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The Electoral Consequences of Globalization

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The reasons for the election of Donald Trump as President of the U.S. will be analyzed and argued about for many years to come. Undoubtedly there are U.S.-specific factors that are relevant, such as racial divisions in voting patterns. But the election took place after the British vote to withdraw from the European Union and the rise to power of conservative politicians in continental Europe, so it is reasonable to ask whether globalization bears any responsibility.

The years before the global financial crisis were years of rapid economic globalization. Trade flows grew on average by 7% a year over the 1987-2007 period. Financial flows also expanded, particularly amongst the advanced economies. Global financial assets increased by 8% a year between 1990 and 2007. But all this activity was curtailed in 2008-09 when the global financial crisis pushed the world economy into a downturn. Are the subsequent rises in nationalist sentiment the product of these trends?

Trump seized upon some of the consequences of increased trade and investment to make the case that globalization was bad for the U.S. He had great success with his claim that international trade deals are responsible for a loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector. In addition, he blamed outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by U.S. firms that opened production facilities in foreign countries for moving manufacturing jobs outside the U.S. Among the firms that Trump criticized were Ford Motor, Nabisco and the Carrier Corporation, which is moving a manufacturing operation from Indiana to Mexico.

Have foreign workers taken the jobs of U.S. workers? Increased trade does lead to a reallocation of resources, as a country increases its output in those sectors where it has an advantage while cutting back production in other sectors. Resources should flow from the latter to the former, but in reality it can be difficult to switch employment across sectors. Daron Acemoglu and David Autor of MIT, David Dorn of the University of Zurich, Gordon Hanson of UC-San Diego and Brendan Price of MIT have found that import competition from China after 2000 contributed to reductions in U.S. manufacturing employment and weak U.S. job growth. They estimated manufacturing job losses due to Chinese competition of 2.0 – 2.4 million. Other studies find similar results for workers who do not have high school degrees.

Moreover, multinational firms do shift production across borders in response to lower wages, among other factors. Ann E. Harrison of UC-Berkeley and Margaret S. McMillan of Tufts University looked at the hiring practices of the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms during the period of 1977 to 1999. They found that lower wages in affiliate countries where the employees were substitutes for U.S. workers led to more employment in those countries but reductions in employment in the U.S. However, when employment across geographical locations is complementary for firms that do significantly different work at home and abroad, domestic and foreign employment rise and fall together.

Imports and foreign production, therefore, have had an impact on manufacturing employment in the U.S. But several caveats should be raised. First, as Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee of MIT and others have pointed out, technology has had a much larger effect on jobs. The U.S. is the second largest global producer of manufactured goods, but these products are being made in plants that employ fewer workers than they did in the past. Many of the lost jobs simply do not exist any more. Second, the U.S. exports goods and services as well as purchases them. Among the manufactured goods that account for significant shares of U.S. exports are machines and engines, electronic equipment and aircraft. Third, there is inward FDI as well as outward, and the foreign-based firms hire U.S. workers. A 2013 Congressional Research Service study by James V. Jackson reported that by year-end 2011 foreign firms employed 6.1 million Americans, and 37% of this employment—2.3 million jobs—was in the manufacturing sector. More recent data shows that employment by the U.S. affiliates of multinational companies rose to 6.4 million in 2014. Mr. Trump will find himself in a difficult position if he threatens to shut down trade and investment with countries that both import from the U.S. and invest here.

The other form of globalization that drew Trump’s derision was immigration. Most of his ire focused on those who had entered the U.S. illegally. However, in a speech in Arizona he said that he would set up a commission that would roll back the number of legal migrants to “historic norms.”

The current number of immigrants (42 million) represents around 13% of the U.S. population, and 16% of the labor force. An increase in the number of foreign-born workers depresses the wages of some native-born workers, principally high-school dropouts, as well as other migrants who arrived earlier. But there are other, more significant reasons for the stagnation in working-class wages. In addition, a reduction in the number of migrant laborers would raise the ratio of young and retired people to workers—the dependency ratio—and endanger the financing of Social Security and Medicare. And by increasing the size of the U.S. economy, these workers induce expansions in investment expenditures and hiring in areas that are complementary.

The one form of globalization that Trump has not criticized, with the exception of outward FDI, is financial. This is a curious omission, as the crisis of 2008-09 arose from the financial implosion that followed the collapse of the housing bubble in the U.S. International financial flows exacerbated the magnitude of the crisis. But Trump has pledged to dismantle the Dodd-Frank legislation, which was enacted to implement financial regulatory reform and lower the probability of another crisis. While Trump has criticized China for undervaluing its currency in order to increase its exports to the U.S., most economists believe that the Chinese currency is no longer undervalued vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.

Did globalization produce Trump, or lead to the circumstances that resulted in 46.7% of the electorate voting for him? A score sheet of the impact of globalization within the U.S. would record pluses and minuses. Among those who have benefitted are consumers who purchase items made abroad at cheaper prices, workers who produce export goods, and firms that hire migrants. Those who have been adversely affected include workers who no longer have manufacturing jobs and domestic workers who compete with migrants for low-paying jobs. Overall, most studies find evidence of positive net benefits from trade. Similarly, studies of the cost and benefits of immigration indicate that overall foreign workers make a positive contribution to the U.S. economy.

Other trends have exerted equal or greater consequences for our economic welfare. First, as pointed out above, advances in automation have had an enormous impact on the number and nature of jobs, and advances in artificial intelligence wii further change the nature of work. The launch of driverless cars and trucks, for example, will affect the economy in unforeseen ways, and more workers will lose their livelihoods. Second, income inequality has been on the increase in the U.S. and elsewhere for several decades. While those in the upper-income classes have benefitted most from increased trade and finance, inequality reflects many factors besides globalization.

Why, then, is globalization the focus of so much discontent? Trump had the insight that demonizing foreigners and U.S.-based multinationals would allow him to offer simple solutions—ripping up trade deals, strong-arming CEOs to relocate facilities—to complex problems. Moreover, it allows him to draw a line between his supporters and everyone else, with Trump as the one who will protect workers against the crafty foreigners and corrupt elite who conspire to steal American jobs. Blaming the foreign “other” is a well-trod route for those who aspire to power in times of economic and social upheaval.

