Tag Archives: Eurozone

Risk and FDI

Leave a reply

While FDI flows recovered in 2021 from the previous year’s decline, not all countries benefitted from the increase. UNCTAD reported that almost three quarters of global FDI flows in 2021 occurred in advanced economies, and China and other Asian economies recorded the largest increases amongst the emerging markets and developing economies. Multinational companies are evaluating the course of the pandemic in those countries and their suitability for new global supply routes. Risk, always a factor in FDI decisions, has become an even more important concern.

There are, of course, many forms of risk. Neil M. Kellard, Alexandros Konotonikas and Stefano Maini of the University of Essex with Michael J. Lamla of Leuphana University Lüneburg and Geoffrey Wood of Western University examined the effects of financial system risk in “Risk, Financial Stability and FDI“, published in the Journal of International Money and Finance this year (working paper version here). They specifically investigated the impact of risk on inward FDI stocks within 16 Eurozone between 2009 and 2016, and used bilateral data drawn from the origin countries and host economies to compare the effects of different forms of risk in both locations.

Their results indicated that an increase in risk in the banking sector of an origin country—as measured by the proportion of non-performing loans—led to a decrease in FDI in the host countries. However, changes in bank risk in the host country had no similar impact. They interpret this result as indicating that multinationals are dependent on bank financing in their origin countries to finance their expansion.

In addition, inward FDI was negatively linked to upturns in sovereign yields in both the origin and host countries. The impact of the sovereign yield variable in the origin countries was larger than that of the corresponding yield in the host countries. They interpret the latter results as showing that an increase in sovereign risk in the origin country discouraged risk-taking by multinational firms based there, while the increase in risk in the host country caused multinationals to turn to other hosts. Moreover, when they separated the Eurozone countries into two groups, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain as the stressed group, they found that the size of the impact of the sovereign risk variables was comparatively larger in the stressed group.

Risk is also the subject of a recent NBER working paper by Caroline Jardet and Cristina Jude of the Banque de France and Menzie Chin of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “Foreign Direct Investment Under Uncertainty: Evidence From A large Panel of Countries.” They examined host country “pull” factors and global “push” factors for inward FDI flows in a panel of 129 advanced, emerging market and developing economies over the period of 1995 to 2019. They focused on domestic and global uncertainty, using the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) and the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index as well as the VIX as measures of risk.

Their initial results indicate that the effects of uncertainty depend on the country group, and therefore they disaggregated the data.  Domestic uncertainty does not appear to be a factor for any of the three groups, but global uncertainty as measured by the WUI has a large and significant negative impact on FDI in the advanced and emerging market economies.

The authors also examined the impact of global financial factors on FDI. They iniitally used the real value of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, and report that an increase in that measure is linked to increases in FDI in the advanced economies but declines in the emerging market and developing economies. The higher returns in the U.S. draw funds away from those propsetive hosts.

Similarly, when they replace the S&P 500 with the nominal shadow Federal Funds rate or a world interest rate, they report that increases in either rate increased FDI in the advanced economies and lowered FDI flows in the developing economies. They suggest that this result reflects the existence of booms in the financial center countries that GDP data do not capture. They also reexamine the significance of the world uncertainty index as the different global financial variables are used, and find that the negative and significant impact holds up in the case of the emerging market economies.

Many types of risk, therefore, have an impact on FDI. Domestic financial risk in an origin country, for example, leads to less outward FDI by multinational firms based in that country. But firms are also affected by global uncertainty, and their response in terms of foreign investment seems to be most evident in the emerging market economies. Geopolitical tensions over the Ukraine,  the possibility of a new variant of the virus and the prospect of higher U.S. interest rates all reinforce global uncertainty and complicate the decision over where to locate new investments.

The Spillover Effects of Rising U.S. Interest Rates

1 Reply

U.S. interest rates have been rising, and most likely will continue to do so. The target level of the Federal Funds rate, currently at 1.75%, is expected to be raised at the June meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee. The yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds rose above 3%, then fell as fears of Italy breaking out the Eurozone flared. That decline is likely to be reversed while the new government enjoys a (very brief) honeymoon period. What are the effects on foreign economies of the higher rates in the U.S.?

One channel of transmission will be through higher interest rates abroad. Several papers from economists at the Bank for International Settlements have documented this phenomenon. For example, Előd Takáts and Abraham Vela of the Bank for International Settlements in a 2014 BIS Paper investigated the effect of a rise in the Federal Funds rate on foreign policy rates in 20 emerging market countries, and found evidence of a significant impact on the foreign rates. They did a similar analysis for 5-year rates and found comparable results. Boris Hofmann and Takáts also undertook an analysis of interest rate linkages with U.S. rates in 30 emerging market and small advanced economies, and again found that the U.S. rates affected the corresponding rates in the foreign economies. Finally, Peter Hördahl, Jhuvesh Sobrun and Philip Turner attribute the declines in long-term rates after the global financial crisis to the fall in the term premium in the ten-year U.S. Treasury rate.

The spillover effects of higher interest rates in the U.S., however, extend beyond higher foreign rates. In a new paper, Matteo Iacoviello and Gaston Navarro of the Federal Reserve Board investigate the impact of higher U.S. interest rates on the economies of 50 advanced and emerging market economies. They report that monetary tightening in the U.S. leads to a decline in foreign GDP, with a larger decline found in the emerging market economies in the sample. When they investigate the channels of transmission, they differentiate among an exchange rate channel, where the impact depends on whether or not a country pegs to the dollar; a trade channel, based on the U.S. demand for foreign goods; and a financial channel that reflects the linkage of U.S. rates with the prices of foreign assets and liabilities. They find that the exchange rate and trade channels are very important for the advanced economies, whereas the financial channel is significant for the emerging market countries.

