The U.S. came out of World War II with the largest economy and a predominant place in the post-WW II international financial order. It was the only nation that could provide the international leadership that Charles Kindleberger wrote was necessary to avoid catastrophic events such as the Great Depression of the 1930s. But in return for stability the U.S. also received a degree of control, and that legacy is under attack today.
American financial hegemony evolved in the years following the end of WW II. Capital flows were severely regulated under the Bretton Woods regime so that national governments could maintain autonomy over national monetary policy and also to avoid destabilizing speculation. But as international trade picked up the dollar served as a vehicle currency, which led to the U.S. serving in the role of what Emile Despres, Charles Kindleberger and Walter Salant called the “world’s banker.”
In 1971 President Richard Nixon revoked the U.S. pledge to accept dollars from foreign central banks in exchange for gold. But the end of this linkage did not diminish the use of dollars as an international reserve currency. Private capital flows continued to expand as governments deregulated their capital accounts and the dollar had a central role in the growing international financial markets.
Andrew Sobel identified the attributes of a financial hegemon in Birth of Hegemony. These include large and liquid capital markets and openness to foreign capital flows. In addition, Kindleberger in his account of the role of an international financial leader in The World In Depression specifically referred to the need for international liquidity. U.S. government actions, including those of the Federal Reserve, have been consistent with these principles (see here). Capital flows are largely unregulated, while the Federal Reserve has used swap agreements to provide dollars to foreign central banks which in turn could use them to maintain dollar funding in foreign financial markets.
Consequently, while other currencies such as the euro and the Japanese yen have been considered as possible rivals for the dollar, no single viable alternative has emerged. But Serkan Arslanap of the IMF, Barry Eichengreen of UC-Berkeley and Chima Simpson-Bell, also of the IMF, have shown in their IMF working paper, “The Stealth Erosion of Dollar Dominance: Active Diversifiers and the Rise of Nontraditional Reserve Currencies,” that the composition of international reserves has shifted away from the dollar over time. This decline has been offset by a rise in what they call nontraditional currencies, including the Chinese renminbi but also the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, and the Swiss franc.
Two recent developments have reopened the question of the continued central role of the dollar. The first is the seizure of more than $300 billion of foreign currency assets of the Russian central bank in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This seizure, while not unprecedented, raises legal and political questions. To date the U.S. and its European allies have resisted confiscating these funds to assist the Ukrainian government, but the pressure to do so will mount as the war continues. The confiscation of the Russian central bank’s assets certainly causes other foreign central banks to reassess the composition of their foreign exchange holdings. Moreover, the People’s Bank of China has established its own swap lines to foreign central banks.
The second event is the debate that took place within the U.S. over the debt ceiling. This political theater was resolved, but the opposition of some Republican legislators to any increase in the U.S. Treasury’s borrowing authority triggered a reassessment of whether U.S. Treasury bonds are truly “safe assets.” When governments default on their debt, it usually is because economic conditions have curbed their ability to raise funds through domestic taxes or to roll over their debt. The U.S. situation is different: the government faced a self-inflicted attempt to force the Treasury into a position where it might not have made payments on its debt. Several bank failures had already, according to the IMF, shown the extent of U.S. financial fragility, and a debt default would have severely escalated the volatility.
Either of these events—the confiscation of Russian assets or the threat of a failure to raise the U.S. debt ceiling—is probably sufficient to increase the pace of currency diversification in central bank reserves. But replacing the U.S. dollar in the international financial system will be a more complicated task. First, as Michael Pettis has observed, the global role of the dollar allows the U.S. to offset the savings imbalances that exist in countries such as China, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. If the U.S. did not offset the current account surpluses of those and other countries, then either they would have to find a substitute or increase their domestic demand.
Second, international capital markets still deal in dollars. Bafundi Maronoti of the Bank for International Settlements points out in his examination of the international role of the dollar in the December 2022 issue of the BIS Quarterly Review that “About half of all international debt securities and cross-border loans issued in these offshore funding markets are denominated in USD.” It is difficult to imagine how any other currency could take the place of the dollar in these markets.
There are legitimate questions, therefore, about the dominance of the U.S. dollar in international finance. Central banks will continue to diversify the currency denominations of their foreign exchange holdings. But the dollar’s central role in global financial flows will not be easily replaced.