Globalization, therefore, should not be held responsible for the election of Donald Trump and those in other countries who offer similar simplistic solutions to challenging trends. But globalization’s advocates did indirectly lead to his rise when they oversold the benefits of globalization and neglected the downside. Lower prices at Wal-Mart are scarce consolation to those who have lost their jobs. Moreover, the proponents of globalization failed to strengthen the safety networks and redistributive mechanisms that allow those who had to compete with foreign goods and workers to share in the broader benefits. Dani Rodrik of Harvard’s Kennedy School has described how the policy priorities were changed: “The new model of globalization stood priorities on their head, effectively putting democracy to work for the global economy, instead of the other way around. The elimination of barriers to trade and finance became an end in itself, rather than a means toward more fundamental economic and social goals.”

The battle over globalization is not finished, and there will be future opportunities to adapt it to benefit a wider section of society. The goal should be to place it within in a framework that allows a more egalitarian distribution of the benefits and payment of the costs. This is not a new task. After World War II, the Allied planners sought to revive international trade while allowing national governments to use their policy tools to foster full employment. Political scientist John Ruggie of the Kennedy School called the hybrid system based on fixed exchange rates, regulated capital accounts and government programs “embedded liberalism,” and it prevailed until it was swept aside by the wave of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s.

What would today’s version of “embedded liberalism” look like? In the financial sector, the pendulum has already swung back from unregulated capital flows and towards the use of capital control measures as part of macroprudential policies designed to address systemic risk in the financial sector. In addition, Thomas Piketty of the École des hautes etudes en sciences (EHESS) and associate chair at the Paris School of Economics, and author of Capital in the Twenty-first Century, has called for a new focus in discussions over the next stage of globalization: “…trade is a good thing, but fair and sustainable development also demands public services, infrastructure, health and education systems. In turn, these themselves demand fair taxation systems.”

The current political environment is not conducive toward the expansion of public goods. But it is unlikely that our new President’s policies will deliver on their promise to return to a past when U.S. workers could operate without concern for foreign competition or automation. We will certainly revisit these issues, and we need to redefine what a successful globalization looks like. And if we don’t? Thomas Piketty warns of the consequences of not enacting the necessary domestic policies and institutions: “If we fail to deliver these, Trumpism will prevail.”

The Retreat of Financial Globalization?

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Eight years after the global crisis of 2008-09, its reverberations are still being felt. These include a slowdown in world trade and a reassessment of the advantages of globalization. Several recent papers deal with a decline in international capital flows, and suggest some reasons for why this may be occurring.

Matthieu Bussière and Julia Schmidt of the Banque de France and Natacha Valla of CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) compare the record of the period since 2012 with the pre-crisis period and highlight four conclusions. First, the retrenchment of global capital flows that began during the crisis has persisted, with gross financial flows falling from about 10-15% of global GDP to approximately 5%. Second, this retrenchment has occurred primarily in the advanced economies. particularly in Europe. Third, net flows have fallen significantly, which is consistent with the fall in “global imbalances.” Fourth, there are striking differences in the adjustment of the various types of capital flows. Foreign direct investment has been very resilient, while capital flows in the category of “other investment”—mainly bank loans—have contracted substantially. Portfolio flows fall in between these two extremes, with portfolio equity recovering much more quickly than portfolio debt.

Similarly, Peter McQuade and Martin Schmitz of the European Central Bank investigate the decline in capital flows between the pre-crisis period of 2005-06 and the post-crisis period of 2013-14. They report that total inflows in the post-crisis period reached about 50% of their pre-crisis levels in the advanced economies and about 80% in emerging market economies. The decline is particularly notable in the EU countries, where inflows fell to only about 25% of their previous level. The steepest declines occurred in the capital flows gathered in the “other investment” category.

McQuade and Schmitz also investigate the characteristics of the countries that experienced larger contractions in capital flows in the post-crisis period. They report that inflows fell more in those countries with higher initial levels of private sector credit, public debt and net foreign liabilities. On the other hand, countries with lower GDP per capita experienced smaller declines, consistent with the observation that inflows have been curtailed more in the advanced economies. In the case of outflows, countries with higher GDP growth during the crisis and greater capital account openness were more likely to increase their holdings of foreign assets.

Both studies see an improvement in financial stability due to the larger role of FDI in capital flows. Changes in bank regulation may have contributed to the smaller role of bank loans in capital flows, as has the diminished economic performance of many advanced economies, particularly in the Eurozone. On the other hand, smaller capital flows may restrain economic growth.

While capital flows to emerging markets rebounded more quickly after the crisis than those to advanced economies, a closer examination by the IMF in its April 2016 World Economic Outlook of the period of 2010-2015 indicate signs of a slowdown towards the end of that period. Net flows in a sample of 45 emerging market economies fell from a weighted mean inflow of 3.7% of GDP in 2010 to an outflow of 1.2% during the period of 2014:IV – 2015:III. Net inflows were particularly weak in the third quarter of 2015. The slowdown reflected a combination of a decline in inflows and a rise in outflows across all categories of capital, with the decline in inflows more pronounced for debt-generating inflows than equity-like inflows. However, there was an increase in portfolio debt inflows in 2010-2012, which then declined.

The IMF’s economists sought to identify the drivers of the slowdown in capital flows to these countries. They identified a shrinking differential in real GDP growth between the emerging market economies and advanced economies as an important contributory factor to the decline. Country-specific factors influenced the change in inflows for individual countries, as economies with more flexible exchange rates recorded smaller declines.

In retrospect, the period of 1990-2007 represented an extraordinarily rapid rise in financial globalization, particularly in the advanced economies. The capital flows led to increased credit flows and asset bubbles in many countries, and culminated in an economic collapse of historic dimensions. The subsequent retrenchment of capital flows may be seen as a return to normalcy, and the financial and banking regulations–including capital account controls–enacted since the crisis as an attempt to provide stronger defenses against a recurrence of financial volatility. But the history of finance shows that new financial innovations are always on the horizon, and their risks only become apparent in hindsight.