Robin Koepke, formerly of the Institute of International Finance and now at the IMF, has examined the role of U.S. monetary policy tightening in precipitating financial crises in the emerging market countries. His results indicated that there are three factors that raise the probability of a crisis: first, the Federal Funds rate is above its natural level; second, the rate increase takes place during a policy tightening cycle; and third, the tightening is faster than expected by market participants. The strongest effects were found for currency crises, followed by banking crises.

According to the trilemma, policymakers should have options that allow them to regain monetary control. Flexible exchange rates can act as a buffer against external shocks. But foreign policymakers may resist the depreciation of the domestic currency that follows a rise in U.S. interest rates. The resulting increase in import prices can trigger higher inflation, particularly if wages are indexed. This is not a concern in the current environment. But the depreciation also raises the domestic value of debt denominated in foreign currencies, and many firms in emerging markets took advantage of the previous low interest rate regime to issue such debt. Now the combination of higher refinancing costs and exchange rate depreciation is making that debt much less attractive, and some central banks are raising their own rates to slow the deprecation (see, for example, here and here and here).

Dani Rodrik of the Kennedy School and Arvin Subramanian, currently Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, however, have little sympathy for policymakers who complain about the actions of the Federal Reserve. As they point out, “Many large emerging-market countries have consciously and enthusiastically embraced financial globalization…there were no domestic compulsions forcing these countries to so ardently woo foreign capital.” They go on to cite the example of China, which “…has chosen to insulate itself from foreign capital and has correspondingly been less affected by the vagaries of Fed actions…”

It may be difficult for a small economy to wall itself off from capital flows. Growing businesses will seek new sources of finance, and domestic residents will want to diversify their portfolios with foreign assets. The dollar has a predominant role in the global financial system, and it would be difficult to escape the spillover effects of its policies. But those who lend or borrow in foreign markets should realize, as one famed former student of the London School of Economics warned, that they play with fire.

Not All Global Currencies Are The Same

Leave a reply

The dollar may be the world’s main global currency, but it does not serve in that capacity alone. The euro has served as an alternative since its introduction in 1999, when it took the place of the Deutschemark and the other European currencies that had also been used for that purpose. Will the renminbi become the next viable alternative?

A new volume, How Global Currencies Work: Past, Present and Future by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California-Berkeley and Arnaud Mehl and Livia Chiţu of the European Central Bank examines the record of the use of national currencies outside their borders. The authors point out that regimes of multiple global currencies have been the norm rather than an exception. Central banks held reserves in German marks and French francs as well as British sterling during the period of British hegemony, while the dollar became an alternative to sterling in the 1920s. The authors foresee an increased use of China’s renminbi and “..a future in which several national currencies will serve as units of account, means of payments, and stores of value for transactions across borders.”

Camilo E. Tovar and Tania Mohd Nor of the IMF examine the use of the reminbi as a global currency in a IMF working paper, “Reserve Currency Blocs: A Changing International Monetary System.” They claim that the international monetary system has transitioned for a bi-polar one based on the dollar and the euro to a tri-polar system that also includes the renminbi. They provide estimates of a dollar bloc equal in value to 40% of global GDP that is complemented by a renminbi bloc valued at 30% of global GDP and a euro bloc worth 20% of world output. The renminbi bloc, however, is not primarily Asian, but rather dominated by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). This suggests that its increased use may be due to geopolitical reasons rather than widespread regional use.

If relative size is a driving factor in the adoption of a currency for international transactions, then an increasing role for the renminbi is inevitable. But the dollar will continue to be the principal currency for many years to come. Ethan Ilzetzki of the London School of Economics, Carmen Reinhart of Harvard’s Kennedy School and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard examine the predominance of the dollar in a NBER working paper, “Exchange Arrangements Entering the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?” They show that the dollar is far ahead of other currencies in terms of trade invoicing , foreign exchange trading, and most other measures.

The U.S. also holds a dominant role in international financial flows. Sarah Bauerle Danzman and W. Kindred Winecoff of Indiana University Bloomington have written about the reasons for what they call U.S. “financial hegemony” (see also their paper with Thomas Oatley of the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and Andrew Penncok of the University of Virginia). They point to the central role of the U.S. financial system in the network of international financial relationships. They claim that the financial crisis of 2008-09 actually reinforced the pivotal position of the U.S., in part due to the policies undertaken by U.S. policymakers at that time to stabilize financial markets and institutions. This included the provision by the Federal Reserve of swap lines to foreign central banks in countries where domestic banks had borrowed dollars to invest in U.S. mortgage-backed securities. (Andrew Tooze provides an account of the Federal Reserve’s activities during the crisis.)

The central position of the U.S., moreover, evolved over time, and reflects a number of attributes of the U.S. economy and its governance. Andrew Sobel of Washington University examined the features that support economic hegemony in Birth of Hegemony. He cites Charles Kindleberger’s claim of the need for national leadership in order to forestall or at least offset international downturns, such as occurred during the depression (see The World in Depression 1929-1939). Kindleberger specifically referred to the need for international liquidity and the coordination of macroeconomic policies by a nation exercising economic leadership.

Sobel, drawing upon the history of the Netherlands, Great Britain and the U.S., maintains that the countries that have provided these collective goods have possessed public and private arrangements that allowed them to provide such leadership. The former include adherence to the rule of law, a fair tax system and effective public debt markets. Among the private attributes are large and liquid capital markets and openness to foreign capital flows. Sobel shows that these features evolved in the historical cases he examines in response to national developments that did not occur in other countries that might have been alternative financial hegemons (such as France).

Will a new dominant financial hegemon appear to take the place of the U.S.? It is difficult to see the European Union or China assuming that role in the short- or medium-term. European leaders are dealing with disagreements over the nature of their union and the discontent of their voters, while China is establishing its own path. (See Milanovic on this topic.) U.S. financial institutions are dedicated to preserving their interests, and not likely to surrender their predominance. It would take a major shock, therefore, to current arrangements to upend the existing network of financial relationships. But we now live in a world where such things could happen.

