders share the risks of the ventures they own. In the past, this meant that China’s negative net FDI position acted as a crisis buffer. China’s net primary income turned positive in 2007 and 2008; its foreign exchange assets continued to pay returns, while the return on domestic FDI fell due to the global financial crisis.  Moreover, a decline in the value of FDI as well as portfolio equity lowered China’s liabilities, contributing to an improvement in the net international investment position.

China is not unique in the composition of its foreign assets and liabilities. Philip Lane of Trinity College/Dublin has written about the “long debt, short equity” position of many emerging markets, which helped them ride out the economic turbulence of the global crisis. Many advanced economies, on the other hand, were “long equity, short debt,” which while profitable in normal times, exacerbated the decline in their economies when the crisis hit.

China’s situation will change if there is a shift towards a net positive FDI position. The flow of income from foreign assets will become more pro-cyclical. Moreover, those assets will lose value in the event of a downturn. A depreciation of the renminbi would only increase this valuation effect.

Chinese firms traditionally moved abroad to secure reliable supplies of natural resources. More recently, the surge of outward FDI has also reflected aspirations to venture into foreign markets. The movement outward will eventually raise China’s net investment return and provide it with the ability to hold assets in currencies other than the dollar. But it will also diminish the role of FDI liabilities to act as a crisis buffer. This is one factor that should be added to the list of benefits and costs of a change in China’s net FDI position.

China’s Trilemma Maneuvers

China’s exchange rate, which had been appreciating against the dollar since 2005, has fallen in value since February. U.S. officials, worried about the impact of the weaker renminbi upon U.S.-China trade flows, have expressed their concern. But the new exchange rate policy most likely reflects an attempt by the Chinese authorities to curb the inflows of short-run capital that have contributed to the expansion of credit in that country rather than a return to export-led growth. Their response illustrates the difficulty of relaxing the constraints of Mudell’s “trilemma”.

Robert Mundell showed that a country can have two—but only two—of three features of international finance: use of the money supply as an autonomous policy tool, control of the exchange rate, and unregulated international capital flows. Greg Mankiw has written about the different responses of U.S., European and Chinese officials to the challenge of the trilemma. Traditionally, the Chinese sought to control the exchange rate and money supply, and therefore restricted capital flows.

In recent years, however, the Chinese authorities have pulled back on controlling the exchange rate and capital flows, allowing each to respond more to market forces. The increase in the value of renminbi followed a period when it had been pegged to increase net exports. As the renminbi appreciated, foreign currency traders and others sought to profit from the rise, which increased short-run capital inflows and led to an increase in foreign bank claims on China. But this inflow contributed to the domestic credit bubble that has fueled increases in housing prices. Private debt scaled by GDP has risen to levels that were followed by crises in other countries, such as Japan in the 1980s and South Korea in the 1990s. All of this gave the policymakers a motive for trying to discourage further capital inflows by making it clear the renminbi’s movement need not be one way.

Moreover, the authorities may have wanted to hold down further appreciation of the renminbi. The release of new GDP estimates for China based on revised purchasing power parity data showed that country’s economy to be larger than previously thought. The new GDP data, in turn, has led to revisions by Marvin Kessler and Arvind Subramanian of the renminbi exchange rate that would be consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson model that correlates exchange rates to levels of income.  Their results indicate that the exchange rate is now “fairly valued.” With the current account surplus in 2013 down to 2% of GDP, Chinese officials may believe that there is little room for further appreciation.

Gavyn Davies points out that there is another way to relieve the pressure on the exchange rate due to capital inflows: allow more outflows. Even if domestic savers receive the higher rates of return that government officials are signaling will come, Chinese investors would undoubtedly want to take advantage of the opportunity to diversity their asset holdings. As pointed out previously, however, capital outflows could pose a threat to the Chinese financial system as well as international financial stability. Chinese economists such as Yu Yongding have warned of the consequences of too rapid a liberalization of the capital account.

The Chinese authorities, therefore, face difficult policy choices due to the constraints of the trilemma. Relaxing the constraints on capital flows could cause the exchange rate to overshoot while further adding to the domestic credit boom that the central bank seeks to restrain. But clamping down on capital flows would slow down the increase in the use of the renminbi for international trade. As long as the policymakers seek to maneuver around the restraints of the trilemma, they will be reacting to the responses in foreign exchange and capital markets to their own previous initiatives.

China’s Place in the Global Economy

Last week’s announcement that China’s GDP grew at an annualized rate of 7.4% in the first quarter of this year has stirred speculation about that country’s economy. Some are skeptical of the data, and point to other indicators that suggest slower growth.  Although a deceleration in growth is consistent with the plans of Chinese officials, policymakers may respond with some form of stimulus. Their decisions will affect not just the Chinese economy, but all those economies that deal with it.

The latest World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund has a chapter on external conditions and growth in emerging market countries that discusses the impact of Chinese economic activity. The authors list several channels of transmission, including China’s role in the global supply chain, importing intermediate inputs from other Asian economies for processing into final products that are exported to advanced economies. Another contact takes place through China’s demand for commodities.  The author’s econometric analysis shows that a 1% rise in Chinese growth results in a 0.1% immediate rise in emerging market countries’ GDPs. There is a further positive effect over time as the terms of trade of commodity-exporters rise. Countries in Latin America are affected as well as in Asia.

These consequences largely reflect trade flows, although China’s FDI in other countries is acknowledged. But what would happen if China’s capital account regulations were relaxed? Financial flows conceivably could be quite significant. Chinese savers would seek to diversity their asset holdings, while foreigners would want to hold Chinese securities. Chinese banks could expand their customer base, while some Chinese firms might seek external financing of their capital projects. A study by John Hooley of the Bank of England offers an analysis of the possible increase in capital flows that projects a rise in the stock of China’s external assets and liabilities from about 5% of today’s world GDP to 30% of world GDP in 2025.