Capital Flows and Financial Crises

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The impact of capital flows on the incidence of financial crises has been recognized since the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Inflows before the crisis contributed to the expansion of domestic credit and asset booms, while the liabilities they created escalated in value once central banks abandoned their exchange rate pegs and their currencies depreciated. More recently, evidence that foreign direct investment lowers the probability of financial crises has been reported. A new paper by Atish R. Ghosh and Mahvash S. Qureshi of the IMF investigates how the different types of capital flows affect financial stability.

The authors point out that capital inflows can be problematic when they lead to appreciations of real exchange rates and increases in domestic spending. The empirical evidence they report from a sample of 53 emerging market economies over the period of 1980-2013 does show linkages between capital inflows on the one hand and both GDP growth and overvaluation of the real exchange rate. But when the authors distinguish among the different types of capital inflows, they find that FDI, which has the largest impact on GDP growth and the output gap, is not significantly associated with overvaluation. Net portfolio and other investment flows, on the other hand, do lead to currency overvaluation as well as output expansion.

Ghosh and Qureshi investigated next the impact of capital flows on financial stability. Capital inflows are associated with higher domestic credit growth, bank leverage and foreign currency-denominated lending. When they looked at the composition of these capital flows, however, FDI flows were not linked to any of these vulnerabilities, whereas portfolio—and in particular debt—flows were.

Ghosh and Quershi also assessed the impact of capital flows on the probability of financial crises, and their results indicate that net financial flows raise the probability of both banking and currency crises. When real exchange rate overvaluation and domestic credit growth are included in the estimation equations, the significance of the capital flow variable falls, indicating that these are the principal transmission mechanisms. But when the capital flows are disaggregated, the “other investment” component of the inflows are significantly linked to the increased probabilities of both forms of financial crises, whereas FDI flows decrease banking crises.

The role of FDI in actually reducing the probability of a crisis (a result also found here and here) merits further investigation. The stability of FDI as opposed to other, more liquid forms of capital is relevant, but most likely not the only factor. Part of the explanation may lie in the inherent risk-sharing nature of FDI; a local firm with a foreign partner may be able to withstand financial volatility better than a firm without any external resources. Mihir Desai and C. Fritz Foley of Harvard and Kristin J. Forbes of MIT (working paper here), for example, compared the response of affiliates of U.S. multinationals and local firms in the tradable sectors of emerging market countries to currency depreciations, and found that the affiliates increased their sales, assets and investments more than local firms did.  As a result, they pointed out, multinational affiliations might mitigate some of the effects of currency crises.

The increased vulnerability of countries to financial crises due to debt inflows makes recent developments in the emerging markets worrisome. Michael Chui, Emese Kuruc and Philip Turner of the Bank for International Settlements have pointed to the increase in the debt of emerging market companies, much of which is denominated in foreign currencies. Aggregate currency mismatches are not a cause for concern due to the large foreign exchange holdings of the central banks of many of these countries, but the currency mismatches of the private sector are much larger. Whether or not governments will use their foreign exchange holdings to bail out over-extended private firms is very much an open issue.

Philip Coggan of the Buttonwood column in The Economist has looked at the foreign demand for the burgeoning corporate debt of emerging markets, and warned investors that “Just as they are piling into this asset class, its credit fundamentals are deteriorating.” The relatively weak prospects of these firms are attributed to the slow growth of international trade and the weakening of global value chains. Corporate defaults have risen in recent years, and Coggan warns that “More defaults are probably on the way.”

The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook forecasts increased growth in the emerging market economies in 2016. But the IMF adds: “However, the outlook for these economies is uneven and generally weaker than in the past.” The increase in debt offerings by firms in emerging market economies will bear negative consequences for the issuing firms and their home governments in those emerging market economies that do not fare as well as others. Coggan in his Buttonwood column also claimed that “When things do go wrong for emerging-market borrowers, it seems to happen faster.” Just how fast we may be about to learn. Market conditions can deteriorate quickly and when they do, no one knows how and when they will stabilize.

Capital Flows and Financial Activity in Commodity Exporters

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Emerging markets and developing economies have struggled in recent years to regain the growth rates of the last decade before the global financial crisis. The slowdown has been particularly evident in commodity-exporters that face declining prices. The World Bank’s most recent Global Economic Prospects, for example, projects growth for those countries of only 0.4% in 2016. Moreover, the fall in commodity prices is linked to capital flows to those countries and an increase in the fragility of their financial sectors.

In a recent paper in the Journal of International Money and Finance, Joseph P. Byrne of Heriot-Watt University and Norbert Fiess of the World Bank examined the determinants of capital inflows to 64 emerging market economies. Among the drivers of capital flows were real commodity prices: an increase in these prices increased flows to the emerging markets, particularly total equity and bank flows. Real commodity prices also contributed to an increase in the global volatility of capital flows.

Commodity price cycles, therefore, should be associated with capital flow cycles, and declines in both may lead to financial crises. Carmen Reinhart of Harvard’s Kennedy School, Vincent Reinhart of the American Enterprise Institute and Christoph Trebesch of the University of Munich documented such a correspondence of capital flows, commodity prices and sovereign defaults during the period 1815 to 2015 in a paper in the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 
(working paper here). They found evidence of an overlap between booms in capital flows and commodity prices, which resulted in a “double bonanza,” and a “double bust” when capital flows and prices declined. They also recorded the incidence of sovereign defaults, and found that four of six global peaks in defaults followed double busts in capital flows and commodity markets. The most recent boom was exceptionally prolonged, beginning in 1999 and lasting until 2011, and was followed by a “double bust.”

Commodity prices can also affect the fragility of domestic financial sectors. Tidiane Kinda, Montfort Mlachila and Rasmané Ouedraogo in an IMF working paper looked at the impact of commodity price shocks on the financial sectors in 71 emerging market and developing economies that are commodity exporters. Falling prices weakened the financial sector as manifested through higher non-performing loans and reduced bank profits, and an increased probability of a banking crisis. The transmission channels included an increase in the amount of debt denominated in foreign currency as well as lower economic growth and less government revenues.