The Retreat of Financial Globalization?

Leave a reply

Eight years after the global crisis of 2008-09, its reverberations are still being felt. These include a slowdown in world trade and a reassessment of the advantages of globalization. Several recent papers deal with a decline in international capital flows, and suggest some reasons for why this may be occurring.

Matthieu Bussière and Julia Schmidt of the Banque de France and Natacha Valla of CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) compare the record of the period since 2012 with the pre-crisis period and highlight four conclusions. First, the retrenchment of global capital flows that began during the crisis has persisted, with gross financial flows falling from about 10-15% of global GDP to approximately 5%. Second, this retrenchment has occurred primarily in the advanced economies. particularly in Europe. Third, net flows have fallen significantly, which is consistent with the fall in “global imbalances.” Fourth, there are striking differences in the adjustment of the various types of capital flows. Foreign direct investment has been very resilient, while capital flows in the category of “other investment”—mainly bank loans—have contracted substantially. Portfolio flows fall in between these two extremes, with portfolio equity recovering much more quickly than portfolio debt.

Similarly, Peter McQuade and Martin Schmitz of the European Central Bank investigate the decline in capital flows between the pre-crisis period of 2005-06 and the post-crisis period of 2013-14. They report that total inflows in the post-crisis period reached about 50% of their pre-crisis levels in the advanced economies and about 80% in emerging market economies. The decline is particularly notable in the EU countries, where inflows fell to only about 25% of their previous level. The steepest declines occurred in the capital flows gathered in the “other investment” category.

McQuade and Schmitz also investigate the characteristics of the countries that experienced larger contractions in capital flows in the post-crisis period. They report that inflows fell more in those countries with higher initial levels of private sector credit, public debt and net foreign liabilities. On the other hand, countries with lower GDP per capita experienced smaller declines, consistent with the observation that inflows have been curtailed more in the advanced economies. In the case of outflows, countries with higher GDP growth during the crisis and greater capital account openness were more likely to increase their holdings of foreign assets.

Both studies see an improvement in financial stability due to the larger role of FDI in capital flows. Changes in bank regulation may have contributed to the smaller role of bank loans in capital flows, as has the diminished economic performance of many advanced economies, particularly in the Eurozone. On the other hand, smaller capital flows may restrain economic growth.

While capital flows to emerging markets rebounded more quickly after the crisis than those to advanced economies, a closer examination by the IMF in its April 2016 World Economic Outlook of the period of 2010-2015 indicate signs of a slowdown towards the end of that period. Net flows in a sample of 45 emerging market economies fell from a weighted mean inflow of 3.7% of GDP in 2010 to an outflow of 1.2% during the period of 2014:IV – 2015:III. Net inflows were particularly weak in the third quarter of 2015. The slowdown reflected a combination of a decline in inflows and a rise in outflows across all categories of capital, with the decline in inflows more pronounced for debt-generating inflows than equity-like inflows. However, there was an increase in portfolio debt inflows in 2010-2012, which then declined.

The IMF’s economists sought to identify the drivers of the slowdown in capital flows to these countries. They identified a shrinking differential in real GDP growth between the emerging market economies and advanced economies as an important contributory factor to the decline. Country-specific factors influenced the change in inflows for individual countries, as economies with more flexible exchange rates recorded smaller declines.

In retrospect, the period of 1990-2007 represented an extraordinarily rapid rise in financial globalization, particularly in the advanced economies. The capital flows led to increased credit flows and asset bubbles in many countries, and culminated in an economic collapse of historic dimensions. The subsequent retrenchment of capital flows may be seen as a return to normalcy, and the financial and banking regulations–including capital account controls–enacted since the crisis as an attempt to provide stronger defenses against a recurrence of financial volatility. But the history of finance shows that new financial innovations are always on the horizon, and their risks only become apparent in hindsight.

The Search for an Effective Macro Policy

1 Reply

Economic growth in the advanced economies seems stalled. This summer the IMF projected increases in GDP in these economies of 1.8% for both 2016 and 2017. This included growth of 2.2% this year in the U.S. and 2.5% in 2017, 1.6% and 1.4% in the Eurozone in 2016 and 2017 respectively, and 0.3% and 0.1% in Japan. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has called on the Group of 20 countries to use all available tools to raise growth, as has the IMF’s Managing Director Christine Lagarde. So why aren’t the G20 governments doing more?

The use of discretionary fiscal policy as a stimulus seems to be jammed, despite renewed interest in its effectiveness by macroeconomists such as Christopher Sims of Princeton University. While the U.S. presidential candidates talk about spending on much-needed infrastructure, there is little chance that a Republican-controlled House of Representatives would go along. In Europe, Germany’s fiscal surplus gives it the ability to increase spending that would benefit its neighbors, but it shows no interest in doing so (see Brad Setser and Paul Krugman). And the IMF does not seem to be following its own policy guidelines in its advice to individual governments.

One of the traditional concerns raised by fiscal deficits rests on their impact on the private spending that will be crowded out by the subsequent rise in interest rates. But this is not a relevant problem in a world of negative interest rates in many advanced economies and very low rates in the U.S. The increase in sovereign debt payments should be more than offset by the increase in economic activity that will be reinforced by the effect of spending on infrastructure on future growth.

On the other hand, there has been no hesitation by monetary policymakers in responding to economic conditions. They initially reacted to the global financial crisis by cutting policy rates and providing liquidity to banks. When the ensuing recovery proved to be weak, they undertook large-scale purchases of assets, known in the U.S. as “quantitative easing,” to bring down long-term rates that are relevant for business loans and mortgages.The asset purchases of the central banks led to massive expansions of their balance sheets on a scale never seen before. The Federal Reserve’s assets, for example, rose from about $900 billion in 2007 to $4.4 trillion this summer. Similarly, the Bank of Japan holds assets worth about $4.5 trillion, while the European Central Bank owns $3.5 trillion of assets.