While the study points out that financial liberalization by China would allow more asset diversification, it also acknowledges that world financial markets would become vulnerable to a shock in China’s financial system.  Martin Wolf warns that the down-side risk is quite large. He cites price distortions and moral hazard as possible sources of instability, as well as regulators unfamiliar with global markets and an existing domestic credit boom. Similarly, Tahsin Saadi Sedik and Tao Sun of the IMF in an examination of the consequences of capital flow liberalization claim that deregulation of the Chinese capital account would result in higher GDP per capita and lower inflation in that country, but also higher equity returns and lower bank adequacy ratios, which could endanger financial stability.

There could be another result. A sizable Chinese presence in global asset markets would lead to even more scrutiny of Chinese monetary policy. A policy initiative undertaken in response to domestic conditions would affect financial flows elsewhere, and foreign policymakers most likely would voice their unhappiness with the impact on their economies. The Peoples Bank of China, accustomed to criticism from the U.S. over its handling of its exchange rate, might find the accusation of “currency wars” coming from other emerging market countries.  The price of a successful integration of Chinese financial markets with global finance will be calls for more sensitivity to the external impacts of domestic policies.

1944, 1976, 2013?

When the financial crisis of 2007 was changing into the Great Recession of 2008-09, national leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown turned to the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 for inspiration. They invoked the spirit of the conference as they sought to resolve the crisis and devise regulations that would allow them to rein in the financial institutions that they held responsible for instigating the crisis. Indeed, Bretton Woods is often used as a model of international cooperation. (See, for example, here and here.)

But Bretton Woods is an odd choice for a prototype of international collaboration. Benn Steil in The Battle of Bretton Woods has shown how the conference proceedings were controlled by the U.S. delegation headed by Harry White, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. John Maynard Keynes, a member of the British delegation, was out-maneuvered by White, and the final agreement reflected the U.S. vision for the post-war international monetary regime more than anyone else’s. While the conference had a Quota Committee, for example, in reality the quotas assigned the members were chosen by the U.S. officials.

A more apt historical precedent may be the negotiations that took place during the early 1970s over the design of an international monetary system to replace Bretton Woods. Michelle Frasher has provided an account of these consultations in Transatlantic Politics and the Transformation of the International Monetary System. The U.S. had ended the conversion of gold for dollars by foreign central banks in August 1971. This act, according to Frasher, reflected the belief of U.S. President Richard Nixon and his Treasury Secretary John Connally that maintaining gold conversion limited their domestic and foreign policy options rather than any ideological view regarding Bretton Woods.

However, George Schultz, Connally’s successor as Treasury Secretary, came to favor floating exchange rates after the breakdown of the Smithsonian agreement in 1973. But while the U.S. had been able to dominate its Allies in 1944, it faced a different situation in the early 1970s.  It could not ignore the wishes of its major European allies, France, West Germany and Great Britain, which were concerned about unconstrained markets. The French in particular sought to place restraints on the ability of nations to maintain floating rates. In the end, the U.S. and French negotiators agreed to amend the IMF’s Article IV to include a commitment by the IMF’s members “to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates…” The IMF is still struggling to explain what this means in terms of which practices are permissible and which are not.

Over three decades later, many of the same tensions persist. Now, however, it is China and other Asian countries that express concerns about the U.S. Frasher (p. 135), for example, describes the source of the Europeans’ resentment in the 1970s:

…the US tendency to behave paternally and use its reserve status to disregard European opinions, act unilaterally on major policy initiatives, frame the relations in terms of US interests, and dictate the conditions of international monetary reform constantly frustrated European views about partnership. The economic and political differences within the transatlantic alliance made for an unconstructive, uneven, and often tense partnership.

Substitute “Asian” for “European” and “transpacific” for “transatlantic,” and we have a good summary of the Asians’ current views of the U.S. For example, Justin Yifu Lin, a former Chief Economist of the World Bank and the founding director of the China Center for Economic Research, wrote in Against the Consensus: Reflections on the Great Recession (p. 156)

One of the main flaws in the nonsystem that evolved in the post-Bretton-Woods period eventually led to the 2008-9 global crisis: the potential conflict of interest between US macroeconomic policy for domestic objectives and the dollar’s role as a global reserve currency…Inevitably, national economic concerns guided US fiscal and monetary policies, at times in ways that were detrimental to global stability.

Similarly, Xu Hongcai of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges in an article in the Global Summitry Journal co-authored with Yves Tiberghien wrote (p. 10):

Despite the status of the US as anchor for the global monetary system, the US central bank, the Federal Reserve is strictly mandated to set its monetary policy with consideration for US inflation, growth, and employment only. There is no channel for inputs from the rest of the world in managing the world’s currency. Thus, the major international reserve currency issuer continues to implement quantitative easing monetary policies in light of the needs of its own economy without considering the global spillover effect of such policies. These policies have caused inflationary pressures on emerging economies, and in turn increased the systemic risks of the global financial system.

After 1976, France gave up trying to devise a rule-based global system and turned to a regional system. What are China’s options? It has already shown a willingness to join with other Asian nations in a currency swap arrangement, the Chiang Mai initiative. It has the potential to do more, and could become a regional reserve currency. But to increase the use of the renminbi would require further financial decontrol, and until recently it did not appear that the government was ready to move in that direction. Most observers thought that a “fully global renminbi was a distant goal.”

The political battles over the debt ceiling, however, may push the Chinese government to rethink its long-run plans for the renminbi. Chinese officials expressed their frustration with the indifference of the U.S. to the global consequences of its domestic political discord. If Chinese policymakers now advance their timetable for expanding the renminbi’s use as a global currency, we may look back at 2013 as an inflection point.