The fragility of the financial sectors of the commodity exporters has been exacerbated by a growth in private credit. The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects has reported that credit to the nonfinancial sector in emerging markets and developing economies increased in the five years ending in 2015, and credit growth was particularly pronounced in commodity exporting countries. Much of this credit went to nonfinancial corporations, and the borrowing was concentrated in the energy sector. As a result, credit growth in the commodity exporting emerging market and developing economies has risen to levels of credit/GDP that in the past have been associated with credit booms that have often (but not always) been followed by bank crises.

Commodity price fluctuations, therefore, are accompanied by changes in capital flows and the status of financial sectors in commodity exporters. Booms in domestic credit can further threaten long-term financial stability. More flexible exchange rates may alleviate some of the strain of a downturn in commodity prices and capital inflows. But countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Russia face little relief from the drag on their economic performance as long as commodity prices remain depressed. The accommodative monetary policies of the advanced economies have bolstered asset prices in many emerging markets, but that situation can not be counted on to continue indefinitely.

The Impact of Financial Globalization on the Brexit Vote

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The reasons for the majority vote in favor of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union will be studied and analyzed for years to come. Globalization in the form of migration—or fear of migration—played a considerable role. Support for leaving the EU was also high in the British version of the “rust belt,” in this case the industrial Northern areas that have lost jobs to overseas competitors. But financial globalization also played a role in exacerbating the divisions that led to the vote to exit.

London’s role as an international financial center has served that city well. According to The Guardian, “The capital generates 22% of the UK’s gross domestic product, much of this from financial services, despite accounting for only 12.5% of the UK population.” Those employed in the financial sector have been well compensated for their work. In a study of financial sector wages in London, Joanne Lindley of King’s College London and Steve McIntosh of the University of Sheffield (see a shorter version here) report that “…the average wage in the financial sector was almost three times as large as the average wage across the whole private sector in 2009.” The same phenomenon has been observed in wages in the U.S. financial sector as well as in other European economies.

The relatively high wages paid to those employed in the financial sector contributes to rising income inequality in the UK. The Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, has soared in recent years, and according to one report is now the highest in Europe. According to the Equality Trust, “Average household income in London is considerably higher than in the North East.” But this disparity across the regions of the country has not been an issue in recent elections, leaving those outside the financial sector feeling left behind and marginalized.

These developments are consistent with a broader trend towards higher inequality in economies that have deregulated their capital accounts. Davide Furceri and Prakash Loungani of the IMF (see also here) examined the distributional impact of capital account liberalization in 149 countries over the period of 1970 to 2010. They found that capital liberalization reforms increase inequality and reduce the labor share of income. The latter effect is particularly prevalent in high- and middle-income countries.

A UK withdrawal from the EU will entail significant changes in both that country and the EU, which in turn will affect the direction of financial globalization. Financial services exports account for a large proportion of all the UK’s financial services operations. The UK’s membership in the EU has allowed it to provide these services to other EU members. But if the UK leaves the EU, the country will have to negotiate continued access to the EU’s financial markets, and the remaining EU members will most likely be unwilling to permit this if the country is unwilling to adopt EU standards in other areas such as the movements of people.

If financial service providers no longer find the UK to be a suitable location, the effect will be seen in the balance of payments. The country’s current account deficit, which reached 5.2% of GDP last year and 7% in the first quarter of this year, has been financed by capital inflows, including inward FDI. Capital inflows will drop off as international banks and other financial services providers relocate at least some of their operations to EU countries where membership is not an issue. The sharp exchange rate depreciation after the vote may partially reverse the current account deficit, but a decline in capital inflows will exacerbate the situation.

In the meantime, the supervision of financial services within the UK will be muddled as regulators decide which rules to keep and which need to be modified. The loss of the UK as a member will also affect the design of financial regulations within the EU, as the UK has played a major role in promoting a more liberal approach to regulation within the union. If it no longer serves as an advocate for that position, the EU members may adopt a more regulatory approach that favors banks over capital markets.

But many Britons will be unsympathetic to these effects of the referendum. Their vote is one more unfavorable verdict on globalization, similar to those seen in the U.S. and other European countries (see here and here). Until there is confidence that globalization delivers benefits for all of society or that there are mechanisms to share the rewards, the negative backlash will continue. Criticizing the Brexit vote or the measures proposed by Donald Trump is not sufficient: voters need to believe that globalization can be handled in a responsible and evenhanded fashion. Managing the direction and impact of globalization–including capital flows–without reversing its direction may be the biggest task facing the next President of the U.S. and other national leaders.

The Role of the U.S. in the Global Financial System

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The mandate of the Federal Reserve is clear: “…promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.” How to achieve those goals, of course, has been the subject of great debate: should the central bank use interest rates or monetary aggregates? should it rely on rules or discretion? The ongoing controversy within the U.S. over the benefits and costs of globalization opens up the issue of the geographic scope of the Fed’s responsibilities: does the Fed (and for that matter the U.S. Treasury) need to worry about the rest of the world?

Stanley Fischer, Federal Reserve Vice Chair (and former first deputy managing director of the IMF) sees a role for limited intervention. Fischer acknowledges the feedback effects between the U.S. and the rest of the world. The U.S. economy represents nearly one quarter of the global economy, and this preponderance means that U.S. developments have global spillovers. Changes in U.S. interest rates, for example, are transmitted to the rest of the world, and the “taper tantrum” showed how severe the responses could be. Therefore, Fischer argues, our first responsibility is “to keep our own house in order.” It also entails acknowledging that efforts to restore financial stability can not be limited by national borders. During the global financial crisis, the Fed established swap lines with foreign central banks so that they could provide liquidity to their own banks that had borrowed in dollars to hold U.S. mortgage-backed securities. Fischer cautions, however, that the Fed’s global responsibilities are not unbounded. He acknowledges Charles Kindleberger’s assertion that international stability can only be ensured by a financial hegemon or global central bank, but Fischer states, “…the U.S. Federal Reserve System is not that bank.”