The interventions of the central banks were successful in bringing down interest rates. They also elevated the prices of financial assets, including stock prices. But their impact on real economic activity seems to be stunted. While the expansion in the U.S. has lowered the unemployment rate to 4.9%, the inflation rate utilized by the Federal Reserve continues to fall below the target 2%. Investment spending is weaker than desired, despite the low interest rates. Indeed, many firms have sufficient cash to finance capital expenditures, but prefer to hold it back. The situations in Europe and Japan are bleaker. Investment in the Eurozone, where the unemployment rate is 10.1%., remains below its pre-crisis peak. Japan also sees weak investment that contributes to its stagnant position.

If lower interest rates do not stimulate domestic demand, there is an alternative channel of transmission: the exchange rate, which can improve the trade balance through expenditure switching. But there are several disturbing aspects of a dependence on a currency depreciation to increase output (see also here). First, there is an adverse impact on domestic firms with liabilities denominated in a foreign currency, as the cost of servicing and repaying that debt rises. Second, expansionary monetary policy does not always have the expected impact on the exchange rate. The Japanese yen appreciated last spring despite the central bank’s acceptance of negative interest rates to spur spending. Third, a successful depreciation requires the willingness of some other nation to accept an appreciation of its currency. The U.S. seems to have accepted that role, but Mohammed A. El-Erian has pointed out, U.S. firms are concerned “…about the impact of a stronger dollar on their earnings…” He also points to “…declining inward tourism and a deteriorating trade balance…” Under these circumstances, the willingness of the U.S. government to continue to accept an appreciating dollar is not guaranteed.

There is one other consequence of advanced economies pushing down their interest rates: increased capital flows to emerging market economies. Foreign investors, who had pulled out of bond markets in these countries for much of the last three years, have now reversed course. The inflows may help out those countries that face adverse economic conditions. But if/when the Federal Reserve resumes raising its policy rate, the attraction of these markets may pall.

The search for an effective macro policy tool, therefore, is constrained by political considerations as much as the paucity of options. But there is another factor: is it possible to return to pre-2008 economic growth rates? Harvard’s Larry Summers points out that those rates were based on an unsustainable housing bubble. He believes that private spending will not return us to full-employment, and urges the Fed to keep interest rates low and the government to engage in debt-financed investments in infrastructure projects. Ken Rogoff (also of Harvard), on the other hand, believes that we are suffering the downside of a debt supercycle. Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University blames deficient aggregate demand in part on income inequality.

The one common theme that emerges from these different analyses is that there is no “quick fix” that will restore the advanced economies to some economic Eden. Structural and other forces are acting as headwinds to slow growth. But voters are not interested in long-run analyses, and many will turn to those who claim that they have solutions, no matter how potentially disastrous those are.

 

The Continuing Dominance of the Dollar: A Review of Cohen’s “Currency Power”

2 Replies

Every year I choose a book that deals with an important aspect of globalization, and award it the Globalization Book of the Year, also known as the “Globie.” Unfortunately, there is no cash prize to go along with it, so recognition is the sole award. Previous winners can be found here and here.

The winner of this year’s award is Currency Power: Understanding Monetary Rivalry by Benjamin J. Cohen of the University of California: Santa Barbara. The book deals with an issue that is widely-discussed but poorly-understood: the status of the dollar as what Cohen calls the “top currency.” The book’s appearance is quite timely, in view of the many warnings that China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB), is about to replace the dollar (see, for example, here).

Cohen proposes a pyramid taxonomy of currencies. On the top is the “top currency,” and in the modern era only the pound and dollar have achieved that status. The next level is occupied by “patrician currencies,” which are used for cross-border purposes but have not been universally adopted. This category includes the euro and yen, and most likely in the near future the RMB. Further down the pyramid are “elite currencies” with some international role such as the British pound and the Swiss franc, and then “plebeian currencies” that are used only for domestic purposes in their issuing countries. Below these are “permeated currencies” which face competition in their own country of issuance from foreign monies that are seen as more stable, “quasi-currencies” that have a legal status in their own country but little actual usage, and finally at the base of the pyramid are “pseudo-currencies” that exist in name only.

Cohen points out that not too long ago the euro was seen a competitor for the dollar as a “top currency.” The euro’s share of the publicly known currency composition of central banks’ foreign exchange reserves has fluctuated around 25% in the last decade, and its share of the international banking market is higher. But Cohen believes that the relative position of the euro may have peaked due to its inability to devise a way to deal with fiscal imbalances among members of the Eurozone.

Cohen compares the Eurozone’s institutional framework with that of the U.S., which adopted a common currency early in its history. The U.S. system includes fiscal transfers (“automatic stabilizers”) between the federal government and the states but no bailout of a state government in fiscal distress, accompanied by balanced budget restrictions in most states. The European Union’s (EU) Stability and Growth Pact put a limit on the budget deficits of its members and their debt, and was followed by the European Fiscal Compact that mandates balanced budget regulations in national laws. But resistance to the EU’s oversight of national budgets has been widespread. Moreover, the European Stability Mechanism, the EU’s instrument to assist members in financial crisis, is still a work in progress, as the lack of resolution of the Greek debt crisis demonstrates. While the size of the Eurozone ensures the wide usage of the euro and a role as a “patrician currency,” the inability of its member governments to decide on how to handle fiscal governance ensures that it will never rival the dollar.

China does not face the problem of unruly national governments, although the finances of local governments are shaky. The RMB has become more widely used in international commerce, not a surprising development in view of the rise of China as a global trading nation. The IMF is considering the inclusion of the RMB with dollars, euros, pounds and yen in the basket of currencies that comprise the IMF’s own unit of value, the Special Drawing Right. The Chinese government sees the upgrade in the status of the RMB as a confirmation of that country’s ascent in economic status.

But Cohen cautions against interpreting the increasing use of the RMB in trade as a precursor to the widespread adoption of the RMB as a global currency. He points out that there are private functions as well as official roles of an international currency, including its use for foreign exchange trading and financial investments. The RMB is not widely used for financial transactions, in part due to barriers to the foreign acquisition of Chinese securities, while the size of Chinese financial markets, while growing, is limited. Eswar Prasad and Lei Ye of Cornell reported in 2012 that “China still comes up short when it comes to the key dimensions of financial market development, and financial system weaknesses are likely to impede its steps to heighten the currency’s international role.”

Moreover, the government’s response this summer to the volatility in its stock markets was seen as heavy-handed. Cohen questions whether the Chinese government is willing to relinquish its control of the financial sector, despite its desire to promote the international use of the RMB. Capital flight would be a threat to stability and a sign of the government’s loss of legitimacy.

Cohen concludes his insightful analysis with a prediction that “Well into the foreseeable future, the greenback will remain supreme.” The U.S. currency continues to have widespread usage for many purposes. But any sort of triumphalism would be short-sighted. A recent working paper by Robert N McCauley, Patrick McGuire and Vladyslav Sushko of the Bank for International Settlements estimated the amount of dollar-denominated credit outside the U.S. at about $9 trillion. A rise in the cost of borrowing in dollars will be passed on to the foreign borrowers, which will further slow down their economies. The decision in September of the Federal Open Market Committee to delay raising interest rates reflected its concern about the global economy, which complicates its ability to use monetary policy for domestic goals. The U.S. can not ignore the feedback between the international roles of the dollar and its own economic welfare. Great responsibility comes with great power.

Greece’s Missing Drivers of Growth

Leave a reply

Analyses and discussions of Greece’s economic situation usually begin—and often end—with its fiscal policy. The policies mandated by the “troika” of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund have undoubtedly resulted in a severe contraction that will continue for at least this year. But little has been said about the private sectors of the economy, and why they have not offset at least part of the fiscal “austerity.” Consumption spending is linked to income, so there is no relief there. But what about the other sources of spending, investment and net exports?

Investment expenditures provide no counterweight, as they have plunged in the years since the global financial crisis. The same phenomenon took place in other countries in the southern periphery of the European Union, but the change in Greece’s investment/GDP ratio between its pre-crisis 2007 level and that of 2014 was an extraordinary decline of 16 percentage points at a time when GDP itself was falling:

Investment/GDP 2007 2014
Cyprus 24% 12%
Greece 27% 11%
Ireland 28% 17%
Italy 22% 17%
Portugal 23% 15%
Spain 31% 19%

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook

In view of the scale of the crisis, it is not surprising that investment fell as much as it did in these countries. The parlous state of the banks only reinforced the decline. The particularly severe decrease in Greece reflects the political uncertainty there as well as the calamitous economic conditions.

Net exports of goods and services have continued to record a deficit in Greece while the other periphery countries by 2013 showed small (or in the case of Ireland large) surpluses:

Balance on goodsand services/GDP 2007 2013
Cyprus -5% 2%
Greece -12% -3%
Ireland 9% 21%
Italy 0% 2%
Portugal -8% 1%
Spain -6% 3%

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Although Greece’s balance continued to show a deficit, the turnaround between 2007 and 2013 of 9 percentage points of GDP was only exceeded by the increase in Ireland’s trade balance by 12 percentage points. But this change was due largely to the decline in imports that accompanied the contraction of the economy rather than a growth in exports, as happened in Ireland and Portugal. The lack of Greek export growth has been surprising in view of the decline in unit labor costs. These had soared in the period leading up to the crisis, as had those in the other periphery countries. Since these countries could not devalue their exchange rates, labor costs had to come down to make their exports competitive. But despite the declines in wages, there has been no corresponding expansion in Greek exports.

Explaining the lack of responsiveness of Greek exports to the decline in wages has been the subject of several analyses. A study on macroeconomic adjustment programs in the Eurozone undertaken for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament by a team of authors that included Daniel Gros, Cinzia Alcidi and Alessandro Giovannini of the Centre for European Policy Studies, Ansgar Belke of the University of Duisberg-Essen, and Leonor Coutinho of the Europrism Research Centre claimed: “Greek exports price competitiveness has not improved nearly as much as its cost (and wage) competitiveness…” The report’s authors attribute the rigidity in prices to “structural deficiencies.”

A similar analysis was offered by Uwe Böwer, Vasiliki Michou and Christph Ungerer of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (see also here). They use a gravity model to predict export flows in 56 countries, and compare the predictions of the model with actual exports. Greek exports were 32.6% lower than those predicted by the model, which they label the “puzzle of the missing Greek trade.” They then add measures of institutional quality to their model, and find that these are quite significant. Since Greece’s institutional quality is seen as relatively poor, the authors claim this deficiency contributes to the lack of exports.

In view of all the institutional measures that have already been introduced into the Greek economy, it may seem surprising that more structural reform is seen as necessary. Alessio Terzi of Bruegel has argued that the initial reforms in Greece were slanted towards reform of the public sector rather than the private sector. Some of this shortfall was rectified in the 2012 program, but implementation was slowed by the political climate and economic collapse. A lack of coordination with changes in labor market practices has resulted in a decline in wages that has not been matched by corresponding adjustments in prices. Terzo claims that responsibility for these flaws in program design is a responsibility of the troika as well as of the Greek government.