The U.S. did hold that hegemonic position, however, during the Bretton Woods era when we ensured the convertibility of dollars held by central banks to gold. We abandoned the role when President Richard Nixon ended gold convertibility in 1971 and the Bretton Woods system subsequently ended. Governments have subsequently experimented with all sorts of exchange rate regimes, from fixed to floating and virtually everything in between.

While many countries do not intervene in the currency markets, others do, so there is a case for a reserve currency. But perhaps more importantly, we live in an era of global finance, and much of these financial flows are denominated in dollars. The offshore dollar banking system, which began in the 1960s with the Eurodollar market, now encompasses emerging markets as well as upper-income countries. This financial structure is vulnerable to systemic risk. Patrick Foulis of The Economist believes that “The lesson of 2007-08 was that a run in the offshore dollar archipelago can bring down the entire financial system, including Wall Street, and that the system needs a lender of last resort.”

Are there alternatives to the U.S. as a linchpin? The IMF is the international agency assigned the task of ensuring the provision of the international public good of international economic and financial stability. Its track record during the 2008-09 crisis showed that it could respond quickly and with enough financial firepower to deal with global volatility (see Chapter 10). But it can only move when its principals, the 189 member nations, allow it to do so. The Fund’s subsequent dealings with the European nations in the Greek financial crisis demonstrate that it can be tripped up by politics.

Is China ready to take on the responsibilities of an international financial hegemon? Its economy rivals, if not surpasses, that of the U.S. in size, and it is a dominant international global trader. China’s financial footprint is growing as well, and the central bank has established its own series of swap lines. This past year the renminbi was included in the basket of currencies that are used to value the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights. But the government has moved cautiously in removing capital account regulations in order to avoid massive flows in either direction, so there is limited liquidity. Chinese debt problems do not encourage confidence in its ability to deal with financial stress.

The Federal Reserve is well aware that international linkages work both ways. Fed Chair Janet Yellen cited concerns about the Chinese economy last fall when the Fed held back its first increase in the Federal Funds rate. And Fed Governor Lael Brainard believes that the global role of the dollar and the proximity to a zero lower bound may amplify spillovers from foreign conditions onto the U.S.

Whether or not the U.S. has a special responsibility to promote international financial stability may depend in part on one’s views of the stability of global capital markets. If they are basically stable and only occasionally pushed into episodes of excess volatility, then coordinated national policies may be sufficient to return them to normalcy. But if the structure of the global financial system is inherently shaky, then the U.S. needs to be ready to step in when the next crisis occurs. Andrés Velasco of Columbia University believes that “Recent financial history suggests that the next liquidity crisis is just around the corner, and that such crises can impose enormous economic and social costs. And in a largely dollarized world economy, the only certain tool for avoiding such crises is a lender of last resort in dollars.”

Unfortunately, if a crisis does occur it will take place during a period when the U.S. is reassessing its international ties. Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican candidate, achieved that position in part because of his argument that past U.S. trade and finance deals were against our national interests. He shows little interest in maintaining multilateral arrangements such as the United Nations. Trump has announced that he would most likely replace Janet Yellen because of her political affiliation. It is doubtful that the criteria for a new Chair would include a sensitivity to the international ramifications of U.S. policies.

The interest of the U.S. public in international dealings has always waxed and waned, and Trump’s nomination is a sign that we are in a period when many believe we should minimize our engagement with the rest of the world. But this will be difficult to do as long as the dollar remains the predominant world currency for private as well as official use. Regardless of domestic politics, we will not escape the fallout of another crisis, regardless of where it starts. It would be better to accept our international role and seeks ways to minimize risk than to undertake a futile attempt to make the world go away.

The Repercussions of Financial Booms and Crises

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Financial booms have become a chronic feature of the global financial system. When these booms end in crises, the impact on economic conditions can be severe. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff of Harvard pointed out that banking crises have been associated with deep downturns in output and employment, which is certainly consistent with the experience of the advanced economies in the aftermath of the global crisis. But the aftereffects of the booms may be even deeper and more long-lasting than thought.

Gary Gorton of Yale and Guillermo Ordoñez of the University of Pennsylvania have released a study of “good booms” and “bad booms,” where the latter end in a crisis and the former do not. In their model, all credit booms start with an increase in productivity that allows firms to finance projects using collateralized debt. During this initial period, lenders can assess the quality of the collateral, but are not likely to do so as the projects are productive. Over time, however, as more and more projects are financed, productivity falls as does the quality of the investment projects. Once the incentive to acquire information about the projects rises, lenders begin to examine the collateral that has been posted. Firms with inadequate collateral can no longer obtain financing, and the result is a crisis. But if new technology continues to improve, then there need not be a cutoff of credit, and the boom will end without a crisis. Their empirical analysis shows that credit booms are not uncommon, last ten years on average, and are less likely to end in a crisis when there is larger productivity growth during the boom.

Claudio Borio, Enisse Kharroubi, Christian Upper and Fabrizio Zampolli of the Bank for International Settlements also look at the dynamics of credit booms and productivity, with data from advanced economies over the period of 1979-2009. They find that credit booms induce a reallocation of labor towards sectors with lower productivity growth, particularly the construction sector. A financial crisis amplifies the negative impact of the previous misallocation on productivity. They conclude that the slow recovery from the global crisis may be due to the misallocation of resources that occurred before the crisis.

How do international capital flows fit into these accounts? Gianluca Benigno of the London School of Economics, Nathan Converse of the Federal Reserve Board and Luca Forno of Universitat Pompeu Fabra write about capital inflows and economic performance. They identify 155 episodes of exceptionally large capital inflows in middle- and high-income countries over the last 35 years. They report that larger inflows are associated with economic booms. The expansions are accompanied by rises in total factor productivity (TFP) and an increase in employment, which end when the inflows cease.

Moreover, during the boom there is also a reallocation of resources. The sectoral share of tradable goods in advanced economies, particularly manufacturing, falls during the periods of capital inflows. A reallocation of investment out of manufacturing occurs, including a reallocation of employment if a government refrains from accumulating foreign assets during the episodes of large capital inflows, as well as during periods of abundant international liquidity. The capital inflows also raise the probability of a sudden stop. Economic performance after the crisis is adversely affected by the pre-crisis capital inflows, as well as the reallocation of employment away from manufacturing that took place in the earlier period.