Designing the optimal composition and pace of structural reforms is always difficult. Antionio Fatás of INSEAD writes about the record of reform in Europe since the 1970s (see also here). He shows that there has been a convergence of policies and institutions over time. He takes particular note of Greece and Portugal’s progress vis-à-vis the record of other OECD countries in business-related reforms, although he also notes that small differences are associated with noticeable differences in productivity and output. Christian Thimann of the Paris School of Economics and AXA Group believes that there is substantial scope for further change.

Can reforms be implemented when fiscal policy is contractionary? Tamim Bayoumi of the IMF admits that the short-run impact of regulatory changes is likely to be disruptive, which only reinforces the impact of the fiscal policy. Under these circumstances, the IMF can play a critical role in providing external financing while reforms are being implemented. But, he writes, “…structural policies need a strong leader and broad agreement across a wide swath of opinion makers about the need to re invigorate the economy.”

Such an agreement is difficult to achieve in the wake of a crisis. Atif Mian of Princeton, Amir Sufi of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago and Francesco Trebbi of the Vancouver School of Economics have shown that countries become more polarized after a financial crisis as voters become more ideologically extreme and ruling coalitions become weaker. This makes consensus much harder to achieve.

The latest bailout provides an opportunity to change the structure of Greece’s private sector. Consumer markets are to be liberalized, labor practices to be reviewed and an upgrade of its infrastructure to be taken. Can Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras maintain the popular support needed to implement the reforms? And can these lead to a turnaround in the Greek economy? The private sector must become viable if the country’s continuing economic degradation is to end. It would be ironic if such a turnaround occurred during the administration of a political leader who campaigned on a platform of defying the troika and its programs, including structural reform measures. But “a foolish consistency is the hobglobin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines…”

 

The Challenges of the Greek Crisis

Leave a reply

The Greek crisis has abated, but not ended. Representatives of the “troika” of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund returned to Athens for talks with the Greek government about a new bailout. This pause allows an accounting of the many challenges that the events in Greece pose to the international community.

The main challenge, of course, is to the Greek government itself, which must implement the fiscal and other measures contained in the agreement with the European governments. These include steps to liberalize labor markets as well as open up protected sectors of the economy. While these structural reforms should promote growth over time, in the short-run they will lead to layoffs and reorganizations. At the same time, Prime Minister Alex Tsipras must oversee tax rises and cuts in spending. The combined impact of all these measures, which follow the virtual shutdown of the financial sector during the protracted negotiations with the European governments, will postpone any resumption in growth that past efforts may have generated.

It is not clear how long the Greek public will endure further misery. Any form of debt restructuring may give policymakers some justification to continue with the agreement. New elections will clarify the degree of political support for the pact. But the possibility of an exit from the Eurozone has not been removed, either in the eyes of Greek politicians or those of officials of other governments.

The Greek crisis, however, is not the only hazard that the Eurozone faces. The Eurozone’s governments have yet to come to terms with the effects of the global financial crisis on its members’ finances. A split prevails between those countries that ally themselves with the German position that debt must be repaid and those that seek with France to find some sort of middle ground. Other European countries with debt/GDP ratios of over 100% include Belgium, Portugal, and Italy. Weak economic growth could push any of them into a situation where the costs of refinancing become daunting. How would the Eurozone governments respond? Would they bail out another member? If so, would the terms differ from those imposed on Greece? Would European banks be able to pass the distressed debt on to their own governments?

In the long-term, the governments of the Eurozone face the dilemma of how to reconcile centralized rule-making with national sovereignty. The ECB, for example, has been granted supervisory oversight of the banks in the Eurozone. It will exercise direct oversight of over 100 banks deemed to be “significant,” while sharing responsibility with national supervisors for the remaining approximately 3,500 banks. The ECB has a Supervisory Board, supported by a Steering Committee, to plan and executes its supervisory tasks, which supposedly allows it to separate its bank supervisory function from its role in setting monetary policy. All these agencies and committees must work out their respective jurisdictions and responsibilities. Meanwhile, the European Commission, which oversees fiscal policies, faces requests for exemptions from its budget guidelines by governments with faltering growth. But if it shows flexibility in enforcing its own rules, it will be derided as weak and ineffective.

The IMF has its own set of challenges. The IMF was sharply criticized for its response to the wave of crises that struck emerging markets in the last 1990s and early 2000s, beginning with Mexico in 1994 and extending to Turkey and Argentina in 2001. Critics charged that the IMF was slow to respond to the rapid “sudden stops” of capital outflows that set off and exacerbated the crises. When the Fund did act, it attached too many conditions to its programs; moreover, these conditions were harsh and inappropriate for crises based on capital outflows.

The global financial crisis gave the IMF a second chance to demonstrate its crisis-management abilities (for a full account, see here). The Managing Director at the time, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, seized the opportunity to redeem the IMF ‘s reputation, as well as reestablish his own political career in France. The IMF lent quickly to its members, attached relatively few conditions to the loans, and allowed the use of fiscal measures to stabilize domestic economies. The result was less severe adjustment, the avoidance of excessive exchange rate movements and a resumption of economic growth. By the time the global economy recovered, the IMF had proven that it could respond in a flexible manner to a financial emergency.

The IMF’s response in 2010 to the Greek debt crisis was very different. The IMF’s loan to Greece was the first to a Eurozone member; moreover, the loan was much larger than any the IMF had extended before, whether measured by the total amount of credit or as a percentage of the borrowing country’s quota at the Fund. To make the loan, the IMF had to overlook one of it own guidelines for granting “exceptional access” by a member to Fund credit. Such loans were to be made only if the borrowing government’s debt would be sustainable in the medium-term. Greece’s debt burden did not pass this criterion, so the Fund justified its actions on the grounds that there was a risk of “international systemic spillovers.”

The IMF’s involvement in the Greek program was also unusual in another sense: the IMF’s contribution, as large as it was, was still smaller than that of the European governments. The IMF was, in effect, a “junior partner.” While it had worked with other governments before (such as the U.S. when it lent to Mexico in 1994-95), this was the first time that the IMF was not in a lead position. This may have initially made it reluctant to disagree with the other members of the troika.