Alessandra Bonfiglioli of Universitat Pompeu Fabra looked at the issue of financial integration and productivity (working paper here). In a sample of 70 countries between 1975 and 1999, she found that de jure measures of financial integration, such as that provided by the IMF, have a positive relationship with total factor productivity (TFP). This occurred despite the post-financial liberalization increase in the probability of banking crises in developed countries that adversely affects productivity. De facto liberalization, as measured by the sum of external assets and liabilities scaled by GDP, was productivity enhancing in developed countries but not in developing countries.

Ayhan Kose of the World Bank, Eswar S. Prasad of Cornell and Marco E. Terrones of the IMF also investigated this issue (working paper here) using data from the period of 1966-2005 for 67industrial and developing countries. Like Bonfiglioli, they reported that de jure capital openness has a positive effect on growth in total factor productivity (TFP). But when they looked at the composition of the actual flows and stocks, they found that while equity liabilities (foreign direct investment and portfolio equity) boost TFP growth, debt liabilities have the opposite impact.

The relationship of capital flows on economic activity, therefore, is complex. Capital inflows contribute to economic booms and may increase TFP, but can end in crises that include “sudden stops” and banking failures. They can also distort the allocation of resources, which affects performance after the crisis. These effects can depend on the types of external liabilities that countries incur. Debt, which exacerbates a crisis, may also adversely divert resources away from sectors with high productivity. Policymakers in emerging markets who think about the long-term consequences of current activities need to look carefully at the debt that private firms in their countries have been incurring.

China’s Vulnerable External Balance Sheet

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China’s capital outflow last year is estimated to have totaled $1 trillion. Money has been channeled out of China in various ways, including individuals carrying cash, the purchase of foreign assets, the alteration of trade invoices and other more indirect ways. The monetary exodus has pushed the exchange rate down despite a trade surplus, and raised questions about public confidence in the government’s ability to manage the economy. Moreover, the changes in the composition of China’s external assets and liabilities in recent years will further weaken its economy.

Before the global financial crisis, China had an external balance sheet that, like many other emerging market economies, consisted largely of assets held in the form of foreign debt—including U.S. Treasury bonds—and liabilities issued in the form of equity, primarily foreign direct investment, and denominated in the domestic currency. This composition, known as “long debt, short equity,” was costly, as the payout on the equity liabilities exceeded the return on the foreign debt. But there was an offsetting factor: in the event of an external crisis, the decline in the market value of the equity liabilities strengthened the balance sheet. Moreover, if there were an accompanying depreciation of the domestic currency, then the rise in the value of the foreign assets would further increase the value of the external balance sheet. and help stabilize the economy.

After the crisis, however, there was a change in the nature of China’s assets and liabilities. Chinese firms acquired stakes in foreign firms, while also investing in natural resources. The former were often in upper-income countries, and were undertaken to establish a position in those markets as much as earn profits. Many of these acquisitions now look much less attractive as the world economy shows little sign of a robust recovery, particularly in Europe.

Moreover, many of these acquisitions were financed with debt, including funds from foreign lenders denominated in dollars. Robert N McCauley, Patrick McGuire and Vladyslav Sushko of the Bank for International Settlements estimated that Chinese borrowing in dollars, mostly in the form of bank loans, reached $1.1 trillion by 2014. The fall in the value of the renminbi raises the cost of this borrowing. Menzie Chinn points out that if the corporate sector’s foreign exchange assets are taken into account, then the net foreign exchange debt is a more manageable $793 billion. But not all the firms with dollar-denominated debt possess sufficient foreign assets to offset their liabilities.

Declines in the values of the foreign assets purchased through Chinese outward FDI combined with an increase in the currency value of foreign-held debt pushes down the value of the Chinese external balance sheet. This comes at a time when the Chinese central bank is using its foreign exchange assets to slow the decline of the renminbi. The fall in reserves last year has been estimated to have reached $500 billion. Moreover, foreign firms and investors are cutting back on their acquisition of Chinese assets while repatriating money from their existing investments. China’s external position, therefore, is deteriorating, albeit from a strong base position.

Policymakers have a limited range of responses. They are tightening controls on the ability of households and companies to send money abroad, as the head of the central bank of Japan has urged. But controls on capital outflows are often seen as a sign of weakness, and do not inspire confidence. Raising interest rates to deter capital outflows would only further weaken the domestic economy, and may not work. Such moves would be particularly awkward to defend in the wake of the IMF’s inclusion of the Chinese currency in the basket of currencies that the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights are based on.

China’s remaining foreign exchange reserves and trade surplus allow policymakers some breathing room, as Menzie Chinn points out. The Chinese authorities retain a great deal of administrative control over financial transactions.  As policy officials are shuffled around, those still in office seek to reassure investors that the economy remains in good shape. But injecting more credit into the economy does not alleviate concerns about mounting debt. The economic measures promised by the leadership are being judged in the financial markets, and the verdict to date seems to be one of little or no confidence.

Can Systemic Financial Risk Be Contained?

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Risk aversion is a basic human characteristic, and in response to it we seek to safeguard the world live in. We mandate airbags and safety belts for automobile driving, set standards for the handling and shipment of food, build levees and dams to control floods, and regulate financial transactions and institutions to avoid financial collapses. But Greg Ip in Foolproof shows that our best attempts at avoiding catastrophes can fail, and even bring about worse disasters than those that motivate our attempts to avoid them. Drivers who feel safer with antilock brakes drive more quickly and leave less space between cars, while government flood insurance encourages building houses on plains that are regularly flooded.

Is the financial sector different? The traditional measures implemented to avoid financial failures are based on attaining macroeconomic stability. Monetary policy was used to control inflation, and when necessary, respond to shocks that destabilized the economy. When a crisis did emerge, the primary responsibility of a central bank was to act as a lender of last resort, providing funds to institutions that were solvent but illiquid. There was a vigorous debate before the global crisis of 2008-09 over whether central banks should attempt to deflate asset bubbles, but most central bankers did not believe that this was an appropriate task.

Fiscal policy was seen as more limited in its ability to combat business downturns because of lags in its design, implementation and effect. A policy that established a balanced budget over the business cycle, thus limiting the buildup of public debt, was often considered the best that could be expected. Automatic stabilizers, therefore, were set up to respond to cyclical fluctuations.

In open economies, flexible exchange rates provided some insulation against foreign shocks, and avoided the dangers that a commitment to a fixed rate entailed. Countries that did fix, or at least manage, their exchange rates stockpiled foreign exchange reserves to forestall speculative attacks. IMF surveillance provided an external perspective on domestic policies, while IMF lending could supplement foreign exchange reserves.

The global financial crisis demonstrated that these measures were inadequate to provide financial stability. The Federal Reserve led the way in implementing new monetary policies—quantitative easing—to supplement lower policy rates that faced a zero lower bound. But policymakers also responded with a broad range of innovative financial regulations. A new type of regulation—macroprudential—was introduced to minimize systemic financial risk, i.e., the risk associated with the collapse of a financial system (as opposed to the microprudential risk of the failure of an individual institution). These measures seek to prevent speculative rises in asset prices and credit creation, and the establishment of risky balance sheet positions. They include limits on interest rate and foreign exchange mismatches on balance sheets, caps on bank loan to value ratios, and countercyclical capital requirements (see here for an overview of these measures).

In the international sector, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision produced “Basel III,” a new set of regulations designed to strengthen the resilience of its members’  banking systems. Capital control measures, once viewed as hindrances to the efficient allocation of savings, are now seen as useful in limiting inflows of foreign funds that contribute to asset bubbles. Swap lines allow central banks to draw upon each other for foreign exchange to meet the demand from domestic institutions, while the IMF has sought to make borrowing more user-friendly. Meetings of the member governments of the newly-formed Group of 20 allow them to coordinate their policies, while the IMF’s surveillance purview has expanded to include regional and global developments.

Are these measures sufficient? The lack of another global crisis to date is too easy a criterion, given that the recovery is still underway. But there may be inherent problems in the behavior of financial market participants that could frustrate policies that seek to prevent or at least contain financial crises. Moral hazard is often blamed for shoddy decision-making by those who think they can dodge the consequences of their actions. Many who were involved in the creation and sale of collaterized securities may have thought that the government would step in if there were a danger of a breakdown in these markets. But many banks held onto these securities, indicating that they thought that the reward of owning the securities outweighed the risks. Bank officials who oversaw the expansion of mortgage lending generally lost their jobs (and reputations). It is difficult to believe after the crisis that anyone thought that they could manipulate the government into absorbing all the consequences of their actions.

But if moral hazard is not always at fault, there is ample evidence that asymmetric information and behavioral anomalies result in hazardous behavior. Will the regulatory provisions listed above minimize the incidence of risky financial practices? There is some evidence that the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are working. But the regulatory framework continues to be implemented, and bankers and other financial market participants will always seek to find loopholes that they can exploit.

Regulatory practices on the international level are also subject to manipulation. Roman Goldbach, a political economist at Deutsche Bundesbank, in his book Global Governance and Regulatory Failure: The Political Economy of Banking points out that the overlap of national and global standards in what he calls the “transnational regulatory regime” results in layering “gaps.” The resulting loopholes in the policymaking process allow private interest coalitions to have a disproportionate influence on policy formulation. Moreover, policy officials consider the competitiveness of domestic financial structures as a goal (at least) equal to financial stability in international negotiations over regulatory standards. While there have been substantial changes since the global crisis, including the formation of the Financial Stability Board, the incentives in the governance structure of global finance have not changed.

Even regulations that work as intended may have unintended and unwanted consequences due to externalities. Kristin Forbes of MIT and Marcel Fratzscher, Thomas Kostka and Roland Straub of the European Central Bank examined Brazil’s tax on capital inflows from 2006 to 2011. They found that the tax did cause investors to decrease their portfolio allocation to Brazilian securities, as planned. But other countries also felt the impact of the tax. Foreign investors increased their allocation to economies that had some similarities to Brazil, while cutting back on those countries that were likely to impose their own control measures. Capital control measures that are imposed unilaterally, therefore, may only divert risky funds elsewhere, and are not a tool for controlling global financial risk.

The flow of money looking for higher yields outside the U.S. may diminish in the wake of the rise in the Federal Funds rate in the U.S. But Lukasz Rachel and Thomas D. Smith of the Bank of England claim that long-term factors account for a decline in the global real interest rate that will not be soon reversed. This poses a challenge for policymakers, as measures implemented in one country to contain a domestic credit boom may be undermined by foreign inflows. Domestic actions, therefore, ideally would be matched by similar measures in other countries, which would require macroprudential policy coordination.

Barry Eichengreen of UC-Berkeley has studied the record of international policy coordination, and finds that it works best under four sets of circumstances: when the coordination is centered on technical issues, such as central bank swaps; when the process is institutionalized; when it is aimed at preserving an existing set of policies, i.e., regime preserving, rather than devising new procedures; and when there exists a sense of mutual interests on a broad set of issues among the participants. Are such conditions present today? At the time of the crisis, central bankers cooperated in setting up the currency swap agreements while discussing their monetary policies. The formation of the Group of 20 provided a new forum for regular consultation, and there was widespread agreement in preserving a regime that encouraged international trade while preventing competitive currency devaluations. But the passage of time has weakened many of the commitments made when the crisis threatened, and the uneven recovery has caused national interests to diverge.

Perhaps a more basic issue is whether it is possible to design a financial system free of volatility. A government that is willing to replace markets in directing financial flows and allocating financial returns can maintain stability, but at a price. Such a system is characterized as “financial repression,” and includes limits on interest rates received by savers, control of banks and their lending, and the use of regulations to prevent capital flows. These regulations penalize household savers, and allow the government and state-sponsored enterprises to receive credit at relatively low rates while blocking credit to firms that do not enjoy government backing.