The subsequent contraction in the Greek economy far exceeded the IMF’s forecasts. The IMF later admitted that it underestimated the size of the multipliers for the fiscal policies contained in the program in a paper co-authored by the head of the IMF’s Research Department, Olivier Blanchard (see also here). The failure to properly estimate the impact of these conditions calls into doubt the basic premises of the 2010 and 2012 programs.

More recently, the IMF has challenged its European partners over their projections for the Greek debt, as well as the budget and fiscal targets contained in the latest agreement. The Fund claims that the debt projections are much too optimistic. Greece’s debt will only be sustainable if there is debt relief on a much larger scale than the European governments have been willing to undertake. Moreover, the IMF states that it will not be part of any new programs for Greece if debt relief is not a component.

The public admission of error and the rebukes of the European governments will only partially restore the IMF’s reputation. The generous treatment of Greece as well as Ireland and Portugal reinforces the belief that the European countries and the U.S. control the IMF. The members of the European Union have a total quota share of almost one-third, much larger than their share of world GDP. This voting share combined with the U.S. quota gives these countries almost half of all the voting shares at the IMF. The need for a realignment of the quotas to give the emerging market nations a larger share has long been acknowledged, but approval of the reform measures is mired in the U.S. Congress.

Another aspect of European and U.S. control of the “Bretton Woods twins”—the IMF and the World Bank—has been their selection of the heads of these organizations. All the Managing Directors of the IMF have been Europeans, and until the appointment of Ms. Lagarde, European males. All the heads of the World Bank have been U.S. citizens. Ms. Lagarde’s term expires next July, and the pressure to name a non-European will be tremendous. How the Europeans and U.S. respond to this challenge will go a long way in determining whether these institutions will be shunted aside by the emerging market nations in favor of institutions that they can control.

The last challenge of the Greek crisis comes for the Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen has been explaining that a rise in the Fed’s policy rate, the Federal Funds rate, is likely to occur later this year. This forecast, however, is contingent on continued economic growth and favorable labor market conditions. These plans could be threatened by any financial volatility that followed a disruption in the latest Greece bailout.

The Federal Reserve is also aware that a rise in interest rates would affect the dollar/euro exchange rate. The euro, which has been depreciating, could fall lower when the Fed raises rates while the ECB keeps its refinancing rate at 0.05%. A further appreciation of the dollar would threaten U.S. exports, thus endangering a recovery.

The Fed also faces concerns about the broader impact of its policy initiatives on the world economy. The IMF is worried about how a rate rise would affect the global economy, and has urged the Fed to hold off on interest rate increases until 20016. Companies that borrowed in dollars through bonds and bank loans will be adversely affected by the combined effects of an interest rate rise and a dollar appreciation.

Greece’s GDP accounts for only 0.4% of world GDP and about 1.3% of the European Union’s total output. But the global financial crisis demonstrated how financial linkages across sectors and countries can disrupt economic activity no matter what their source. The response to these incidents by national and international authorities can risk global stability if they are based on self-interest and organizational agendas. Commitments to cooperation disappear quickly when national concerns are threatened.

(A Powerpoint version of this post is available here.)

Greek Tale(s)

Leave a reply

No matter what new twist the Greek debt crisis takes, there can be no question that it has been a catastrophe for that country and for the entire Eurozone. The Greek economy contracted by over a quarter during the period of 2007 to 2013, the largest decline of any advanced economy since 1950. The Greek unemployment rate last year was 26.5%, and its youth unemployment rate of 52.4% was matched only by Spain’s. But who is responsible for these conditions depends very much on which perspective you take.

From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the Greek saga is one of austere budget polices imposed on the Greek government by the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank in an attempt to collect payment on the government’s debt. The first program, enacted in 2010 in response to Greece’s escalating budget deficits, called for fiscal consolidation to be achieved through cuts in government spending and higher taxes. The improvement in the primary budget position (which excludes interest payments) between 2010-11 was 8% of GDP, above its target. But real GDP, which was expected to drop between 2009 and 2012 by 5.5%, actually declined by 17%. The debt/GDP level, which was supposed to fall to about 155% by 2013, actually rose to 170% because of the severity of the contraction in output. The IMF subsequently published a report criticizing its participation in the 2010 program, including overly optimistic macroeconomic assumptions.

To address the continuing rise in the debt ratio, a new adjustment program was inaugurated in 2012, which included a writedown of Greek debt by 75%. Further cuts in public spending were to be made, as well as improvements in tax collection. But economic conditions continued to deteriorate, which hindered the country’s ability to meet the fiscal goals. The Greek economy began to expand in 2014, and registered growth for the year of 0.8%. The public’s disenchantment with the country’s economic and political status, however, turned it against the usual ruling parties. The left-wing Syriza party took the lead position in the parliamentary elections held this past January, and the new Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, pledged to undo the policies of the troika. He and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis have been negotiating with the IMF, the ECB and the other member governments of the Eurozone in an attempt to obtain more debt reduction in return for implementing new adjustment measures.

The macroeconomic record, therefore, seems to support the position of those who view the Greek situation as one of imposed austerity to force payment of debt incurred in the past. Because of the continuing declines in GDP, the improvement in the debt/GDP ratio has remained an elusive (if not unattainable) goal. (For detailed comments on the impact of the macroeconomic policies undertaken in the 2010 and 2012 programs see Krugman here and Wren-Lewis here.)