China used these types of measures during the 1980s and 1990s to finance its investment- and export-led growth, and its self-imposed financial isolation allowed it to escape the effects of the Asian financial crisis. But more recently China has engaged in financial liberalization, removing controls on interest rates and bank activities while deregulating its capital account and allowing more exchange rate flexibility. The responses have included the emergence of a shadow banking system and a boom in private credit, which will require government actions to avoid a crisis.

Several years ago Romain Rancière of the Paris School of Economics, Aaron Tornell of the University of California-Los Angeles and Frank Westermann of Osnabrueck University coauthored a paper (here; working paper here) on the tradeoff between systemic financial crises and economic growth. They showed that financial liberalization leads to more growth and a higher incidence of crises. But their empirical estimates indicated that the direct effect on growth outweighed the negative impact of the crises. They contrasted the examples of Thailand, which had a history of lending booms and crises with that of India, which had a more controlled financial sector, and showed that Thailand had enjoyed higher growth in per capita GDP. In a subsequent paper (here; working paper here), they explored the relationship between crises that produced a negative skewness in the growth of real credit, which in turn had a negative link with growth.

If there is a tradeoff between the volatility associated with financial liberalization and economic growth, then each society must choose the optimal combination of the two. Financial innovations will change the terms of the tradeoff, and lead to movements back and forth as we learn more about the risks of new financial tools. The advantages of novel instruments at the time when they seem most productive must be weighed against the possible (but unknown) dangers they pose. Perhaps the greatest threat is that the decisions over how much control and regulation is needed will be made not by those public officials entrusted with preserving financial stability, but by those who will profit most from the changes.

The Enduring Relevance of “Manias, Panics, and Crashes”

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The seventh edition of Manias, Panics, and Crashes has recently been published by Palgrave Macmillan. Charles Kindleberger of MIT wrote the first edition, which appeared in 1978, and followed it with three more editions. Robert Aliber of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago took over the editing and rewriting of the fifth edition, which came out in 2005. (Aliber is also the author of another well-known book on international finance, The New International Money Game.) The continuing popularity of Manias, Panics and Crashes shows that financial crises continue to be a matter of widespread concern.

Kindleberger built upon the work of Hyman Minsky, a faculty member at Washington University in St. Louis. Minsky was a proponent of what he called the “financial instability hypothesis,” which posited that financial markets are inherently unstable. Periods of financial booms are followed by busts, and governmental intervention can delay but not eliminate crises. Minsky’s work received a great deal of attention during the global financial crisis (see here and here; for a summary of Minksy’s work, see Why Minsky Matters by L. Randall Wray of the University of Missouri-Kansas City and the Levy Economics Institute).

Kindleberger provided a more detailed description of the stages of a financial crisis. The period preceding a crisis begins with a “displacement,” a shock to the system. When a displacement improves the profitability of at least one sector of an economy, firms and individuals will seek to take advantage of this opportunity. The resulting demand for financial assets leads to an increase in their prices. Positive feedback in asset markets lead to more investments and financial speculation, and a period of “euphoria,” or mania develops.

At some point, however, insiders begin to take profits and withdraw from the markets. Once market participants realize that prices have peaked, flight from the markets becomes widespread. As prices plummet, a period of “revulsion” or panic ensues. Those who had financed their positions in the market by borrowing on the promise of profits on the purchased assets become insolvent. The panic ends when prices fall so far that some traders are tempted to come back into the market, or trading is limited by the authorities, or a lender of last resort intervenes to halt the decline.

In addition to elaborating on the stages of a financial crisis, Kindleberger also placed them in an international context. He wrote about the propagation of crises through the arbitrage of divergences in the prices of assets across markets or their substitutes. Capital flows and the spread of euphoria also contribute to the simultaneous rises in asset prices in different countries. (Piero Pasotti and Alessandro Vercelli of the University of Siena provide an analysis of Kindleberger’s contributions.)

Aliber has continued to update the book, and the new edition has a chapter on the European sovereign debt crisis. (The prior edition covered the events of 2008-09.) But he has also made his own contributions to the Minsky-Kindleberger (and now –Aliber) framework. Aliber characterizes the decades since the early 1980s as “…the most tumultuous in monetary history in terms of the number, scope and severity of banking crises.” To date, there have been four waves of such crises, which are almost always accompanied by currency crises. The first wave was the debt crisis of developing nations during the 1980s, and it was followed by a second wave of crises in Japan and the Nordic countries in the early 1990s. The third wave was the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, and the fourth is the global financial crisis.

Aliber emphasizes the role of cross-border investment flows in precipitating the crises. Their volatility has risen under flexible exchange rates, which allow central banks more freedom in formulating monetary policies that influence capital allocation. He also draws attention to the increases in household wealth due to rising asset prices and currency appreciation that contribute to consumption expenditures and amplify the boom periods. The reversal in wealth once investors revise their expectations and capital begins to flow out makes the resulting downturn more acute.

These views are consistent in many ways with those of Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements (see also here). He has written that the international monetary and financial system amplifies the “excess financial elasticity,” i.e., the buildup of financial imbalances that characterizes domestic financial markets. He identifies two channels of transmission. First, capital inflows contribute to the rise in domestic credit during a financial boom. The impact of global conditions on domestic financial markets exacerbates this development (see here). Second, monetary regimes may facilitate the expansion of  monetary conditions from one country to others. Central bankers concerned about currency appreciation and a loss of competitiveness keep interest rates lower than they would otherwise, which furthers a domestic boom. In addition, the actions of central banks with international currencies such as the dollar has international ramifications, as the current widespread concern about the impending rise in the Federal Funds rate shows.

Aliber ends the current edition of Manias, Panics and Crashes with an appendix on China’s financial situation. He compares the surge in China’s housing markets with the Japanese boom of the 1980s and subsequent bust that initiated decades of slow economic growth. An oversupply of new housing in China has resulted in a decline in prices that threatens the solvency of property developers and the banks and shadow banks that financed them. Aliber is dubious of the claim that the Chinese government will support the banks, pointing out that such support will only worsen China’s indebtedness. The need for an eighth edition of Manias, Panics and Crashes may soon be apparent.