Another perspective, however, brings an additional dimension to the analysis. From a public finance point of view, the successive Greek governments have been unable and/or unwilling to deal with budget positions—and in particular expenditures through the pension system—that are unsustainable. Pension expenditures as a proportion of GDP have been relatively high when compared to other European countries, and under the pre-2010 system were projected to reach almost 25% of GDP by 2050.  Workers were able to receive full benefits after 35 years of contributions, rather than 40 as in most other countries. Those in “strenuous occupations,” which were broadly defined, could retire after 25 years with full benefits.  The amount that a retiree received was based on the last year of salary rather than career earnings, and there were extra monthly payments at Christmas and Easter. The administration of the system, split among over 100 agencies, was a bureaucratic nightmare.

Much of this has been changed. The minimum retirement age has been raised, the number of years needed for full benefits is now 40, and the calculation of benefits changed so as to be less generous. But some fear that the changes have not been sufficient, particularly if older workers are “sheltered” from the changes.

Moreover, government pensions are important to a wide number of people. The old-age dependency ratio is around 30%, one of the highest in Europe. The contraction in the Greek economy means that the pension is sometimes the sole income payment received by a family. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the pension system is seen as a “red line” which can not be crossed any further in Greece.

The challenge, therefore, is for the government to establish its finances on a sound footing without further damaging the fragile economy. This will call for some compromises on both sides. The IMF’s Olivier Blanchard has called for the Greek government “to offer truly credible measures“ to attain the targets for the budget, while showing its commitment to a limited set of reforms, particularly with pensions. But he also asks the European creditors to offer debt relief, either through rescheduling or a further “haircut.” Other proposals have been made (see here) that also attempt to satisfy the need to restructure the government’s finances while offering the Greek people a way to escape their suffering. There may be a strategy that allows Greece to reestablish itself on a new financial footing. But if the European governments insist that Greece must also pay back all its outstanding debt, then there is only one possible ending for this saga, and it will not be a happy one.

Martin Wolf’s Warning

Leave a reply

It is time for the 2014 Globie—a (somewhat fictitious) prize I award once a year to a book that deserves recognition for its treatment of the consequences of globalization. (Previous winners can be found here.) The financial turmoil of the last week makes this year’s award-winner particularly appropriate: Martin Wolf for The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned–and Have Still to Learn–from the Financial Crisis. Wolf, a distinguished writer for the Financial Times, once viewed globalization as a positive force that enhanced welfare. But the events of the last few years have changed his views of financial markets and institutions. He now views financial flows as inherently susceptible to the occurrence of crises. And Wolf’s intellectual evolution leaves him deeply concerned about the consequences of financial globalization.

Part I of the book deals with the “shocks” to the global economy. Wolf begins in the U.S. with the crisis of 2008-09 and the relatively weak recovery. He shares the view of Richard Koo of Nomura Research that this was a “balance sheet recession,” with the private sector seeking to shed the debt it had built up during the pre-crisis period. The cutback in private sector spending was initially matched by an increase in the government’s fiscal deficit, which arose as expenditures on unemployment benefits and other programs grew and revenues fell. The rise in the fiscal deficit was particularly appropriate as the “liquidity trap” limited the downward fall of interest rates and the expansionary effects of monetary policy. However, the political acceptance of deficits and debts ended prematurely in 2010, and the recovery has not been as robust as it needs to be.

Wolf then turns to the Eurozone, which experienced its shift towards fiscal austerity after the crisis in Greece erupted. Wolf views the monetary union as “incomplete and imperfect.” On the one hand, its members have sovereign powers that include issuing debt; on the other hand, they do not have the risk-sharing mechanisms that a federal union possesses. When the capital flows that had fed housing bubbles in Spain and Ireland and financed fiscal deficits in Greece and Portugal ended, the borrowing countries were encumbered with  the debt they had accumulated either directly through fiscal borrowing or indirectly as they bailed out their domestic banks. Those increases in public  debt were seen by Germany and others as proof that the crises were due to fiscal excess, which had to be met by fiscal austerity. But Wolf claims that the German view “…was an effort at self-exculpation: as the Eurozone’s largest supplier of surplus capital, its private sector bore substantial responsibility for the excesses that led to the crisis.”

After surveying the relartvely more benign experience of the emerging and developing countries during the crisis, Wolf turns to the “shifts” that led to the breakdown of the financial system. These include the liberalization of market forces, particularly finance; technological change, which speeded up the integration of markets and financial markets; and ageing, which transformed the savings-investment balance in high-income countries. These led to an increase in financial fragility that made financial markets unstable and crises endemic. The changes took place in a global economy where global savings where channeled from oil-exporters and Asian economies, particularly China, to the U.S., thus reinforcing the credit boom.

The last section of the book deals with solutions to the crises. Wolf is ready to consider “radical reform,” which includes higher capital ratios for the banks and macroprudential policies that seek to achieve both asset market and macroeconomic stability. Policies to rebalance the global economy include encouraging less risky forms of finance, increasing insurance against external shocks, and moving towards a global reserve asset. The steps needed to assure the continued existence of the euro start with a mechanism to assure symmetrical adjustment across the Eurozone, debt restructuring, and a banking union.

None of these measures will be easy to implement. But Wolf’s willingness to discuss them is a sign of how much the crisis has unsettled those who thought they understood the risks of financial globalization. Wolf attributes the responsibility for the crisis to “Western elites,” who misunderstood the consequences of financial liberalization, allowed democracy to be weakened, and in the case of the Eurozone, imposed a system without accountability. The loss in public confidence, he writes, reduces trust in domestic legitimacy.

The title of the last chapter, “Fire Next Time,” is taken from James Baldwin’s book of the same name, which in turn borrowed from an African-American spiritual: “God gave Noah the rainbow sign, no more water but fire next time.” Wolf warns that the next global economic crisis “could end in the fire.” While he  does not explicitly explain what this fire will be, he mentions in the preface that his father was a Jewish refugee from Austria in the 1930s, and the historical reference is clear. At a time when right-wing parties are ascendant in Europe, Wolf’s warning is a sober reminder that unsettled economic circumstances can lead to political extremism and instability.